



HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL
Draft Report: Preventing Targeted Violence Against
Faith-Based Communities

DRAFT
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This publication is presented on behalf of the Homeland Security Advisory Council, Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) Subcommittee for the Prevention of Targeted Violence Against Faith-based Organizations, Co-Chaired by General John R. Allen, USMC (Ret.) President, The Brookings Institution and Paul Goldenberg, President and CEO, Cardinal Point Strategies, LLC to the (A) Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, Chad F. Wolf.

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**SUBCOMMITTEE FOR THE PREVENTION OF TARGETED VIOLENCE AGAINST
FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS**

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Responding to a 20 MAY 2019 letter from the Acting Secretary for Homeland Security, the Homeland Security Advisory Council Subcommittee on Preventing Targeted Violence Against Faith-based Communities responded to four specific taskings. This Executive Summary lays out the principal findings and recommendations of the Subcommittee.

Top Findings and Recommendations

1. Central Point of Contact in DHS for Faith-Based Organizations (FBOs)

Finding: There should be a central point of contact designated within DHS for matters associated with the security of faith-based organizations.

Recommendations:

- DHS designate a position at the Assistant Secretary level or higher to serve as a Director who will oversee and lead all the Department's faith-based programs and represent the Department within the Interagency.
- DHS recommend to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs the creation of an FBO working group dedicated to securing houses of worship, to be convened at the National Security Council to support policy formulation within the Interagency and across the Federal government.

2. Proactive Training for Faith-Based Communities

Finding: There is not a consistent approach to preparing and training FBOs for the security of their communities.

Recommendation:

- DHS take lead, in conjunction with State and local officials, in establishing a package approach to security of FBOs.

3. FBO Coordination with Law Enforcement

Finding: The relationships between state and local law enforcement and the FBOs are very "unlevel" across the country, especially outside urban areas.

Recommendations:

- DHS encourage FBOs to work with local police and first responder communities to develop real-time information sharing systems.
- DHS, working with State officials, seek to provide local law enforcement with additional earmarked funding to create or expand outreach and connectivity with FBOs, especially in rural areas.

4. Protective Security Advisors (PSAs)

Finding: The role of PSAs must be enhanced.

Recommendation:

- DHS determine specific requirements for PSAs, and if necessary, request additional sustained funding from Congress to hire, train, and increase the actual numbers of PSAs as needed for the security of the FBOs.

5. Fusion Center Outreach to FBOs

Finding: Fusion Centers are not well known or understood and are not organized in the same manner across the country.

Recommendations:

- DHS work with State and local officials to ensure Fusion Centers receive the same level of training and are similarly organized around the guiding principle of proactive outreach to every house of worship within a Fusion Center's area of responsibility.
- DHS, with State and local officials, reinforce the expectation that Fusion Centers and the PSAs are to be considered a team, and their work is inextricably linked.
- DHS conduct an evaluation of Fusion Centers to determine their effectiveness in promoting FBO security, and from that evaluation identify areas needing improvement.
- DHS demonstrate transparency in the procedures and guidelines of Fusion Centers in order to guarantee privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties for FBOs and their communities.

6. Defining the Domestic Terrorism Threat

Finding: Members of law enforcement have cited the absence of a domestic terrorism statute as hampering their efforts to track and prosecute domestic terrorist groups.

Recommendation:

- Congress, working with DHS and the Department of Justice, encourage cooperation between Federal, State, local, and Tribal law enforcement to monitor, understand, investigate, and prosecute acts of domestic terrorism through intelligence sharing requirements.
- Congress work with DHS and DOJ to pass a statute defining such acts and providing funds for monitoring the acts can assist law enforcement in ordering its priorities without compromising constitutional values.


7. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Grants

Finding: The FEMA Nonprofit Security Grant Program is a vital source of funding for FBOs to bolster their security, but the funding level is insufficient, and the application process is complex, opaque, and long.

Recommendations:

- DHS seek additional funding from Congress to provide increased security grant money for FBOs.
- DHS establish an office dedicated to assisting applicants, particularly from small or poorly staffed FBOs, in order to navigate the complexities of the Federal grants process.
 - To avoid any potential conflicts of interest, this office of grant application assistance should be separate from any of the grant-awarding arms of DHS and its staff should play no role in reviewing or awarding grants.
- DHS give the new Director responsibility for the Nonprofit Security Grant Program.

INTRODUCTION



INTRODUCTION: THE ACTING SECRETARY’S TASKING AND THE SUBCOMMITTEE’S PROCESS

In many respects, the United States and the American social fabric have traditionally rested upon the stability and the sense of community of our faith-based organizations and communities. And while the United States has scrupulously guarded the rights of all Americans to worship freely, it has also fiercely resisted any appearance, real or perceived, as favoring one faith over another.

This has been complemented by an equally important, and until recently, carefully observed tradition of never condemning or criticizing any particular faith group. The tradition of the separation of church and state has served well the United States, its people. The American secular democracy has grown into maturity alongside a diverse and vibrant faith-based community. While separate, they were in many ways complementary of each other, underwriting both a commitment to the principles of the American Constitution and to the spiritual strength of American citizenry and the society. In the last several years, America has experienced an increase in targeted violence against our faith-based communities and organizations. Houses of worship and their congregants, and individuals with a particular faith identity, have been terrorized and, in some cases, attacked ruthlessly and injured or brutally murdered.

On May 20, 2019, in a response to “recent attacks against synagogues, churches, temples, and mosques,” then-Acting Secretary of Homeland Security Kevin McAleenan requested that the Homeland Security Advisory Council convene a Subcommittee “focused on the security of faith-based organizations across the country.” The Acting Secretary charged the Subcommittee with focusing on three specific areas referred to in this report as taskings: 1) “ensuring two-way information flows between DHS and faith-based organizations”; 2) “evaluating preparedness and protective efforts for the faith community,” including whether “faith-based organizations have the resources and training needed to ensure protective measures are put in place and exercised on a routine basis”; and 3) “evaluating the role the faith-based community could/should have in locally-based prevention efforts” The former Acting Secretary requested an interim report within 90 days of the Subcommittee’s formation.

In the midst of our work, and at a public hearing in Jackson, Mississippi, the Acting Secretary added a fourth tasking specifically requesting that the Subcommittee “[e]valuate the adverse impacts that

violent extremists and domestic terrorists, including those inspired by white supremacy¹ ideologies, have on faith-based and other vulnerable communities.”

In conducting its research and formulating its findings and recommendations, the Subcommittee has been assisted ably by Department of Homeland Security (DHS) staff, which has arranged internal briefings from the Office of Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, the United States Secret Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, state and local law enforcement, community leaders, and experts from across the nation. DHS staff also coordinated several site visits described below.

The Subcommittee has also consulted the work of two previous Homeland Security Advisory Council subcommittees that were given similar taskings in 2012 and 2014. Links to those two reports can be found in Appendix 3. Many of those reports’ recommendations remain relevant to this Subcommittee’s conclusions. There is no evidence any of the recommendations were acted upon. With this the third report of this nature, and in view of the urgency of our moment, and the imprimatur of this Subcommittee, this report should be converted into an implementation plan at the earliest possible moment for the systematic adoption of the actionable recommendations. Given the strong Congressional interest in this work, periodic DHS reporting to Congress on the accomplishment of these recommendations is a potential outcome of this report.

In order to evaluate the status and viability of previous and contemporaneous recommendations, as well as to identify and assess current best practices that may be employed in different locations, the Subcommittee conducted field visits in places as diverse in geography and demography as Montana, Louisiana, Mississippi, Minnesota, California, Wisconsin, and New Jersey. The Subcommittee interviewed victims of violence, as well as local faith leaders and state and local first responders. Those perspectives ground this Subcommittee’s findings and conclusions in real-world realities that make its recommendations readily actionable and achievable.

¹ The 2018 DHS Lexicon defines a *white supremacist extremist* as a group or person who facilitate or engage in acts of unlawful violence directed at the Federal Government, ethnic minorities, or Jewish persons in support of their belief that Caucasians are intellectually and morally superior to other races and their perception that the government is controlled by Jewish persons.

The DHS Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence published in 2019 states that “*White supremacist violent extremism*, one type of racially- and ethnically-motivated violent extremism, is one of the most potent forces driving domestic terrorism. Lone attackers, as opposed to cells or organizations, generally perpetrate these kinds of attacks. But they are also part of a broader movement. White supremacist violent extremists’ outlook can generally be characterized by hatred for immigrants and ethnic minorities, often combining these prejudices with virulent anti-Semitism or anti-Muslim views.”

Finally, the Subcommittee's work has been informed fundamentally by the then-Acting Secretary's recent adoption of the *Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence*. Drawing on this document, this Subcommittee's recommendations are intended to advance the goals set forth in the *Strategic Framework*, namely, to "[u]nderstand the evolving terrorism and targeted violence threat environment, and support partners in the homeland security enterprise through this specialized knowledge"; "[p]revent terrorism and targeted violence"; and "[e]nhance U.S. infrastructure protections and community preparedness." What follows is the Subcommittee's research across the four taskings. Each of the four sections is organized with an introduction, key findings, and recommendations. A final section offers the conclusions of the Subcommittee.

Tasking One – Ensuring two-way information flows between DHS and faith-based organizations (e.g. Do faith-based organizations have routine access to information and assessments about domestic violent extremist movements and the threats they espouse against faith-based organizations? What additional information would be of assistance in their security efforts? Do faith-based organizations receive timely notification of specific and credible threats to their organizations?).

Tasking Two – Evaluating preparedness and protective efforts for the faith community. (e.g., Do faith-based organizations have the resources and training needed to ensure protective measures are put in place and exercised on a routine basis? If not, what is the best way to close the gap? Are there additional measures beyond traditional protective efforts- such as enhanced understanding of behavioral indicators,² knowing the simple steps that can be taken during an incident to increase the chances of survival, and actions that should be considered following an incident to quickly reconstitute services- that can be better conveyed to the community to enhance security in a manner that maintains the integrity of places of worship while sustaining a welcoming environment that allows for peaceful congregation?)

Tasking Three – Evaluating the role the faith-community could/should have in locally-based prevention efforts. (e.g., Are there aspects of the current trend of the racially motivated violence, which the faith community can address more effectively than the government or other parts of society?)

Tasking Four – Evaluate the adverse impacts that violent extremists and domestic terrorists, including those inspired by violent white supremacy ideologies, have on faith-based and other vulnerable communities. Explore the key factors (such as social media and other influencers) that violent extremists are exploiting to promote, promulgate, and in some cases, galvanize violent attacks against faith-based organizations. What more can be done by the Department to prevent these attacks and increase community resistance to mobilization to violence, and what are the best practices and lessons learned for consideration?

² The Subcommittee believes that moving away from racial profiling is imperative to build trust with FBOs. Hence this tasking is intended to look at behavior instead of a person's ethnic or religious background.

Ensuring Two-Way Information Flows Between the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and Faith-Based Organizations

Tasking One – Ensuring two-way information flows between DHS and faith-based organizations (e.g. Do faith-based organizations have routine access to information and assessments about domestic violent extremist movements and the threats they espouse against faith-based organizations? What additional information would be of assistance in their security efforts? Do faith-based organizations receive timely notification of specific and credible threats to their organizations?).

Introduction

During the Subcommittee’s site visits to houses of worship across the nation, it became apparent that Faith-Based Organizations (FBOs) largely do not have consistent access to timely actionable information and assessments related to domestic violence movements or trends, and how those threats affect their houses of worship and local communities. As one pastor of a small Baptist church in rural Opelousas, Louisiana stated, “There is a sense of paranoia that information is not being shared with the churches.” This sense of paranoia was palpable in every house of worship we visited. Many suffered from the trauma of personally experiencing an attack on their congregation, or of witnessing attacks on other places of worship. Adding to anxiety among those in faith-based communities is the sense that the government does not keep them informed of current threats.

For meaningful two-way information sharing to occur and be sustained between the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the faith-based community, it must be based upon agreed standard operating procedures and relationships where there is trust and respect.

It is every government’s duty to secure conditions of peace, justice, and liberty in which people of faith may exercise their religious freedoms without oppression and fear. We call upon our leaders to guarantee freedom of thought and conscience while at the same time uphold the freedoms enumerated in the Bill of Rights and U.S. Constitution to practice and propagate religion.

As members of the Subcommittee, we share a deep concern for all who have been unjustly treated, experienced loss of life, or are currently suffering exercising those freedoms. When one faith community, regardless of religious affiliation, is harmed, we all are harmed. We share a common concern for protecting privacy, liberty, and reject privacy infringement from any source. We value security-related incident transparency and more information is appreciated rather than less. In order to best serve America’s faith communities, we need information delivered in a simple manner with clear timely calls to action based upon evidence. We, as the Subcommittee, call upon governments at all levels to uphold the rights of all faith-based organizations to freely and voluntarily adopt security recommendations without the force of compliance unless compliance is mandatory by law.

Findings, Background, and Recommendations

Central Point of Contact in DHS for FBOs

Findings:

- There is currently no single point of contact at DHS through which all relevant government programs can be coordinated and offered to faith-based communities.
- There is need for a position at the National Security Council to support policy development related to FBO security across the Interagency and the Federal government.

