



**POLICE DEPARTMENT
CITY OF BURLINGTON**

TO: City Council President Benjamin Traverse
FROM: Police Chief Jon Murad
DATE: Thursday, December 5, 2024
RE: **Report Requested by Resolution 6.9 of September 9, 2024**

“BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the Chief of the Burlington Police Department, with input from BPD leadership, members of the BPOA, and other community partners, shall present a report to the City Council on or by December 9, 2024...”¹

In preparing this report I consulted with Burlington Police Department (BPD) leadership, particularly Deputy Chief Brian LaBarge, Executive Manager Shannon Trammell, and Assistant Director, CAIP, Lacey-Ann Smith. I also consulted with the Burlington Police Officers Association (BPOA), particularly executive board President Joseph Corrow. I have also met, spoken, and communicated with community members, business owners, and advisors, and incorporated input from those conversations. Ultimately, however, this document contains my analyses and conclusions as Chief of Police, based on five years in the role and twenty years in the profession.

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¹ From the *Resolution Relating to Improving Recruitment for Emergency First Responders and Reexamining the “Cap” on the Number of Sworn Police Officers and Burlington Police Department Personnel*, September 9, 2024, lines 64 to 66.

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On June 29, 2020, the Burlington City Council resolved to reduce the authorized headcount of the Burlington Police Department (BPD) by 30%, from 105 to 74 sworn officers, via attrition. Since the beginning of Fiscal Year 2021 on July 1, 2020, the BPD has lost 58 sworn police officers. In that time, it has hired 30 officers. As a result, headcount has fallen from 92 on July 1, 2020, to 64 on December 1, 2024.

This unprecedented decline has placed the BPD in four-and-a-half years of crisis—a crisis we still face every day. Currently, 64 officers are being asked to police Vermont’s largest city—a city of 15 square miles, 44,000 residents, and workers, students, and visitors who routinely double that population. The number of non-supervisory officers on patrol, who answer the vast majority of calls for service, is half what it was in 2019.

Since the reduction, many high-stakes or high-impact incidents have increased substantially. There have been more robberies, simple assaults, and burglaries. Comparing the 53 months preceding July 2020 to the 53 months since, aggravated assaults are up 44%; aggregated larcenies and retail thefts are up 76%. Although numbers are small, murder and attempted murder have tripled. Stolen vehicles, gunfire incidents, and overdoses are up 364%, 369%, and 371%, respectively.

To ease officers’ workload, confront our city’s issues with crime and public order, and restore responsive community connectivity to Burlington, the BPD should once again be authorized for 105 sworn officers.

Absent extraordinary spending, however, recovering to this number may take several years. An optimistic projection shows 84 is possible by the end of FY28, although it requires the BPD to exceed its best-ever year repeatedly for five years in a row. The regrowth would be aided by an explicit, official admission by the City that the decision to reduce the department was an ill-considered, destructive experiment, and an explicit, official rejection of the 74-officer cap created by that decision and a rejection of the current cap of 87, as well. In reference to the resolution that occasioned this report, the BPOA stated that removing the cap would “signal to potential applicants that the City Administration is committed to investing in the Department and making it a better place to work.”

II. BACKGROUND

On June 29, 2020, the Burlington City Council resolved to reduce the authorized headcount of the BPD by 30%, from 105 to 74 sworn officers.² Eschewing layoffs, the Council ordered the reduction through attrition. The resolution also removed school resource officers, or SROs, from schools in the Burlington School District. It was preceded by three weeks of online public meetings in which caller after caller used the phrase “Defund the Police,” and repeated demands informed primarily by an online letter to the Mayor, the City Council, and the Police Commission from the Racial Justice Alliance. That letter demanded “an immediate 30 percent reduction in uniformed officers.”³

The police department took the nine-to-three vote for the resolution as a vote of no confidence from the city. Officers—who had dedicated their careers to Burlington; who were proud of their innovative, compassionate department; and who felt existentially stung by the speed and breadth of what they saw as an undeserved, impulsive local overreaction to national events—resigned in droves. Their exit questionnaires tell this plainly. (See Appendix 01) From July 1, 2020, through December 1, 2024, the BPD lost 58 officers.

Another way of contextualizing that is to note that the BPD has lost a number of officers equivalent to 90% of our total current count.