Background:

In, now, three similar reports, subcommittees have determined the responsibilities of DHS offices for the FBOs are distributed across the department with no single point of entry or exit for matters associated with or related to the faith community. In 2014, a prior HSAC Subcommittee, similarly constituted, recommended that “The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) should designate a singular point of contact between DHS and faith-based organizations (FBOs) for security-related issues.” This recommendation was also made in 2012 and is reaffirmed in 2019. Every site we visited highlighted the need for such a point of contact within DHS to reduce confusion. The designation of a single point of contact is perhaps the single most important recommendation we will make; the absence of such a point of contact has prevented a coherent internal departmental approach to these matters and coherent external connectivity to the faith-based communities.

The DHS Point of Contact (POC) should be responsible for evaluating the effectiveness and public awareness of all programs affecting the faith-based organizations and should produce an annual report assessing the various programs’ effectiveness. Accountability has been lacking; it is essential. The single point of contact should host a website on the DHS platform that consolidates all the information and programs relevant to faith-based communities.

As a corollary to the establishment of a single point of contact, we recommend that DHS reconstitute the HSAC’s Faith-Based Advisory Council to advise the Secretary and the POC on evolving needs and to report on the effectiveness of government programs. The 2012 recommendation was to continue the operations of the Subcommittee; the Subcommittee was, however, discontinued by the HSAC Executive Director in coordination with the Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security and other senior DHS leadership on July 12, 2016.

The absence of coordination within DHS is replicated throughout the Federal government and has engendered confusion not just within the faith-based communities but also within the government agencies themselves. We believe the urgency of the issue and the absence of coordination requires the creation of an interagency working group focused on the security of houses of worship, to be convened by the National Security Council. The DHS POC should be a member of the working group.

Recommendations:

- DHS designate an individual at the Assistant Secretary level or higher to serve as a Director who will oversee and lead all the Department's faith-based programs. The office of this individual should be organized, funded, and staffed to be able to work across the DHS enterprise at a senior level.
- This senior leader serve as the single point of contact within the Department for the faith-based community on all security-related issues.
- DHS recommend to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs the creation of an interagency working group dedicated to securing houses of worship, to be convened at the NSC to support policy formulation across the Interagency and the Federal government.
- DHS continue, under this new leadership position, to develop and enhance relationships and bi-directional communication with FBOs, Protective Security Advisors, Fusion Center³ Personnel, as well as state, local and tribal law enforcement to further homeland security information sharing. [Note: this was a 2014 report recommendation that was never implemented. The Subcommittee reaffirms its validity in 2019.]

Fusion Center Outreach to FBOs

Findings:

There is considerable confusion about the role and function of Fusion Centers, particularly regarding their relevance to faith-based organizations. As such, Fusion Centers are not well known or understood by FBOs. Nationally, Fusion Centers vary widely in their organization and generally lack necessary standardization in how threat information is disseminated and to whom. The effectiveness of Fusion Centers in promoting the security of FBOs needs to be evaluated and standardized nationally.

Background:

Fusion Centers were designed to promote information sharing at the Federal level between agencies such as DHS, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), state, local, and tribal law enforcement. Fusion Centers do an excellent job of sharing real-time threat information with law enforcement and with pre-vetted private sector critical infrastructure partners such as energy, financial, water, etc. However, Fusion Centers remain a mystery and at times are problematic to many local faith-based communities, particularly in rural areas across the U.S. Many faith communities view Fusion Centers with suspicion, which deters individuals from reporting suspicious activity. As one faith leader in Minnesota told the Subcommittee, "They [Fusion Centers] are code for "spy center" here."

Currently, most faith-based institutions do not receive any official threat information from Fusion Centers. Fusion Center staff need to be trained to better understand the needs of FBO communities and the nature of the threats. Fusion Centers need to conduct proactive outreach to faith-based

³ physical or logical facility, encompassing all necessary infrastructure required to facilitate nationwide information-sharing between one or more Federal, state, and/or local law enforcement entities, dedicated to the integration of multiple diverse data sources within a defined functional domain. Source: DHS Lexicon, October 2018.

communities to identify and train individuals within these organizations and to better understand how to receive, analyze and respond to such information post transmittal.

Not all Fusion Centers proactively engage the faith-based community. However, New Jersey offers an excellent model for other Fusion Centers to follow. The New Jersey Office of Homeland Security (NJOHSP) established an Interfaith Advisory Council (IAC)⁴ in 2012. This IAC is chaired by the State Director of Homeland Security and maintains 3,000 active members across all religions. The Council meets quarterly and provides a platform for faith community members and leaders and representatives from the NJ Office of the Attorney General, NJ State Police, FBI, local law enforcement, and other entities. NJOHSP also regularly shares timely information with the faith-based community. The office develops unclassified “multi-faith intelligence resources” which are developed in response to emerging threats or incidents occurring in NJ, nationally, or abroad. The intelligence reports are disseminated to the 3,000 members of the IAC.

In 2012, the prior HSAC Subcommittee recommended that DHS “should work with Fusion Centers and FBOs to educate each other on respective roles and responsibilities,” providing “common scenario” approaches and joint training with FBO liaisons. That mutual education has not occurred in any uniform manner, although the need for it remains acute. At one of our meetings in Minnesota, an imam said to the Fusion Center representative; “How would I know that you actually exist?” Accordingly, we reaffirm the recommendation that Fusion Centers work more closely with faith-based organizations. The HSAC further recommended that DHS should “work with Federal partners to create a Fusion Center manual for collaborating with FBOs that further integrates Federal, state, and local law enforcement best practices.” If such a manual has been produced, we have not seen it, and recommend that its existence be publicized to the affected faith communities. If it has not been produced, we recommend that its production be a priority of the single point of contact at the Department. Finally, we agree with the 2012 recommendation that DHS should include FBO representatives in planning for the National Fusion Center Annual Training.

We also reaffirm the HSAC’s 2012 recommendation that DHS “assign points of contact in each Fusion Center to work with their state and local faith communities.” If Fusion Center POCs are required to work in tandem with PSAs, much local confusion will be improved.

Recommendations:

- DHS work with State and local officials to ensure Fusion Centers receive the same level of training and are similarly organized around the guiding principle of aggressive outreach to every house of worship within a Fusion Center’s area of responsibility.
- DHS, with State and local officials, reinforce the expectation that Fusion Centers and the PSAs are to be considered a team, and that their work is inextricably linked.
- DHS demonstrate transparency in the procedures and guidelines of Fusion Centers in order to guarantee privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties for FBOs and their communities.
- DHS evaluate Fusion Centers to determine effectiveness in promoting FBO security and from that

⁴ <https://www.njhomelandsecurity.gov/interfaith>

evaluation identify areas needing improvement.

Invest in a Two-Way Information Sharing Portal for FBOs

Finding:

That the dedicated Faith-Based Community Portal of the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN)⁵ needs to be reestablished at DHS as the principal means of information sharing with and for the FBO. Further, the HSIN Faith-Based Portal in its former design was seldom used by FBO communities, because the system was not considered user-friendly and was difficult to navigate.

Background:

There is a sense among faith communities that the flow of information is a “one-way street.” Particularly among the Muslim community in Minnesota, individuals expressed frustration that they frequently report suspicious activity to Fusion Centers or other Federal entities, but seldom receive a follow-up or threat information. This concern was echoed by the Jewish community in Whitefish, Montana and by the Christian community in Opelousas, Louisiana. Indeed, the need for a “formal two-way process to share homeland security information” was identified by the HSAC Subcommittee in 2012 and remains a need in 2019. Very few FBOs are aware of HSIN, which until 2018 included a dedicated portal and security section for faith-based communities. In 2018, inexplicably to the faith-based community, DHS stopped populating this faith-based portal with information, and usage by FBOs ceased.

During the Subcommittee’s site visits, faith community members indicated that the flow of information was mostly one-way: FBOs report suspicious activity to Fusion Centers, law enforcement, and other entities, but rarely receive threat information back from these sources. The Subcommittee believes that the current HSIN, if staffed appropriately and adequately publicized to the faith-based communities, could serve as the needed two-way information sharing portal and could be a valuable platform for communities of faith.

The Subcommittee observed faith communities receive threat information from a variety of different sources besides HSIN. Some FBOs utilized the FBI tool InfraGard, while others received emailed threat alerts from their Fusion Center. The multitude of platforms available is confusing, and the vetting process which individuals must undergo in order to gain access to these platforms can be a hindrance to those who are suspicious of government

The Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office in Minnesota uses an online platform called SHIELD, which was developed by the New York Police Department to encourage a two-way flow of information and increase awareness of the threat landscape. The program allows vetted individuals from the private

⁵ DHS-managed national secure and trusted web-based portal for information sharing and collaboration among federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, private sector, and international partners engaged in the homeland security mission. Source: DHS Lexicon, October 2018.

sector and the community to share information or photos of suspicious activity and threat information. For example, a user shared a photo of an anti-Semitic symbol found in a public space, allowing law enforcement and private sector users to be aware of the incident.

While online platforms are likely the most efficient and effective method of information sharing, various methods will suit different communities. For example, a member of the Sikh community in Wisconsin described the process by which he calls the other Sikh temples and Muslim mosques in the surrounding area upon becoming aware of any threats or suspicious activity. Many Christian communities in Louisiana and Mississippi employ a similar relationship-orientated method of disseminating threat information within their faith community.

Recommendations:

- DHS conduct a top-down review of its faith-based information production and sharing processes. Important information and assessments, including information about the threat of domestic terrorism, are not being received by FBOs in a timely and consistent manner.
- DHS re-invest in the HSIN Faith-Based Portal as a two-way information sharing portal that vetted members of the faith community can access to retrieve and share important information related to domestic terrorism⁶ and targeted violence.⁷ This should include an application for mobile devices.
- DHS advertise this portal to FBOs across the country, ensuring it is consistently populated with relevant, timely, actionable documents, and is continuously supported by DHS personnel.
- DHS redesign HSIN Faith-Based Portal access to permit FBO easier entrée into the system and include a “one-stop shop” where FBOs can access or learn about all relevant Federal, state, and local resources.

⁶ The 2018 DHS Lexicon defines *domestic terrorism* as “an act of unlawful violence that is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources committed by a group or person based and operating entirely within the United States or its territories without direction or inspiration from a foreign terrorist group.”

The 2019 DHS Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence expands upon the 2018 Lexicon definition. The document defines *domestic terrorism* as “an act of unlawful violence, or a threat of force or violence, that is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources, and is intended to effect societal, political, or other change, committed by a group or person based and operating entirely within the United States or its territories. Unlike HVEs, domestic terrorists are not inspired by a foreign terrorist group. It should be noted that many groups and individuals defined as “domestic terrorists” are becoming increasingly transnational in outlook and activities. The current label we employ to describe them, which comes from the Federal Government’s lexicon, should not obscure this reality.”

⁷ *Targeted violence* refers to any incident of violence that implicates homeland security and/or U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) activities, and in which a known or knowable attacker selects a particular target prior to the violent attack. Source: 2019 DHS Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence.

Develop a Proactive Messaging Campaign Targeting FBOs

Finding:

DHS messaging about security and preparedness is not adequately reaching faith communities.

Background:

It is necessary for DHS to consider proper presentation of information. The government must differentiate between messaging intended to inform, alert, and/or warn; such communications should be accompanied with proper instructions for the appropriate response behavior given the type and level of threat in question. Preparedness information must be more detailed. The public should be provided with information on threat-specific courses of action and detailed emergency preparedness information should be made available in multiple languages and distributed to non-English speakers and recent immigrants.

Recommendations:

- DHS develop and present annual FBO security best practice awards on the 9/11 Day of Service and Remembrance.
- DHS and its “If You See Something, Say Something” campaign work together with all interested faith-based organizations to prepare a coordinated campaign and toolkit that is similar to what was prepared for the business community and academic institutions.
- DHS work with FBOs to develop a comprehensive faith-based media plan that includes publishing joint Public Service Announcements and engaging in all forms of media to accelerate the dissemination of relevant FBO centric information, including interviews on counter-messaging and prevention topics with calls to action on topics such as domestic terrorism.

Create a Faith-Based Security Advisory Council

Finding:

An external standing oversight body is necessary for the implementation of the results of this and future studies.

At this time, neither DHS nor any other Federal agency supports or coordinates with any independent faith-based body for the purpose of encouraging communication and collaboration between and among government agencies, specifically DHS, and the nation’s faith-based communities and organizations to strengthen the goodwill between DHS and faith-based groups. This is critical in order to keep religious communities secure.

Background:

As discussed on page 14, this Subcommittee conducted a site visit to the New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness, which runs an Interfaith Advisory Council.⁸ Established in 2012, this IAC is chaired by the Director of Homeland Security and maintains 3,000 active members

⁸ For more information about NJOHSP’s IAC, please see this brochure:
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/54d79f88e4b0db3478a04405/t/5dc0575268f3667fd789c506/1572886354809/interfaith_advisory_council_trifold_%2811-04-2019%29.pdf

across all religions. The Council meets quarterly and provides a platform for faith community members and leaders and representatives from the NJ Office of the Attorney General, NJ State Police, FBI, local law enforcement, and other entities.

Development of an independent DHS-recognized Faith-Based Security Advisory Council based on New Jersey's IAC model will encourage communication and collaboration between and among government agencies, and specifically DHS, and the nation's faith-based communities and organizations. The Council, facilitated by a University or Non-Governmental Organization, would work to open lines of communication and build trust between and among government agencies and faith-based organizations on behalf of their respective religious communities. This collaboration and the sharing of information would allow for FBOs to share pertinent information with government officials and amongst themselves regarding security issues impacting their communities. The Council could provide a trusted representative and collaborative forum and vehicle to address homeland security issues, discuss and address community issues of concern, facilitate training, and build bridges between faith-based constituencies and their law enforcement partners.

Recommendation:

- DHS create a permanent, standing Faith-Based Security Advisory Council based on the model of the New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness' Interfaith Advisory Council.

This will be key to the successful sustainability and ongoing effectiveness of homeland security efforts recommended by this and future subcommittees.

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Evaluating Preparedness and Protective Efforts for the Faith Community

Tasking Two - Evaluating preparedness and protective efforts for the faith community. (e.g., Do faith-based organizations have the resources and training needed to ensure protective measures are put in place and exercised on a routine basis? If not, what is the best way to close the gap?

Are there additional measures beyond traditional protective efforts- such as enhanced understanding of behavioral indicators, knowing the simple steps that can be taken during an incident to increase the chances of survival, and actions that should be considered following an incident to quickly reconstitute services- that can be better conveyed to the community to enhance security in a manner that maintains the integrity of places of worship while sustaining a welcoming environment that allows for peaceful congregation?)

Introduction

Faith-based organizations come in a variety of shapes and sizes supporting many different forms of belief. From temples to synagogues, cathedrals to tabernacles, storefronts to living rooms, they are as diverse as America itself; their variety itself attests that the free exercise of religious faith is an indispensable component of American freedom.

The rise of extremist violence, however, has placed that freedom under significant stress. The mass shootings in an African-American church in Charleston, South Carolina, in synagogues in Pittsburgh and San Diego, the Baptist church shooting in Sutherland Park, Texas, and at a Sikh Temple in Wisconsin, as well as arson attacks and bombings of mosques and churches from Minnesota to Utah to Louisiana, are a blight on the fabric of American society. These have underscored the vulnerability of faith-based organizations and the need to provide for the security of houses of worship and the communities they serve.

In order to evaluate whether “faith-based organizations have the resources and training needed to put protective measures in place and exercised on a routine basis,” this Subcommittee has visited, among other sites, the Sikh temple in Oak Creek, Wisconsin that was the site of a massacre; the Jewish community in Whitefish, Montana that was and continues to be threatened with neo-Nazi⁹ violence; churches in Louisiana and Mississippi that have been threatened; a mosque in Minnesota that was bombed; the synagogue in California that was the subject of an armed attack; and other relevant sites. We have been briefed about the security measures undertaken by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, the Sikh community, the Jewish communities nationally as well as in Minneapolis and San Diego, and the Roman Catholic Church in Mississippi, as well as by Federal, state, and local law enforcement leaders in communities across the nation.

The sheer variety of faith-based organizations, communities, and facilities resists any attempt to draw general conclusions about the state of preparedness of the faith community. As discussed more fully below, however, some common themes emerged from our discussions, briefings, and site visits.

⁹ a member of a group espousing the programs and policies of Hitler's Nazis. Source: Merriam Webster English Dictionary.

First, and not surprisingly, the adequacy of physical security is resource-dependent. Some organizations and congregations, such as the Conference Center for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Jewish synagogues and community centers in places such as Minnesota and San Diego that have experienced prior threats or attacks can afford to harden their potentially targeted facilities by installing such features as bullet-proof glass, lock down capability, and surveillance cameras, by hiring security guards, and by forming and training internal security teams. The more sophisticated faith-based organizations are also better equipped to take advantage of Federal grants from entities like FEMA, whose processes can be bewildering to smaller, poorer communities. Smaller, less organized communities, such as the Muslim community in Minneapolis, Minnesota, the Christian community in Opelousas, Louisiana, or the Sikh community in Oak Creek, Wisconsin, may be just as threatened, but may lack the resources to provide adequate protection absent from government or civil society support.

Second, and of particular relevance to resource-challenged organizations, there are programs within DHS and programs sponsored by DHS to assist faith-based organizations. These programs can assist with security audits, with identifying precursor conduct, and, in some cases, with funding to enhance physical security. FEMA grants, infrastructure assessments by PSAs, intelligence briefings by the Secret Service, and situational awareness provided by Fusion Centers are among the services available to vulnerable faith-based organizations.

Third, in many cases, however, faith-based organizations have informed us that they are unaware of the relevant programs and confused about where to go to discover the relevant programs' existence.

These general conditions compel, in our view, the following more specific findings and recommendations:

Protective Security Advisors (PSAs)

Finding:

That the role of the PSAs must be enhanced.

Background:

The PSA program is one of the strongest partnerships the Department has in the field to support hometown security. However, the current number of PSAs in the field is inadequate for the vital missions that they perform.

During our site visits, FBO community members noted that in some states the PSAs do not always reach out to coordinate with faith-based organizations and respond only when requested. Perhaps this restricted rule of engagement accounts for the fact that most communities we visited had never encountered or heard of the PSA. While all the PSAs engaged by this Subcommittee were decidedly devoted to their mission and well-trained professionals, this is not consistent across the country. That said, more PSAs are needed, and their training and preparation need to be standardized across the entire country and focused on proactive engagement with their respective faith communities. As well, and while separate entities, PSAs and Fusion Centers are at their best when working closely together

and should be considered as a team asset to enhance outreach and information sharing with FBOs at the State and local levels.

Recommendation:

- DHS determine specific requirements for PSAs, and if necessary, request additional sustained funding from Congress to hire, train, and increase the actual numbers of PSAs as needed for the security of the FBOs.

Proactive Training for Faith-Based Communities

Finding:

That there is not a consistent approach to preparing and training FBOs for the security of their communities.

Background:

In 2012, the HSAC Subcommittee recommended that “DHS should provide a comprehensive security response to FBOs, such as providing the support for and the training necessary for infrastructure resilience assessments for houses of worship, information on significant events, cybersecurity.” Significant efforts have been undertaken in this regard, but a coherent, comprehensive approach is necessary. This Subcommittee reaffirms this finding.

Recommendation:

- DHS take lead, in conjunction with State and local officials and FBOs, in establishing standardized guidelines for security training.

FEMA Grants.

Finding:

The FEMA Nonprofit Security Grant Program is a vital source of funding for FBOs to bolster their security, but the funding level is insufficient, and the application process is complex, opaque, and long.

Background:

DHS should continue to provide grant funding to bolster FBO information sharing, resilience efforts, and infrastructure protection. Our research demonstrated how important this grant funding was to houses of worship; in many cases being the sole source of funding for needed security measures.

That said, the program is not sufficiently funded to meet the needs of FBOs. According to the FEMA Grant Programs Directorate, for fiscal year 2019, \$60 million was made available through the Nonprofit Security Grant Program (State and Urban Area). For this grant cycle, 2,037 applications were submitted, of which 718 applications were funded.

In addition, the grant process is too complex. Multiple locations cited the complexity of the Federal

grants process as a significant barrier to entry; even successful applicants cited the complexity of the Federal grant process as a hindrance.

Recommendations:

- DHS seek additional funding from Congress to provide increased grant money for FBOs.
- DHS establish an office dedicated to assisting applicants, particularly from small or poorly staffed FBOs, in order to navigate the complexities of the Federal grants process.
 - To avoid any potential conflicts of interest, this office of grant application assistance should be separate from any of the grant-awarding arms of DHS and its staff should play no role in reviewing or awarding grants.
- DHS give the new FBO Director responsibility for the Nonprofit Security Grant Program.

Suspicious Activity Reporting

Finding:

That Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR)¹⁰ is inadequately coordinated within those Federal entities responsible for processing and reacting to faith-based information.

Background:

We found in our study that Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) efforts must be better coordinated among Federal Departments and Agencies. Beyond establishing common standards, Federal departments and agencies need to work together as some systems within DHS and FBI remain disparate. Current efforts are segmented across various departments and agencies and do not seem to be well-coordinated, thus creating what may be an unfocused and diluted effort.

Coordinating efforts would provide one message and one voice at the Federal level to help advance SAR efforts. Such coordination is necessary if SAR is to ever be considered a priority in the United States.

Recommendation:

- DHS address the means for comprehensive coordination and action of SAR across the DHS enterprise and with the relevant agencies and FBI. DHS should also consider working with professional partners who have a trusted process for information sharing between law enforcement and faith communities.

Increase Funding for Engaging FBO Communities

Finding:

DHS has many offices that provide resources to FBOs such as the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and FEMA have a

¹⁰ SAR refers to official documentation of observed behavior that is reasonably indicative of pre-operational planning related to terrorism or other criminal activities. Source: DHS Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence, September 2019.

positive reputation in varying degrees in some faith-based communities.

Background:

Based on the site visits, it was established that faith-based communities were aware of CRCL, CISA, and FEMA. The FBOs had positive views of these government offices. However, after conducting site visits and meetings with Subject Matter Experts (SMEs), we determined that the FBOs lack the experience to obtain resources and the capacity to employ them.

Recommendation:

- Funding be established to enhance entities within DHS that will support the unified effort within the Department and increase support for agencies that equitably engage FBO communities.

DHS Private Security Standards

Finding:

That private security companies (PSCs) are a means to provide security to houses of worship and to FBOs.

Background:

One of the means to provide significantly expanded security for FBOs is through approved PSCs where recruitment, vetting, equipping, and training are certified as having met rigid DHS standards.

Under DHS supervision, as envisaged by this recommendation, PSCs are required to be recertified periodically to ensure the highest standards of reliability and performance. As Congress continues its oversight of homeland security, it should grant funding to DHS to be passed to State homeland security offices in order to provide PSCs as a security consideration where public benefits and private resources may not align. To that end, oversight, regulation, and certification/recertification from DHS would be mandated. DHS would further certify to Congress that PSCs are properly vetted and prepared across the board to cooperate with both the FBOs and local law enforcement for the protection of our faith communities.

Several FBOs we visited emphasized the importance of deploying trained and effective security guards to provide a deterrent to potential attacks, protection from such attacks, and reassurance to anxious faith communities that their security needs are being addressed. In the absence of this kind of local security from PSCs, some FBOs are providing their own armed guards from inside their individual communities.

Recommendations:

- DHS develop a pilot program whereby a PSC is selected to lead a trial to provide private security at the disposal of FBOs.
 - If this pilot is successful, DHS could create the capacity to oversee and certify the recruitment, vetting, equipping, and training of PSCs.
- DHS consider creating a standardized training program for private security companies.

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The Role of the Faith-Community in Locally-Based Prevention Efforts

Tasking Three – Evaluating the role the faith-community could/should have in locally-based prevention efforts (e.g., Are there aspects of the current trend of the racially motivated violence, which the faith community can address more effectively than the government or other parts of society?).

Introduction

Historically and currently, the faith communities are vital at every aspect of the local community. Faith organizations grow from and build on their belief that they have a moral imperative to help those in need and improve the human condition as they pursue God to their understanding.

Faith communities are not separate from the communities in which they exist. They are the people who reside, work, and participate in the public arena that make our towns, cities, counties, states, and nation to be what it is. They comprise business leaders, teachers, parents, students, etc. They are also represented in our law enforcement and government agencies, at the local, state, and Federal levels. What affects one, affects the whole of the community. Faith communities are of various cultures and ethnic groups. It is along these lines that negative forces produce adverse conditions that so easily affect the faith community. Sadly, American history reveals the depressing and dreadful accounts of mistreatments, abuse, disrespect, and ostracisms that have led to isolation, fear, and distrust.

Much of the inequity and pain we see harbored in the rural, urban and outlying areas is fueled by white supremacy, poverty, poor health, unemployment, and other disparities. These elements have accounted in immeasurable ways to the devastation, mental and physical anguish, so visibly present where people of color and other cultures dwell. All these factors have and will continue to represent a threat to the many attempts to launch and sustain efforts to avert risk, mitigate and alleviate the loss of resources as we strive to build, fabricate and engineer the creation of safe and healthy communities. In fact, in the absence of government support, faith communities act as public servants to take care of the needs of their constituencies, especially in the psychological well-being of large segments of our society.

Faith-based communities have the unique ability to share information, build trust, and educate and inform the community. They can also raise volunteers, access space when necessary, and have a strong commitment to responding locally. Faith communities can also play a significant role in linking local, state and Federal organizations to mitigate community threats, and to counter negative messages.

Recognizing the faith community's unique assets, organizing how, when, where, why, and who mobilizes should be integrated into any plan that utilizes an action levels system. This would mean that faith communities should be included in the planning process as a means of breaking down barriers to strengthen preparedness. Also, to provide a critical channel for communication with vulnerable and marginalized populations through their social networks. This report offers

recommendations as to what the faith community can provide to more effectively support and improve government community engagement to reduce racially motivated violence and other community threats.

The Subcommittee believes the recommendations provided below, as well as previous recommendations made by the HSAC Subcommittee in 2012 which have not yet been fully implemented, will bolster the role of the faith-based community in locally-based prevention efforts.

FBO Coordination with Law Enforcement

Findings:

The relationships between state and local law enforcement and the FBOs are very “unlevel” across the country, especially outside urban areas. Faith-based communities are more likely to maintain positive relationships with local law enforcement, while they rarely engage with state and Federal authorities. Still, there remains a need for increased connectivity between houses of worship and local authorities.

Background:

This finding clearly points to the need for as much top-down push as possible from DHS, and with State and local law enforcement, in order to emphasize the necessity for stronger dialogue and relationships built on trust between FBOs and law enforcement and first responders. In municipalities, these relationships were typically much closer, but in rural areas where county police and Sheriffs’ departments are stretched across major areas of countryside, these relationships are very difficult to establish and maintain. FBOs suffer from a lack of attention in terms of security assessment, preparations, training, and response.

In our research, we found that houses of worship more frequently build positive relationships with local law enforcement, while mistrust of Federal personnel and lack of government outreach often hinder FBO engagement with Federal entities. This is especially true when local officers work closely with the faith community, and when the composition of local police departments reflects the demographics of the community they serve. When police chiefs do not come from the community they serve, there is a major disconnect between the community and the police officers. In Jackson, Mississippi, the police chief is a local community member, and a number of officers are representative of the community demographics and attend local places of worship.

This contributes to heightened awareness, productivity, and constructiveness within the police force that allows them to engage positively and frequently with faith community members. In this open environment, individuals are more comfortable engaging with the police. In Whitefish, Montana, one of the local police officers grew up in the town and understood and identified with the community. Individuals frequently felt more comfortable going to him with concerns and problems than to others in the police department. Thus, these relationships with local law enforcement should be leveraged to increase FBO connectivity to Federal entities and resources. In addition, local law enforcement needs to be made aware of Federal resources.

Nationally, there is still an overall great need for improved connectivity at the local level; FBOs have not been routinely designating individuals from their administration or congregation to oversee liaison and partnering with local, state, and Federal law enforcement to address security needs and develop a security plan. This has created substantial gaps in coverage for FBOs. FBOs and their members are often not well tied into sources of information from social services, mental health professionals, local police, and other community figures who could assist the FBOs when they recognize troubling behaviors. These ties need to be recognized and increased in order to help them mitigate the risk of radicalization by addressing the root causes of violence. Where we found FBOs with active law enforcement and community liaison activities, we found faith-based communities well prepared for emergencies. FBOs should engage in regular dialogue with local law enforcement to discuss current and developing threats. Local police must be familiar with the places of worship in their community. In the event of an incident, officers can use their knowledge of the building and security team to respond more efficiently.

To facilitate positive relationships with law enforcement, FBOs should consider making part of the normal operation process inviting first responders into places of worship for training, security recommendations, and participation in social gatherings. Members of the faith-based community should also be aware of and participate in local law enforcement programs such as Citizen Police Academies, regular community discussions with law enforcement, and cultural classes for law enforcement officers that are run by community members.

Recommendations:

- DHS encourage FBOs to develop positive relationships with their local police departments.
- DHS, together with State and local officials, through proactive outreach efforts, actively encourage FBOs and houses of worship to designate liaison personnel to work with law enforcement to assess security needs and conduct relevant security planning, training, and implementation.
- DHS leverage positive FBO relationships with local officials by ensuring that local law enforcement authorities are informed about Federal resources.
- DHS, in its departmental outreach activities, encourage FBOs to work with local police and first responder communities to develop real-time information sharing systems and other relevant recommendations for improving security, and implementing lessons learned and best practices.
- DHS, working with State officials, seek to provide local law enforcement with additional earmarked funding to create or expand outreach and connectivity with FBOs, especially in rural areas.

Multi-faith Coordination at the Local Level

Finding:

FBOs are more effective when they are active within the local faith community and maintain relationships with other congregations in their faith community.

Background:

During every site visit, faith leaders expressed a desire for proactive engagement with one another to form solidarity to enhance mutual security. Many local problems can be mitigated through the sharing of best practices amongst local FBOs. The faith-based communities must start seeing each other as allies and resources as they work together to overcome the issues that lead to targeted violence. A venue and designated group are needed to organize and provide faith groups with the opportunities to connect and collaborate.

The local faith communities are a better resource than DHS to reach isolated faith-based communities and share information on Federal and local resources. If the information comes through word of mouth from a trusted faith-based community member, it will be received more effectively than coming directly from DHS. Thus, DHS should leverage the existing faith-based community network as an avenue to connect with FBOs and to distribute information about Federal and local resources.

FBOs can benefit from the multi-faith community as a resource to learn about security strategies, share best practices, cultivate relationships, and host training. Local collaboration with other FBOs can allow a better understanding of the threat and more effective mitigation of risks. For example, in Salt Lake City, Utah, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints maintains a robust security organization to address their needs locally and in their facilitates throughout the country. This faith community is extremely active in providing resources and training for both law enforcement and local FBOs. FBO resources offered include training, risk assessments, and information about security guidelines. Similarly, individuals at the Poway Synagogue were willing to help other FBOs secure their premises.

The multi-faith network can also provide immediate support to places of worship in the aftermath of attacks. For example, the Dar al Farooq mosque in Bloomington, Minnesota was extremely isolated before it was attacked in 2017. After receiving support from the multi-faith community, Dar al Farooq is now one of the most active mosques in the state. Similarly, the multi-faith community showed solidarity with the Escondido Mosque after an arson attack and with the Poway Synagogue after a shooting. Both organizations were extremely appreciative of public support. Additionally, interaction between faiths can help members facilitate conversations and overcome prejudices. A member of the Poway Synagogue recounted how the multi-faith support after the attack inspired him to overcome the anti-Islamic sentiments he held since 9/11 by visiting a local mosque and offering help.

Recommendations:

- FBOs become involved with the multi-faith community and the community at large.
- DHS utilize existing faith-based community networks as an avenue to distribute information about Federal resources.
- FBOs promote local working groups consisting of the various FBOs in individual communities across the country. This will provide the faith-based community with a venue to meet, discuss, and determine best practices in dealing with and mitigating threats.

Steps Individual FBOs Can Take to Enhance Security

Finding:

Securing a congregation is a bottom-up process, and there are no one-size-fits-all security plans. While each place of worship will need to create a system that suits its individual resources, culture, and comfort level, there are concrete steps FBOs can take to enhance security.

Background:

The HSAC Subcommittee wrote in 2012 that “FBOs are encouraged to designate a security point of contact within their community and communicate who that person is with the designated DHS point of contact.” Based on the Subcommittee’s observations at recent site visits to various FBOs across the country, this previous recommendation has largely not been implemented. The Subcommittee has seen progress regarding this recommendation with larger FBOs, but there is a lot of opportunity for growth in medium and smaller sized FBOs.

The community is the first line of defense. An alert and vigilant congregation that is educated to identify and report troubling behaviors is the best defense against attacks. Training is the first step in protecting and defending congregants. Faith leaders can educate congregations on identifying inflammatory “red flags” or concerning posts on social media.

Additionally, the most secure faith-based communities are proactive in seeking government assistance and take responsibility for assuming the initiative in providing for their own security. In part, such communities have learned from tragic history that they need to prepare themselves to be the first responders when disaster strikes. The Jewish community supports organizations such as the Secure Communities Network, and denominational bodies such as the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations assists members with seeking security resources; the Christian community supports the Christian Emergency Network. The Sikh community has also become much better organized in the wake of the Oak Creek shootings. To our knowledge, no similarly effective information-sharing platform exists to share information amongst different faith groups including but not limited to Buddhists, Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs.

Recommendations:

- FBOs build a basic low-cost security plan and seek state and/or Federal funding to implement cameras.
- FBOs utilize the expertise of active or retired law enforcement, military, or security personnel in their congregation.
- FBO leadership and security teams develop working relationships with local law enforcement to proactively improve security and to provide and receive threat information.
- Faith leaders encourage congregation members to share security concerns and threats to their congregation with FBO leaders or security personnel. Security personnel should then address the concerns or report the information to law enforcement.

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Evaluating the Adverse Impacts that Violent Extremists and Domestic Terrorists, Including Those Inspired by Violent White Supremacy Ideologies, Have on Faith-Based and Other Vulnerable Communities

Tasking Four - Evaluating the adverse impacts that violent extremists and domestic terrorists, including those inspired by violent white supremacy ideologies, have on faith-based and other vulnerable communities. Explore the key factors (such as social media and other influencers) that violent extremists are exploiting to promote, promulgate, and in some cases, galvanize violent attacks against faith-based organizations. What more can be done by the Department to prevent these attacks and increase community resistance to mobilization to violence, and what are the best practices and lessons learned for consideration?

Background

On August 13, 2019, in Jackson, Mississippi, then-Acting Secretary Kevin K. McAleenan delivered the fourth tasking to the Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) at a public forum of HSAC's Subcommittee for the Prevention of Targeted Violence Against Faith-Based Communities.

Introduction

The adverse impacts that violent extremists and domestic terrorists, including those inspired by white supremacist ideologies, are having on faith-based and other vulnerable communities, are difficult to overstate. From Oak Creek, Wisconsin to Whitefish, Montana, from Southern California to Sutherland, Texas, from Minneapolis to Pittsburgh, from Louisiana to South Carolina, targeted violent attacks against our faithful and the institutions they represent have struck at the very core of American freedoms, standing out not just for the escalating death toll, but for the cruelty of wounding and killing people at their most vulnerable, assembled for worship in American houses of worship. What was once unthinkable has become almost routine. The increasing influence of white supremacist ideologies in inspiring acts of domestic terror and targeted violence is, moreover, not a matter of political opinion, but a demonstrable fact.

Data from the University of Maryland's Global Terrorism Database indicates that terror attacks around the world have decreased each year since 2014, falling from about 17,000 in 2014 to about 9,600 in 2018.¹¹ These overall numbers can be misleading, however; while ISIS attacks are decreasing in the Middle East and elsewhere, the U.S. has seen a recent surge, as counterterrorism professionals say, directed by a more discernable and violent group of individuals allied with white supremacists, neo-

¹¹ UMD Global Terrorism Database. Fact Sheet: Global Terrorism in 2018.
https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_GTD_TerrorismIn2018Overview_FactSheet_Oct2019.pdf

Nazis and other groups associated with similar beliefs.¹²

The attacks committed by white supremacist extremists against houses of worship have been committed by lone attackers, as opposed to organized groups or through a system of cells. There are, however, similarities to the attacks perpetrated by ISIS and other extremists. (1) They are radicalized and freely communicate as part of a wide-ranging movement. (2) The social media platforms and individuals that frequent and govern these sites have implemented a comprehensive transnational outlook similar to how ISIS inspired and connected with potential radical violent extremists abroad. (3) White supremacist extremists are now sharing manifestos, conspiracy theories, hate literature, and connecting daily with like-minded persons online.

Beyond the conventional social media platforms, white supremacists and other extremists are leveraging lesser-known sites like Gab, 8chan, and EndChan, as well as encrypted channels. Like violent extremists and other adherents to extremist ideologies, their tactic is to exploit the openness of the instrumentalities of freedom – in this case social media and the internet – to destroy freedom itself – in this case the foundational freedom of religious conscience.

Defining the Domestic Terrorism Threat

Findings:

In the wake of recent attacks on faith-based communities, some members of law enforcement have cited the absence of a domestic terrorism statute as hampering their efforts to track and prosecute domestic terrorist groups. This is further complicated by the inconsistencies between and among the various SLTT government entities on terms and definitions within their respective lexicons.

Background:

While the level of terrorist violence globally decreased for the fourth consecutive year in 2018, the United States has suffered an increase for the third consecutive year with 67 attacks, according to the Global Terrorism Database.¹³ This uptick in terrorist violence has been primarily driven by an increase in extremist attacks; ideological motivations have increased in variety, and there are now more perpetrator groups conducting attacks. Global Terrorism Database analysis indicates that six of

¹² Of the 263 domestic terrorism incidents occurring between 2010 and the end of 2017, 92 were committed by right-wing attackers, according to a Washington Post analysis of Global Terrorism Database information.

Source: *The Washington Post*. “In the United States, Right-Wing Violence is on the Rise.”

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/in-the-united-states-right-wing-violence-is-on-the-rise/2018/11/25/61f7f24a-deb4-11e8-85df-7a6b4d25cfbb_story.html

Additionally, the Anti-Defamation League concluded in a 2019 report that 2018 was the fourth-deadliest year on record for domestic extremist-related killings since 1970.

Source: “Report from the Anti-Defamation League Center on Extremism: Murder and Extremism in the United States in 2018.” <https://www.adl.org/media/12480/downl>

¹³ National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.

<https://www.start.umd.edu/news/global-terrorism-decreases-2018-recent-uptick-us-terrorist-attacks-was-sustained>

the terrorist attacks in the United States were lethal. All six of these attacks involved elements of far-right ideologies, primarily white supremacy.

In the last three years, unprecedented violent attacks targeted houses of worship both here and abroad in such places as Pittsburgh, Poway, and in the state of Texas. Dressed in black tactical-style gear and armed with an assault weapon, 26-year-old Devin Kelley opened fire at the First Baptist Church of Sutherland Springs, Texas, killing 26 people and wounding about 20 others in 2017. These tragic events, now baked into the history of contemporary America, represent a rapidly changing paradigm and a new age for domestic terrorism in the United States.

The Justice Department has reported that hate crimes in the country increased by 17 percent from 2016 to 2017, marking the third straight year where these crimes grew in number.¹⁴ According to the FBI Uniform Crime Reporting data released in November 2018, more than half of the hate crimes reported in 2017 were motivated by racial or ethnic bias, while anti-Semitic hate crimes jumped by 37 percent.

Existing Domestic Terrorism-Related Legislation:

In the wake of the Oklahoma City and Atlanta Olympic bombings in the mid-1990s, the U.S. Congress passed several laws intended to confront incidents of extremist domestic violence, credible and direct threats of violence, conspiracies, and attempts. Congress has enacted statutes related to more than 50 Federal domestic terrorism-related crimes, and a related prohibition on “material support” for domestic terrorism. Congress has also established a framework of hate crimes that law enforcement can use for violence targeting vulnerable communities. The FBI has also asserted expansive powers to investigate “domestic terrorism” under the Patriot Act.

Gaps in the Law:

Notwithstanding the existing framework, however, gaps do exist in the law. Law enforcement has been hampered in addressing the rise of white supremacist-inspired attacks by the inability to identify such attacks as acts of domestic terror. The absence of that category has led law enforcement to treat a number of attacks committed by white supremacist extremists as isolated, unconnected incidents. It has also rendered of extremely limited value the Uniform Crime Reporting and other reporting mechanisms, which may record similar events differently. In the absence of the ability to label white supremacist extremist attacks as acts of domestic terrorism, we have been informed by Federal law enforcement that they have been unable to avail themselves of resources dedicated to counterterrorism, such as additional personnel, training, and essential technologies. The extremists who commit violent acts against Houses of Worship and religious institutions will ultimately be indicted on different Federal charges — hate crimes or weapons possession.

Experts we have consulted inform us that designating homegrown groups as domestic terrorism organizations is highly problematic. The reason is grounded in our constitutional values. Law enforcement may not investigate or prosecute based on First Amendment-protected activity. This has left the American law enforcement community with few options other than to explore other avenues

¹⁴ Federal Bureau of Investigation. 2017 Hate Crimes Statistics Report. <https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2017>

for prosecuting violent white supremacist extremist offenders through other means.

Notwithstanding these obstacles, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and many law enforcement agencies across the nation have facilitated public education on vigilance, identifying suspicious activities and active shooter response. By investing in diverse programs to empower our citizens with knowledge and tools allows them to become force multipliers and active participants. However, as discussed in Tasking 2 above, challenges remain, and faith-based institutions do not fully understand what they should be reporting or how to report the information. In addition, little guidance or consideration is given to ensuring that faith-based community members are appropriately respecting the civil liberties of others when identifying suspicious activity. Currently, the quality of the messages being delivered by the Fusion Centers and PSAs to their faith-based communities remains disparate and sometimes simply incoherent. As a result, disseminating information concerning domestic terrorism threats and risks to communities remain a challenge.

Adopting a Domestic Terrorism Statute:

The Domestic Terrorism Prevention Act of 2019, if enacted, would authorize domestic terrorism offices and units within the Department of Homeland Security, Justice Department and the FBI, require Federal law enforcement agencies to regularly assess extremist threats, and provide resources to assist state and local law enforcement to reduce these threats.

The Domestic Terrorism DATA Act, “which focuses on increasing the coordination, accountability, and transparency of the Federal government in collecting and recording data on domestic terrorism, and the No Hate Act — which seeks to “improve local and state hate crime training, prevention, best practices, and data collection initiatives,” – are intended to enable law enforcement to address the rise of extremist groups and the proliferation of their propaganda. Currently, the primary law criminalizing “material support” for terrorism does not apply to investigations or prosecutions when focused on violent white supremacists acting as domestic terrorists. Terms and definitions for domestic violent extremism, white supremacy and white supremacist activity, and domestic terrorism and terrorist activity lack the level of clarity necessary for all parties to act from a common basis. The failure to pass a statute has resulted from constitutional concerns. We recognize that criminalizing purely domestic associative activity raises legitimate constitutional concerns over rights to freedom of speech and association and potential discrimination. We believe that domestic terrorist groups, much like other domestic groups engaged in organized criminal activity such as the mob, La Cosa Nostra, or certain motorcycle gangs, can be prosecuted under the Racketeer-Influenced Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) and other statutes.

There is no question, however, that law enforcement has been hampered by the failure to define and monitor acts of domestic terrorism. Such acts should be included in the FBI’s annual Uniform Crime Reports. Combatting such acts should be a top law enforcement priority. We believe that a statute defining such acts and providing funds for monitoring the acts can assist law enforcement in ordering its priorities without compromising constitutional values.

Support for the passage of a domestic terrorism statute comes from both the FBO as well as some in the Homeland Security community.

Jared Maples, the Executive Director of the New Jersey Office of Homeland Security & Preparedness stated:

“Bipartisan congressional support of a domestic terrorism statute sends a strong message to violent extremists that our law enforcement community will have the necessary resources to combat threats of extreme hate with the same veracity as those inspired by foreign terrorist organizations. A rise in recruitment efforts and hate-based rhetoric has inspired racially motivated mass violence over the past few years. Individuals with blended and misguided grievances are susceptible to influences of like-minded extremists online, and they have carried out attacks against certain religious and ethnic groups they perceive as their enemies. The shift from inspiration to mobilization can be quick, and attack methods to carry out these atrocities require little or no tactical training.

This alarming and complex trend will not decline by continuing to address domestic threats with the same tools we have used in the past. The New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness (NJOHSP) believes a domestic terrorism statute is a critical first step to efficiently and effectively combat this emerging threat head-on.”

Legislative Recommendations:

- Congress work with DHS and DOJ to pass a statute defining such acts and providing funds for monitoring the acts which will assist law enforcement in ordering its priorities without compromising constitutional values.

Recommendations for DHS:

- DHS recommend to the NSC that the Domestic Terrorism Executive Committee (DTEC), an interagency task force, originally established in response to the Oklahoma City bombing, should be made permanent.
- Congress, working with DHS and DOJ, encourage cooperation between Federal, State, local, and Tribal law enforcement to monitor, understand, investigate, and prosecute acts of domestic terrorism through intelligence sharing requirements.
- DHS work with DOJ, Congress, FBOs, and concerned civil rights and civil liberties groups to define¹⁵ and provide funding to monitor acts of domestic terrorism.
- DHS be guided by the Strategic Framework, attached to this Report as Appendix 3, adopted by then-Acting Secretary Kevin McAleenan for countering targeted violence directed at faith-based and other vulnerable communities.
- DHS lead an interagency effort to coordinate all terms associated with these matters to ensure consistency across the Federal government and among SLTT government entities.

¹⁵ This is further complicated by the inconsistencies between and among the various SLTT government entities on terms and definitions within their respective lexicons.

Online Activity and Extremism

Finding:

State and local law enforcement personnel across the nation expressed concern about their inability to effectively respond to online threats.

This inability is due to the lack of knowledge among law enforcement personnel, but also due to lack of manpower, as many rural police departments suffer from declining recruitment.

Background:

During nearly every site visit, state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) law enforcement personnel described the need for awareness of threatening online activity. As one police officer from a rural county told the Subcommittee, “We know that people are posting threats online, and we know that information about future attacks could be posted online, but we just don’t have the ability to see it.” The dilemma, the officer added, is that “one officer sitting at a computer monitoring the internet is one less officer on the street.”

American youth, who are comfortable with communicating in the social media environment, have become prime targets for radicalization. White supremacist violent extremists have developed an extensive presence on the internet through messaging platforms and online images, videos, and publications, which facilitate groups’ abilities to radicalize and recruit individuals receptive to extremist messaging and propaganda.

In today’s social media environment, it has been observed that online radicalization has often surpassed ISIS type propaganda and recruitment. The accessibility of extremist information facilitates indoctrination, particularly on social media platforms where tech companies long ignored the warning signs that their platforms were contributing to the radicalization of far-right extremists.

This remains a persistent challenge for law enforcement and other international security services. Due to the First Amendment, social media giants have been reluctant to ban extremist white supremacists in the United States. Social media platforms have broad latitude, each establishing its own standards for content and methods of enforcement. Their broad discretion stems from the Communications Decency Act. The 1996 law exempts tech platforms from liability for actionable speech by their users. Magazines and television networks, for example, can be sued for publishing defamatory information they know to be false; social media platforms cannot be found similarly liable for the content they host.

Recommendations:

- The Director make funding decisions on all matters related to Departmental faith-based priorities. (e.g., Subcommittee recommendation).
- The Director consult with the faith-based advisory council on funding decisions.
- DHS increase funding and/or training to SLTT law enforcement to facilitate understanding of the online threat landscape and improve capacity to monitor and address online threat information.

- DHS consider requiring an online threat tracking entity at Fusion Centers to facilitate communication between faith-based communities and SLTT law enforcement.

Community Approach to Radicalization Identification and Intervention

Finding:

That there is need for a comprehensive, community-based intervention framework to identify individuals exhibiting behaviors that are indicative of radicalization toward domestic terror ideologies and to engage these individuals for the purpose of deradicalization.

Background:

One pastor of a rural, predominately African American church recounted an instance in which an unknown white male entered the church and took photos of the floor plan. When the pastor contacted his local police department, they were dismissive and apparently took no further action. It is necessary for local police to understand the threat landscape for houses of worship, and to respond to potentially hostile actions against FBO communities.

Recommendations:

- DHS support efforts at the state and local level to address the rise of domestic terrorism. Such DHS support should include cooperative efforts to include police, prosecutors, social services, mental health, and education officials, in order to provide a whole community intervention approach.
- There be ongoing efforts by the U.S. Secret Service and others to build awareness about behavior indicators of radicalization and recruitment for the purpose of educating parents, teachers, and mental health providers should be continued.
- DHS provide training to intelligence analysts, local law enforcement, Fusion Center personnel, and PSAs on threats from groups seeking to attack others who oppose their ideologies, religions, or race. See the discussion above in Tasking Two.

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CONCLUSION

Concluding Thoughts. It was an honor for the members of the Subcommittee to engage in this study. In the process we met hundreds of earnest and dedicated government employees from the national to the local level; all of them committed utterly to the matter of preventing targeted violence against faith-based communities. We also had the honor, as well as the sobering and humbling experience of meeting members of communities who had directly experienced the terror and violence of targeted attacks. Without exception, as they worked through their grief, they were eager and committed to helping the members of the Subcommittee with our work. It would be difficult to overstate our respect for these brave and noble citizens who've come through these horrific trials. Their testimonies and advice on best practices heavily influenced our work. Finally, we feel compelled to acknowledge the courage of former Acting Secretary Kevin McAleenan for initiating this effort and for setting the example for the Department and more broadly the U.S. Government in committing to combating the forces of hatred, and hateful ideologies, that have directly attacked the social fabric of America as represented by our faith-based communities. He is joined by innumerable employees within the Department, and specifically the staff of the HSAC, who were deeply committed to and supportive of our efforts. We offer them all our sincere thanks.

The broader purpose of our Subcommittee was to provide a framework for building trust between FBOs and law enforcement. We as a society can fortify an environment of enhanced cooperation between our citizenry and our government when we serve the needs of communities, especially those who feel vulnerable to targeted violence against their houses of worship. FBOs contain sacred spaces for many and are invaluable in representing American values to our country and to the rest of the world. We must defend houses of worship with might and wisdom as a matter of a primary and fundamental American interest. We hope that FBOs can strengthen their ties with one another to bind together mutual security.

What follows are specific conclusions that draw from our personal experiences and field research completed as a Subcommittee.

Implement the plan. As we conclude and submit our work, and as pointed out in the introduction, this report finds significant duplication with similar reports tasked to subcommittees of the HSAC in 2012 and 2014. We inquired as to the status and outcomes of the recommendations of those reports. For us, the Subcommittee, while we have offered some new and unique recommendations that recognize organizational and technological changes since 2014, we found substantial overlap with previous work where we then reaffirmed the previous recommendations. If the Department is not rendered expeditiously into an implementation plan, with a requirement that the Department periodically report implementation actions to Congress, then this 2019 report will join the 2012 and 2014 reports on the shelf.

Organizational coherence. We found that there has been and continues to be significant positive evolution within the Department’s efforts to facilitate ground-level prevention of targeted violence against and protection of our faith-based communities and organizations. That said, we conclude that the overall governmental effort still suffers from significant duplication of efforts at the Federal and state levels as well as substantial gaps of coverage. We conclude that the President should reinvigorate the position of Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism on the National Security Council Staff, to coordinate interagency policy formulation on these matters. Under the current Administration, these functions have been allowed to atrophy or have been disestablished. As the President reinvigorates the NSC-level position, he should reinvigorate the manning and the roles and functions of the National Counterterrorism Center to adequately monitor domestic terror as a component of targeted violence against faith-based communities.

Subnational coherence. The Subcommittee was impressed with its site visit to New Jersey and strongly believes that the State’s organizational approach provides examples of both preventive and protective support and provides for an excellent template for organizational coherence on these matters. While States will organize uniquely based on their specific governments and laws, resources will inevitably play both the facilitating and the limiting roles in the effectiveness of States to organize and to support local governments, including local law enforcement entities and other first responders. Again, we return to New Jersey, where the system of State government, the commitment of State resources, and the capacity for funding through grants has optimized State-wide organization and created the capacity to extend resources down to the ground level municipalities and associated police departments. In the context of models and organizational lessons learned the Department would be well served to hold up New Jersey as organizationally representative of the needed coherence in these matters. Recognizing that while not every other State can or will be willing or capable of organizing in the same manner, New Jersey’s principles for organization are coherent and are worthy of emulation where possible.

Resources. Wherever we studied the problem of targeted violence against faith-based communities, solutions invariably revolved around resources, and these typically took the form of increases in Protective Security Advisors (PSAs), standardization among Fusion Centers, standardization and/or creation of information platforms, and the availability of grants. The Subcommittee found that many communities were relatively well-informed on the various resources available to them. There were also segments of America’s faith community that were uninformed on some or all of these resources, which led us to conclude the Department should consider “a national day of preparedness.” This would be a day each year that all levels of government involved in dealing with targeted violence against faith-based communities conduct a concerted outreach for education and capacity building within their community. This day could coincide with annual 9/11 remembrance activities and would be an opportunity for FBOs to learn about all the resources available to them. This would include developing an understanding of the roles and functions of PSAs, Fusion Centers, what two-way communications and informational channels exist, and how to participate in the grant preparation and approval process.

PSAs and Fusion Centers. We have concluded that the current numbers of PSAs and Fusion Centers are inadequate to the tasks of adequately preparing and ultimately protecting our faith-based communities. We have concluded that the current nation-wide number of PSAs, 119, is insufficient. While we did not attempt a detailed analysis to determine the actual requirement, this analysis should nonetheless occur. We also found that the Fusion Centers across the United States are vital to helping to prevent and to provide for the protection of faith-based communities from targeted violence. We found that Fusion Centers' outreach programs for FBOs are generally unlevel in their individual capabilities across States. We concluded there is a need for the Department to lead an effort to standardize the organization, manning, training, and equipping of the Fusion Centers and to emphasize partnership with PSAs to work closely with FBOs. We offer no conclusion with respect to the adequacy of the numbers of current Fusion Centers.

Information. Information is one of the most important resources available to faith-based communities and provides extensively for the preparation of the communities, as well as specific for preventive measures. In an emergency, the rapid movement of threat information and the passing of specific emergency information is critical. From our work, we have concluded that the information platforms available for the two-way passage of information are inadequate to the need. Our conversations and travels revealed a vast discrepancy between and among the various information platforms for the dissemination of information to FBO. This is further complicated by a general absence of awareness of any information platforms by substantial segments of the faith-based community. As reflected in our recommendations, we conclude there is a need for a single, national web-based portal, with an accompanying application for mobile devices, that should be resourced and operated by the Department on behalf of the entire faith-based community. This single platform should be modified as necessary to serve as the "one-stop shop" for every entity involved in dealing with violence against faith-based communities. We noted with some concern that the faith-based portal on the Homeland Security Information Network has been shut down.

Grants. From our many interactions within the Department and across the faith-based communities it is clear the grant programs are working, but much more needs to be done. In particular, significant segments of the faith-based communities are unaware of the grant process, or if they are aware, are incapable of adequately engaging in the process, and actually writing the grant proposals. This is an awareness and capacity development challenge. We have concluded that additional outreach, down to the community level, must occur, which is directly related to the conclusion about the coherence of organization. Where we found high levels of organizational coherence, the grant process was well understood. The idea of a "national day of preparedness" could create the outreach of education and capacity building needed to create an understanding of the process to acquire the resources available to the communities (including two-way informational channels, preparation and approval process).

Technological opportunities and solutions. We have concluded that the Department can play an important role, along with State governments, local governments, and law enforcement entities, in spreading the word on the value of technology in protecting faith-based organizations. In the context

of existing and emerging technologies, there have been enormous advances in electro-optical and motion detection systems as well as other sensors and defensive/protective technologies. In our conversations with faith-based communities, we often found a low level of awareness as to the existence of these sensors and defenses. And if they knew about them at all, they didn't know how to procure and install them. Of course, this is covered to some extent through the grant awareness process. Beyond the sensor packages, we also found a low level of understanding for the creation of or participation in the web-based networks and platforms that can link the surveillance data from individual houses of worship to local police and other first responders.

We have concluded that there are important trends in big data analytics of social media and in artificial intelligence (AI) that can provide highly focused intelligence and threat analysis and warning; in some cases providing this capacity for real-time, autonomous warning of communities, thus substantially accelerating the speed with which faith-based communities can be warned and prepared and first responders can react. Several new companies and non-profit organizations are using AI to cull through masses of information to find specific potential threat streams. Given the speed of this kind of collection and analysis coupled with web-based information networks, warning speeds FBOs can be enormously accelerated. We encourage the Department to explore the state of this technology as other intelligence-based organizations are beginning to embrace AI-powered intelligence analysis warning while assessing the impact on civil liberties and privacy.

White supremacy and white supremacist movements as causal factors of targeted violence. The former Acting Secretary specifically charged the Subcommittee with examining issues associated with white supremacy, white supremacist extremist movements, and domestic terror. We have concluded that white supremacy and white supremacist extremist movements that espouse violent ideologies of terrorism toward segments of the American population are a direct threat to the national security of the United States. We have further concluded that while more remains to be determined, there are sufficient indications of international and domestic white supremacist links that the U.S. Intelligence Community should be tasked with collection, analysis, and production responsibilities. Specifically, the Intelligence Community should examine these potential international links to establish known linkages between foreign and domestic violent ideologies, terrorists, and terrorism.

Legislative approaches. Inherent in defending our faith-based communities is possessing the body of law necessary for full legal recourse and to hold the terrorists and attackers of our faith-based communities fully accountable. While the debate continues about the need for a specific Federal statute addressing Domestic Terrorism, the Subcommittee did conclude the need for a statute requiring DHS and the FBI to track incidents of domestic terrorism and report annually on their incidence in the uniform crime reports.

APPENDIX 1: TASKING LETTER



**Homeland
Security**

May 20, 2019

MEMORANDUM FOR: Judge William Webster
Chair, Homeland Security Advisory Council

FROM: Kevin K. McAleenan 
Acting Secretary, Department of Homeland Security

SUBJECT: New Tasking for the Homeland Security Advisory Council's
Subcommittee on Faith-based Organization Security

In light of recent attacks against synagogues, churches, temples and mosques, I request you swiftly re-establish a Subcommittee under the Homeland Security Advisory Council

(HSAC) focused on the security of faith-based organizations across the country. Houses of worship and faith-based nonprofit organizations dedicate resources to local communities and often serve as the social and moral beacons people rely on in times of trouble. The right to practice our respective religions free of interference or fear is one of our nation's most fundamental and indelible rights. Therefore, the targeting of houses of worship by violent extremists of any ideology is particularly abhorrent and must be prevented.

While the Department of Justice is responsible for investigating and prosecuting attacks against faith-based institutions, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) missions include preparedness, prevention and mitigation for such attacks. In support of these missions DHS provides information, training, exercises and expertise on protective security measures to faith-based organizations. Despite past growth in this area, I recognize that these efforts must be strengthened and expanded, particularly in light of the changing nature of the threat and the recent uptick in attacks.

I believe this subcommittee can assist DHS in identifying additional lines of effort needed, validating the Department's prevention framework that is under development, and examining whether the Department's capabilities need to be adjusted to account for the threat posed by domestic violent extremists. We are seeking the Subcommittee's feedback on how DHS can best support state and local governments' and faith-based organizations' efforts to keep houses of worship safe, secure, and resilient.

In addition to the HSAC members you select, the Subcommittee should include representatives of the associations that work on security-related matters for faith communities such as the Secure Community Network, Christian Emergency Network, The Sikh Coalition or American Legal Defense and Education Fund, the Muslim Public Affairs Council, and other major associations representing faith communities. The subcommittee should also consider organizations that can assist in further conveying information to faith-based communities writ large, such as the Faith-Based Information Sharing and Analysis Organization. The Subcommittee should consider building off the work done by a prior Subcommittee on

Countering Violent Extremism.

Specifically, the Subcommittee should focus their efforts on addressing the following issues:

1. Ensuring two-way information flows between DHS and faith-based organizations (e.g. Do faith-based organizations have routine access to information and assessments about domestic violent extremist movements and the threats they espouse against faith-based organizations? What additional information would be of assistance in their security efforts? Do faith-based organizations receive timely notification of specific and credible threats to their organizations?).
2. Evaluating preparedness and protective efforts for the faith community. (e.g., Do faith-based organizations have the resources and training needed to ensure protective measures are put in place and exercised on a routine basis? If not, what is the best way to close the gap? Are there additional measures beyond traditional protective efforts- such as enhanced understanding of behavioral indicators, knowing the simple steps that can be taken during an incident to increase the chances of survival, and actions that should be considered following an incident to quickly reconstitute services- that can be better conveyed to the community to enhance security in a manner that maintains the integrity of places of worship while sustaining a welcoming environment that allows for peaceful congregation?)
3. Evaluating the role the faith-community could/should have in locally-based prevention efforts. (e.g., Are there aspects of the current trend of the racially-motivated violence, which the faith community can address more effectively than the government or other parts of society?)
4. Evaluate the adverse impacts that violent extremists and domestic terrorists, including those inspired by violent white supremacy ideologies, have on faith-based and other vulnerable communities. Explore the key factors (such as social media and other influencers) that violent extremists are exploiting to promote, promulgate, and in some cases, galvanize violent attacks against faith-based organizations. What more can be done by the Department to prevent these attacks and increase community resistance to mobilization to violence, and what are the best practices and lessons learned for consideration?

I look forward to reviewing the subcommittee's strong recommendations via HSAC approval and request an interim report from the HSAC regarding the above issues within 90 days of the Subcommittee's formation. I have directed the Office of Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention the Office of Intelligence and Analysis the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency to support this Subcommittee in its work. Thank you in advance for your work on these recommendations.

APPENDIX 2: SUBCOMMITTEE FOR THE PREVENTION OF TARGETED VIOLENCE AGAINST FAITH-BASED COMMUNITIES BIOGRAPHIES

John R. Allen (Co-Chair) President, The Brookings Institution

John Rutherford Allen assumed the presidency of the Brookings Institution in November 2017, having most recently served as chair of security and strategy and a distinguished fellow in the Foreign Policy Program at Brookings. Allen is a retired U.S. Marine Corps four-star general and former commander of the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and U.S. Forces in Afghanistan.

He led the security dialogue for the Israeli/Palestinian peace process. President Barack Obama then appointed Allen as special presidential envoy to the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, a position he held for 15 months. Allen's diplomatic efforts grew the coalition to 65 members, effectively halting the expansion of ISIL. In recognition of this work, he was presented the Department of State Distinguished Honor Award by Secretary John Kerry and the Director of National Intelligence Distinguished Public Service Award by Director James Clapper.

During his nearly four-decade military career, Allen served in a variety of command and staff positions in the Marine Corps and the Joint Force. He commanded 150,000 U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan from July 2011 to February 2013. Allen is the first Marine to command a theater of war. During his tenure as ISAF commander, he recovered the 33,000 U.S. surge forces, moved the Afghan National Security Forces into the lead for combat operations, and pivoted NATO forces from being a conventional combat force into an advisory command.

Allen's first tour as a general officer was as the principal director of Asia-Pacific policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, a position he held for nearly three years. In this assignment, he was involved extensively with policy initiatives involving China, Taiwan, Mongolia, and Southeast Asia. Allen also participated in the Six Party Talks on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and played a major role in organizing the relief effort during the South Asian tsunami from 2004 to 2005.

Beyond his operational and diplomatic credentials, Allen has led professional military educational programs, including as director of the Marine Infantry Officer Program and commanding officer of the Marine Corps Basic School. He twice served at the United States Naval Academy, first as a military instructor, where he was named instructor of the year in 1990, and later as commandant of midshipmen; the first Marine Corps officer to hold this position.

Allen was the Marine Corps fellow to the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the first Marine officer to serve as a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations, where today he is a permanent member.

Among his other affiliations, Allen is a senior fellow at the Merrill Center of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a senior fellow at the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory. He is an "Ancien" of the NATO Defense College in Rome, and a frequent lecturer there. Allen is the recipient of numerous U.S. and foreign awards. He holds a Bachelor of Science in

operations analysis from the U.S. Naval Academy, a Master of Arts in national security studies from Georgetown University, a Master of Science in strategic intelligence from the Defense Intelligence College, and a Master of Science in national security strategy from the National Defense University.

Paul Goldenberg (Co-Chair)

President, Cardinal Point Strategies, Senior Fellow Rutgers University Miller Center

Paul Goldenberg is the President and CEO of Cardinal Point Strategies (CPS), a strategic advisory and business intelligence consulting firm. In 2015 Goldenberg was designated as Rutgers University Senior Fellow to the university's Miller Center for Community Protection and Resilience program focused on global community policing and resiliency.

Goldenberg is a recognized transnational security expert providing the U.S. government and private sector strategic counseling and governance on a full array of national security-related issues at the nexus of terrorism, technology, national security, community engagement and policing.

Goldenberg's public career includes more than two decades as New Jersey's Chief of the nation's first full-time statewide agency focusing on domestic terrorism, hate crimes, community engagement, and targeted violence. Director of the nation's 6th largest county social service and juvenile justice system, and as a law enforcement official leading investigation efforts for cases in domestic terrorism, political corruption, and organized crime.

Goldenberg has received numerous tributes while working as a law enforcement officer in urban Essex County, New Jersey. He also served four years as a deep undercover agent for the South Florida Strike Force, for his efforts Goldenberg was bestowed with Florida's most distinguished law enforcement honor for valor: Officer of the Year. His undercover works ultimately led to over 100 arrests and the recovery of nearly a million dollars in stolen property.

In 1986 Goldenberg returned to New Jersey as part of the Organized Crime and Narcotic Task Force where he headed major investigations targeting members of one of New Jersey's most notorious crime families. In 2004, Goldenberg spearheaded an international law enforcement mission for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the world's largest government security initiative, during which he worked in over eight European nations including Ukraine, Hungary, Kosovo and Croatia advising government and NGO groups on topics such as community conflict and the advent of transnational extremism.

Salam Al-Marayati (Co-Vice Chair)

Founder and President, The Muslim Public Affairs Council

Salam Al-Marayati is President of the Muslim Public Affairs Council. He is an expert on Islam in the West, Muslim reform movements, human rights, democracy, and national security. He has spoken at the White House and Capitol Hill, and he has represented the United States at international human

rights and religious freedom conferences. He also testified on Capitol Hill on American Muslim charities and counterterrorism. He delivered a lecture on the Rising Voice of Moderate Muslims to the Secretary of State's Open Forum immediately after 9/11.

Mary Marr (Co-Vice Chair)
Founder and President, Christian Emergency Network

Mary Marr, Founder and President of the Christian Emergency Network (CEN), established the CEN ministry after 911. Her background as a public school teacher, career education administrator, author of the State of Michigan Guidelines for Career Education, national radio broadcaster and her experience serving with the staff of a mega-church in Michigan helped lay the foundation for the national CEN ministry.

Marr has led the charge for the Church to be 'Aware' of the times; to be 'Ready' spiritually, emotionally, mentally, and physically; and to be 'There' as Christ followers with the Gospel in emergencies.

She initiated the CEN ministry with ten national ministries who understood the urgent need for a unified all hazards Christian response to crisis which includes readiness education, crisis communications, and a local biblical response to crises large and small. In her role as CEN Administrator Marr works closely with an all-volunteer team of CEN national field and security advisors who provide ministry direction during CEN national and local activations.

While serving in Michigan, she was approached to host a Christian radio program, *Outreach Alert*, produced by the Family Life Radio Network, which later became a nationally syndicated daily radio program on over 1,000 radio outlets for ten years. Marr continues to use her voice and passion for biblical readiness education to rally the Church nationwide through training, speaking, and as a frequent guest on national Christian radio networks during national incidents.

Marr is the author of *Lighting the Way*, *ReadyChristian*, *ReadyChurch*, and *ReadyCity* and the national report for Rutgers University titled: "*The State of Christian Security - Global and Domestic*" used by law enforcement officials worldwide.

As CEN President, Marr is active in the Mission America Coalition, National Religious Broadcasters, and has been appointed to several U.S. Department of Homeland Security Advisory Committees for over two decades.

Reverend Cassandra Bledsoe
National Chaplain, National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives

Cassandra A. Bledsoe has been the Community Liaison to the Chief of Police for the past 5 years. In this role, she supports an ongoing commitment to maintain open and accessible relationships with all

the members of the community and the Cleveland Division of Police. As well as, develop and maintain operating protocols for the faith-based collaboration.

In 2008, she was approved by Cleveland Mayor Frank G. Jackson as the Administrator of the Office of Professional Standards. Her responsibilities were to oversee the Civilian Police Review Board process and ensure that all complaints regarding alleged improper police conduct are thoroughly investigated. In 2010, Mayor Jackson approved the recommendations from his Commission on Missing Persons and Sex Crimes and expanded the duties of the Office of Professional Standards to include the oversight of Missing Persons and Sex Crimes/Child Abuse Unit Investigations.

In her previous position as Lead Project Director, Civil Rights, Bledsoe was charged with monitoring hate crimes and overseeing relations with Cleveland's 117 ethnic communities and the City's crisis intervention team. She remains dedicated to the field of Civil Rights as a member of the Northeast Ohio Civil Rights Working Group sponsored by the Federal Bureau of Investigation Cleveland Division and the U.S. Attorney's Office Northern District of Ohio.

Bledsoe is a member of Greater Abyssinia Baptist Church where she faithfully serves as the Chief Adjutant to the Senior Pastor. Bledsoe has served five terms to the United States Commission on Civil Rights, Ohio State Advisory Committee. She is also a graduate of the Simon Wiesenthal National Institute Against Hate Crime and Terrorism, a 2001 Graduate of the FBI Citizens Academy, a 2002 recipient of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Director's Community Leadership Award and a 2018 Graduate of the ATF Citizens Academy. She has received numerous other proclamations and recognitions from local, state and Federal officials.

Mark Dannels
Sheriff, Cochise County Arizona

Mark J. Dannels is a 35-year veteran of law enforcement. Dannels has over 3,000 hours of law enforcement training in his portfolio. He began his law enforcement career in 1984 after serving a successful tour in the United States Army. He progressed through the ranks with the Cochise County Sheriff's Office to the position of Deputy Commander after working numerous specialty assignments and leadership roles to include an appointment by the Arizona Governor for his dedicated efforts directed toward highway and community safety.

Dannels is a long-time member of the Fraternal Order of Police, appointed member of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Advisory Council, current member of the National Sheriffs Association where he serves as the Immigration and Border Security Chairman, Southwest Border Sheriffs where he serves on the Board of Directors, Western Sheriffs Association Arizona Homeland Security-Regional Advisory Council, Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats, Border Security Advisory Council, High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Area, 88-Cime, and serves on several community service groups; San Pedro Kiwanis, Just Kids Inc., CASA, Sierra Vista Elks, the Boys and Girls Club of Sierra Vista, the Varsity Wrestling Coach at Buena High School, and teaches at Wayland Baptist University and Cochise College.

Dannels has been recognized and awarded the Medal of Valor, Western States Sheriff of the Year, Sheriff's Medal, Deputy of the Year, Distinguished Service Award, Unit Citation Award, National Police Hall of Fame, Lifesaving Award and dozens of community-service awards from service groups and governmental organizations.

Nathan Diament

Executive Director for Public Policy, Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America

Nathan J. Diament is the Executive Director for Public Policy for the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America – the nation's largest Orthodox Jewish umbrella organization representing more than one-thousand synagogues and hundreds of parochial schools across America.

Diament has worked for more than 20 years in Washington, DC, on a bipartisan basis, to craft and pass legislation addressing an array of policy issues including those related to religious liberty, the security of religious and nonprofit organizations, combating anti-Semitism, education reform, the U.S.-Israel relationship and more. Diament is one of the leaders of the coalition of organizations that spearheaded the creation of the Nonprofit Security Grant Program (administered by DHS/FEMA) and advocates to Congress for its annual funding.

In 2009, Diament was appointed by President Obama to serve as one of twenty-five members of the President's Faith Advisory Council which helped shape current policies under which Federal agencies partner with faith-based organizations across scores of Federal programs.

Diament has also served as an advocate and analyst in major outlets. His writing has been featured in law journals as well as publications including the Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, Washington Times, and New York Times, and he has been a guest on CNN, FOX News, NPR, and other broadcast media.

Diament is an honors graduate of Yeshiva University and the Harvard Law School.

John J. Farmer Jr.

University Professor at Rutgers University

John Farmer is currently University Professor of Law at Rutgers University and has served in this capacity since July 2014. He also served as special counsel to the President of Rutgers University from 2014-2017. His legal career prior to his current position has spanned service in high-profile government appointments, private practice in diverse areas of criminal law, and teaching and law school administration.

Farmer joined the administration of New Jersey Governor Christine Todd Whitman in 1994, serving as assistant counsel, deputy chief counsel, and then chief counsel. From 1999-2002 he was New Jersey's

Attorney General.

From 2003-2004, as senior counsel and team leader for the 9/11 Commission, Farmer led the investigation of the country's preparedness for and response to the terrorist attacks and was a principal author of the Commission's final report. His book, *The Ground Truth: The Story Behind America's Defense on 9/11*, was named a New York Times notable book

He was recruited to become Dean of Rutgers School of Law—Newark in 2009, and served in that capacity until April 2013, when he was asked to complete his Deanship contract by serving as Senior Vice President and General Counsel of Rutgers University.

Farmer is responsible for establishing the Rutgers Center for Critical Intelligence Studies (which has been named an Intelligence Community Center for Academic Excellence through the Office of the Director of National Intelligence) and the Miller Center for Community Protection and Resilience, where he serves as executive director. He served as the principal investigator on a \$1.95 million-dollar grant to develop programs that prepare students to work in intelligence and national security positions.

In 2012, he received the Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. Award from the Association of the Federal Bar of New Jersey and the Distinguished Public Service Award from Leadership New Jersey. In 2014, he received the Thurgood Marshall Award from the Thurgood Marshall College Fund. In 2015, he received the Lifetime Achievement Award from the New Jersey Law Journal.

Kiran Kaur Gill

Executive Director, Sikh American Legal Defense and Education Fund (SALDEF)

Kiran Gill is the Executive Director of the Sikh American Legal Defense and Education Fund (SALDEF). SALDEF is a national Sikh American media, policy, and educational organization. SALDEF's mission is to empower Sikh Americans by building dialogue, deepening understanding, promoting civic and political participation, and upholding social justice and religious freedom for all Americans. Gill has been doing advocacy work for over 10 years including providing Sikh Awareness training to over 2000 law enforcement officers and helping to establish the SikhLEAD New Jersey program which encourages civic engagement among Sikh students. Prior to her role as Executive Director, Gill was president and CEO of PARS Environmental, Inc. a full service environmental consulting firm based in Robbinsville, NJ. In 2014, Gill was selected as "Small Business Person of the Year" by the U.S. Small Business Administration. Gill was also selected among the Best 50 Women in Business by NJBiz and listed among the top 40 Entrepreneurs under 40 by NJBiz the same year. Additionally, Gill serves as a board member of The ONE Project, an interfaith and community coalition organized to address social needs through education and volunteerism and is president and a founding member of Inspiring South Asian American Women (ISAAW) an organization dedicated to promoting civic and community engagement among South Asian American women. In 2018, Gill was named among the top 50 most influential people of color in New Jersey by ROI-NJ.

Keith Manley
Executive Director, Office of General Services USCCB

Keith Manley is the Executive Director, Office of General services for the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB). For the past 17 years, he has been responsible for security at USCCB's headquarters building. He is also responsible for security at the spring and fall General Assembly of all catholic bishops in the United States. Manley was part of the Secret Service security planning team for Pope Benedict XVI's visit to Washington in 2008.

Todd Richins
Director, Field Operations Division, Church Security Department
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints

Todd Richins has worked for the Church Security Department since 1997. During that time, he's worked as a security officer, control center operator, in property and visitor protection, dispatch, in personal protection providing security for Church leaders, and in many management positions. Richins served 7 years as the security director over Church headquarters and event security. Todd is currently the director of their Field Operations Division, which is responsible for security throughout the United States and Canada with a focus on the Church's temples. The division trains security staff, performs risk assessments, makes staffing recommendations, and supports traveling leadership.

In addition to his professional career Richins has served in the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints in many ecclesiastical positions to including as a bishop presiding over a local congregation. He also served a mission for his Church in Ireland. Richins is a Utah native and graduated from the University of Utah. Todd and his wife, Kim, have four children.

Suhag Shukla
Executive Director, Co-Founder of the Hindu American Foundation

Suhag Shukla, Esq., Executive Director, is a co-founder of HAF. She holds a BA in Religion and a JD from the University of Florida. Shukla has helped steer the Foundation to being recognized as a leading voice for civil rights, human rights, and religious freedom. She's been instrumental in the development of a broad range of educational materials and position papers and blogs for a variety of platforms.

Shukla has served on the Boards of the Nirvana Center, Main Line Indian Association, and YWCA of Minneapolis. She was also a member of the Department of Homeland Security Faith-Based Security and Communications Subcommittee.

Shukla is actively involved with Chinmaya Mission, serves on the board of the Bhutanese American

Organization of Philadelphia, and is a thought partner for the Interfaith Center of Greater Philadelphia's Paths to Understanding Public Art Initiative. Shukla is a member of the board for the National Museum of American Religion and serves on religious advisory committees for the Council on Foreign Relations, and the Humane Society of the United States, and is a member of the First Amendment Center's Committee on Religious Liberty and the United Nations Women's Gender Equality and Religion platform. Shukla was named one of twelve "faith leaders to watch in 2017" by the Center for American Progress.

Dr. Randy Vaughn
Senior Pastor, Mount Sinai Missionary Baptist Church Port Arthur

Randy G. Vaughn is the current Sr. Pastor of Mount Sinai Missionary Baptist Church, Port Arthur, Texas. He has been pastoring the Mount Sinai church for over 28 years and has been in ministry for over 35 years. Vaughn presented the need for an office of disaster management following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The Office of Disaster Management was then created with Vaughn as its director. This disaster service is provided to 62 states conventions, over 30,000 churches affiliates and encompass over 7.5 million individual members.

In September 2009, Vaughn orchestrated the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the American Red Cross at the National Convention. He serves as the Convention's representative to the White House of Faith-Based Organizations, consulting with the Department of Homeland Security and FEMA. Vaughn is also the Founder and President of the Succor Foundation and the Help, I'm Hurting Inc. non-profit organization.

Vaughn was awarded "The Ten People Who Made a Difference Award" in 1991 by the Jefferson County. Vaughn also received an Outstanding Service award from the Religious Advisory Committee for the Texas Department of Human Services in 1996 alongside numerous "Keys to the City."

APPENDIX 3: REFERENCED REPORTS

[Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Target Violence](#)
[Report of 2012 Faith-Based Committee](#)
[Report of 2014 Faith-Based Committee](#)

APPENDIX 4: SITE VISITS

Salt Lake City, Utah: Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints Church Security Department
August 1, 2019

Whitefish, Montana: Glacier Jewish Community/B'nai Shalom August 2, 2019

Minneapolis/Bloomington, Minnesota: Dar al Farooq Mosque August 6-7, 2019

Opelousas, Louisiana and Jackson, Mississippi: Little Zion Baptist Church and the Black
Missionary Baptist Church
August 9-12, 2019

San Diego, California: Tri-City Islamic Center, Escondido Mosque, and the Poway Synagogue
August 21-22, 2019

Oak Creek, Wisconsin: The Sikh Temple of Wisconsin September 27, 2019

New Jersey: Rutgers Miller Center, NJ Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness, and the NJ
Regional Operations and Intelligence Center
October 18, 2019

APPENDIX 5: SITE VISIT KEY FINDINGS

Overview

During the months of August, September, and October of 2019, this Subcommittee conducted seven site visits across eight different states. Subcommittee members met with leaders and members of the faith-based community, state and local law enforcement and government officials, and Federal agency personnel based in each area. The goal, as the Subcommittee members explained to those they met with, was to hear communities' concerns, and to learn what actions DHS can take to facilitate effective, proactive, and community-based information-sharing and protection efforts at all levels of government.

From the Dar Al Farooq mosque in Bloomington, Minnesota, to the Poway Synagogue in San Diego, California, to the Sikh Temple of Wisconsin in Oak Creek, the Subcommittee members were welcomed into communities of Latter-day Saints, Jews, Muslims, Christians, and Sikhs. Subcommittee members bore witness to the trauma suffered by all members of the American faith-based community, but also to the great capacity of the multi-faith community to support each other when confronted by hate.

Communities shared frankly their concerns, best practices, triumphs, and suggestions, and the Subcommittee crafted this report based directly upon the valuable insights gained during these site visits.

Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints: Church Security Department

Logistics:

- Location: Salt Lake City, Utah
- Date: August 1, 2019

Background:

Subcommittee members observed best practices and security measures taken by this faith community to secure itself. Members learned about the community's work to provide training and resources with other faiths.

Key Findings

- This faith community leads in church security services domestically and internationally.
- The community is active in the multi-faith community and shares resources and best practices to all faith-based communities. The Church Security Department offers training for FBOs as well as law enforcement and offers FBO resources including risk assessments and information about security guidelines.

- The Church Security Department continuously issues and updates safety guidelines on current threats regarding faith-based communities

Glacier Jewish Community/B'nai Shalom

Logistics:

- Location: Whitefish, Montana
- Date: August 2, 2019

Background:

The Subcommittee visited with the Jewish community, which has been targeted by white supremacists with online and physical threats. Neo-Nazi and white supremacist Richard Spencer lives in Whitefish and has actively organized opposition to the Jewish community here. The Subcommittee sought to observe how the faith community, law enforcement, and local government responded to this threat.

Key Findings:

- A local rabbi expressed that the congregation was being afraid of being Jewish in public. As a result, the Jewish community meets in various locations to avoid being targeted.
- Security measures were implemented in the rabbi's home, and the community began to meet privately in the home for religious practices. There is armed security employed at large gatherings to enhance safety measures.
- Community leaders described the emotional distress of being constantly threatened but added that the struggle gave them a sense of pride in their heritage and religion.

Dar al Farooq Mosque

Logistics:

- Location: Minneapolis/Bloomington, Minnesota
- Date: August 6-7, 2019

Background:

Subcommittee members met with faith community leaders and members of the Dar al Farooq mosque, as well as local law enforcement. In 2017, this mosque was the target of a firebomb attack by a militia group from Illinois. The perpetrators were motivated by anti-Muslim sentiments. Because the attack occurred before morning prayers, no one was injured or killed, but the building was seriously damaged.

Key Findings:

- Local religious leaders from the Muslim community expressed concerns that the threat of white supremacy is not taken seriously by government, and that in the aftermath of the bombing in 2017, the Federal government treated him and his congregants "as suspects, not victims."

- Faith-based communities can do a lot on their own, for example, by leveraging the work already done by the Jewish Community Relations Council (JCRC) to host trainings and conduct their own preparations. The multi-faith community is willing to assist members of the faith community in the prevention and the response aspects; multi-faith platforms are a valuable but underutilized tool.
- The faith-based community in this area harbors great mistrust of Federal government; this was recognized by the U.S. Attorney’s Office as a “huge hurdle” in providing timely threat information and the resources to respond. Among the Muslim community particularly, individuals are afraid to report threat information because they are viewed with suspicion.

Little Zion Baptist Church and the Black’s Missionary Baptist Church

Logistics:

- Locations: Opelousas, Louisiana and Jackson, Mississippi
- Date: August 9-12, 2019

Background:

The Subcommittee held meetings with local pastors and the faith community affected by racism and the 2019 church burnings, along with local, state, and Federal law enforcement officials. Over ten days in March and April 2019, a man conducted arson attacks on three historically African American churches in rural Louisiana, resulting in severe damage to the churches. Officials indicated that the attacks were motivated by racial bias.

Key Findings:

- Particularly in rural areas, there is limited infrastructure in place to alert religious institutions about local suspicious activity or threats. As one faith-based community leader in Opelousas, Louisiana said, “there is a sense of paranoia that information is not being shared with the churches.” Religious communities in this area are also largely unaware of Federal resources such as Protective Security Advisors and FEMA grants.
- There is a gap between suspicious activity and criminal behavior. Law enforcement lacks the preventative tools to effectively respond to suspicious activity. Certain behaviors are not criminal but are indicative of radicalization or pre-attack preparation. One pastor of a rural, predominately African American church recounted an instance in which an unknown white male entered the church and took photos of the floor plan. When the pastor called the police, they were dismissive.
- There is no one-size-fits-all security plan. Faith-based communities need to develop their own customized security plan that suits their own needs, culture, and resources. For example, in the rural south, religious congregations tend to be very community-oriented; informal, relationship-based security plans have proven to be effective here.
- African American churches in this area are effective in leveraging the expertise of active and retired law enforcement, military, and security personnel to help protect their places of worship.

The Chabad of Poway synagogue, Tri-City Islamic Center, and the Escondido Mosque

Logistics:

- Location: San Diego, California
- Date: August 21-22, 2019

Background:

The Subcommittee met with members of the local Jewish and Muslim communities and local law enforcement. In March 2019, a white supremacist conducted an arson attack against the Escondido Mosque. No one was hurt, but the mosque suffered damage. One month later, the same individual opened fire inside the Chabad of Poway synagogue during Passover, fatally shooting one person and injuring three.

Key Findings:

- As in every other place the Subcommittee conducted site visits in, the faith-based community generally had a better relationship with local law enforcement than with Federal entities.
- The confusion and lack of awareness about Federal resources extends to local law enforcement as well as faith-based communities. This is problematic because local law enforcement can leverage their positive relationship and access to the community to convey threat information and educate FBOs about available state and Federal resources.
- The San Diego Sheriff's Office holds cultural classes for law enforcement officers taught by community members. When law enforcement officers are culturally competent, they are more effective in protecting the community, and the community is more comfortable seeking help and sharing information.

The Sikh Temple of Wisconsin

Logistics:

- Location: Oak Creek, Wisconsin
- Date: September 27, 2019

Background:

The Subcommittee visited the leadership and congregants of the Sikh temple and local law enforcement. In 2012, a white supremacist entered the temple and fatally shot six congregants. Four individuals were injured, including a police officer responding to the attack. According to the temple leaders, the perpetrator mistook the temple for a Muslim mosque.

- This temple was targeted because the gunman wrongly believed it was a Muslim mosque. The gunman had called a neighboring religious institution to find the temple's start times

before the day of the attack. There was no communication between the temple and this institution.

- Religious institutions, and the Sikh community in particular, struggle with achieving a balance between being welcoming and maintaining security. The nature of the Sikh religion is to welcome all without questions, even complete strangers. The Wisconsin temple has implemented security measures since 2012, but leaders expressed concern that visitor security is not stringent enough.
- Members of the temple leadership indicated that prior to the attack, there was no information sharing infrastructure in place, but today, information and threat alerts are shared between religious institutions in the area.

Rutgers Miller Center, NJ Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness, and the NJ Regional Operations and Intelligence Center

Logistics:

- Location: New Brunswick, Hamilton, and West Trenton, New Jersey
- Date: October 18, 2019

Background:

At this location, the Subcommittee observed best practices for Fusion Centers and law enforcement. The NJ Fusion Center is considered one of the best in the country due to its coordination with local law enforcement and Federal partners and its engagement with the private sector and faith community.

Key Findings:

- Since 2012, the NJ Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness (NJOHSP) has practiced proactive engagement with the New Jersey faith-based community through its Interfaith Advisory Council (IAC). The IAC is chaired by NJOHSP Director Jared Maples and maintains 3,000 members across all religions. The Council holds quarterly meetings between faith community leaders and members and representatives from the Office of the Attorney General, NJ State Police, FBI, local law enforcement, and other entities.
- NJOHSP regularly shares timely information with the faith-based community. The office develops unclassified “interfaith intelligence resources” which are developed in response to emerging threats or incidents occurring in NJ, nationally, or abroad. The intelligence reports are disseminated to the 3,000 members of the IAC.
- On a ranking system of low, moderate, and high, NJOHSP indicated in its 2019 Terrorism Threat Assessment that “white supremacist extremists” posed a moderate threat to New Jersey. Officials indicated to the Subcommittee that this threat is increasing.

APPENDIX 6: SUBJECT MATTER EXPERTS AND OTHER WITNESSES

1. **Scott Breor**, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, CISA/IP
2. **Michelle Flores**, Deputy Branch Chief, Active Shooter and Insider Threat Mitigation Branch, Security
3. **Brian Harrell**, Assistant Director for Infrastructure Security Division, CISA
4. **Andy Jabbour**, The Faith-Based Information Sharing and Analysis Organization
5. **John Jimenez**, Supervisory Special Agent, Section Chief, Public Corruption and Civil Rights Section, Criminal Investigations Division, FBI
6. **Kathleen Kooiman**, Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center Fusion Center
7. **Brian Murphy**, Principal Deputy Under Secretary Intelligence and Analysis
8. **Elizabeth Neumann**, Assistant Secretary, Threat Prevention and Security Office of Strategy, Policy and Plans, DHS
9. **Tom Plofchan**, Counselor to the Secretary
10. **Taylor Price**, Campaign Manager, "If You See Something, Say Something®" Campaign
11. **Cameron Quinn**, Officer, Office for CRCL DHS
12. **Calvin A. Shivers**, Deputy Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Division, FBI
13. **Kareem W. Shora**, JD, LL.M., Section Chief, Community Engagement Section, Office for CRCL, DHS
14. **Mark S. Silveira**, Incumbent Executive Officer, FEMA, Grant Programs Directorate, DHS
15. **Jennifer Sultan**, Programs Branch Director, Office for CRCL, DHS
16. **Jonathan Thompson**, Executive Director, National Sheriffs' Association
17. **Linda Townsend Solheim**, Director, Soft Targets and Crowded Places Task Force, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure, CISA
18. **Eric W. Treene**, Special Counsel for Religious Discrimination, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice
19. **Chad Wolf**, Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Under Secretary, Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans
20. **Stephen N. Xenakis**, MD, Psychiatrist, Brigadier General(Ret), U.S. Army

APPENDIX 7: FAITH-BASED LEGISLATION

Confronting the Threat of Domestic Terrorism Act - HR4192

To amend title 18, United States Code, to provide for an offense for acts of terrorism occurring in the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, and for other purposes.

Domestic Terrorism Documentation and Analysis of Threats Act - HR3106

To authorize research within the Department of Homeland Security on current trends in domestic terrorism, and for other purposes, having considered the same, report favorably thereon with amendments and recommend that the bill as amended do pass.

Domestic Terrorism Prevention Act - HR1931

To authorize dedicated domestic terrorism offices within the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to analyze and monitor domestic terrorist activity and require the Federal Government to take steps to prevent domestic terrorism.

Protecting Faith-Based and Nonprofit Organizations From Terrorism Act – S. 1593

To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to provide funding to secure nonprofit facilities from terrorist attacks, and for other purposes. There is authorized to be appropriated \$75,000,000 for each fiscal years 2020-2024 to carry out this section. Of the authorized amounts, \$50,000,000 is authorized for eligible nonprofit organizations located in jurisdictions that receive funding under section 2003, and \$25,000,000 is authorized for eligible nonprofit organizations located in jurisdictions not receiving funding under section 2003.

The “Disarm Hate Act” - HR2708

To prevent a person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor hate crime or received an enhanced sentence for a misdemeanor because of hate or bias in its commission, from obtaining a firearm.

The “No Hate Act” - HR3545

To provide incentives for hate crime reporting, provide grants for State-run hate crime hotlines, and establish additional penalties for individuals convicted under the Matthew Shephard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act.