The 30% reduction was based mostly on a Governing.com webpage that showed officer-to-population ratios for American cities with populations fewer than 50,000. At every stage, then-Mayor Miro Weinberger argued against the reduction. His FY21 budget proposed “capping” the BPD at the number of officers who were on the books on June 29, 2020. That would have been an 11% reduction from the FY20 authorized headcount of 105 officers, but it was unacceptable to those seeking a different kind of police reform.

In December 2020, in a presentation to the City Council, I articulated concerns about staffing, made predictions about our increasing inability to handle lower-level calls for service, and asked the Council to amend the cap.⁴ A month later, on January 22, 2021, I presented the

² “BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the Burlington Police Department decrease through attrition, allowing officers to elect of their own accord to retire or leave for other reasons, the maximum total number of uniformed police officers by 30% from 105 to 74 uniformed officers” from the *Resolution Relating to Racial Justice Through Economic and Criminal Justice*, June 29, 2020, lines 51 to 53. Three councilors unsuccessfully voted to reduce the headcount even further—to 63 by July 1, 2022—a number that turned out to be eerily prescient.

³ See <https://www.vtracialjusticealliance.org/2020/06/letter-to-burlington-mayor-city-council-and-police-commission/>, dated June 8, 2020, and <https://www.vtracialjusticealliance.org/2020/06/operation-phoenix/>, dated June 12; both links active and retrieved as of December 1, 2024.

⁴ See <https://vtdigger.org/2020/12/21/burlington-police-chief-asks-for-more-officers-after-30-mandated-cut/>

Public Safety Continuity Plan.⁵ The plan proposed augmenting the Community Service Officers, or CSOs, and also introduced the Community Support Liaison (CSL) position. It also requested that the 74-officer cap be raised, in order to permit hiring and stall the staffing freefall.

This pilot Public Safety Continuity Plan proposal represents a middle path. It is a *shorter-term* solution, not a short-term solution. *It is a good plan done in time, rather than a best plan done too late.* It can continue to be honed based on the results of the two assessments currently planned under the auspices of the Joint Committee of the City Council’s Public Safety Committee and the Burlington Police Commission (the “Joint Committee”). One of these assessments—a “full operational and functional assessment” of the BPD—was described in the Resolution re Racial Justice Through Economic and Criminal Justice eight months ago, but the Joint Committee has yet to commence either the operational assessment or the facilitator assessment.

On February 8, 2021,⁶ the City Council adopted the CSO/CSL parts of the plan, but voted not to alter the cap. At the same meeting, the Council moved forward with the firm CNA to begin the assessment.

In May 2021, owing to falling staffing and rising incident volume, I created and implemented the Priority Response Plan. I updated it in 2022 and 2024,⁷ and it remains in place.

On August 9, 2021, members of the Council tried again to raise the cap, but despite support from Mayor Weinberger and the Police Commission, the resolution was again rejected.⁸

In Oct 2021, after receipt of the CNA Report, the council raised the cap on officers from 74 to 87. By that time, the BPD had already begun to hire not because of the raised cap but because the agency had fallen below 74—headcount was 70 on October 1, 2021. From then to July 1, 2022, the agency hired three officers but lost ten. Headcount bottomed out at 61.

It was not until a new police contract was ratified on July 26, 2022, that the BPD began to increase again. We are now working to rebuild, but progress has not been as strong as desired. Since being allowed to hire again in autumn 2021, the BPD has hired 30 sworn employees. Of those, we currently retain 19, or 63%.

⁵ See <https://www.burlingtonvt.gov/DocumentCenter/View/1593/The-Public-Safety-Continuity-Plan-PDF>

⁶ See <https://vtdigger.org/2021/02/09/burlington-mayor-fails-to-boost-officer-cap-to-84/>

⁷ See <https://www.burlingtonvt.gov/DocumentCenter/View/993/2024-BPD-Priority-Response-Plan-PDF>

⁸ See <https://vtdigger.org/2021/08/10/burlington-city-council-rejects-raising-police-officer-staffing-cap-for-second-time/>

III. POINT-BY-POINT RESPONSE TO RESOLUTION 6.9 OF SEPTEMBER 9, 2024

Responding to the resolution raises challenging questions about funding, for which this report does not provide a solution. In the first months of her administration, Mayor Emma Mulvaney-Stanak was faced with and overcame a tremendous, unanticipated budget gap. Despite this, she provided strong funding to the BPD and embraced its need to regrow. In writing this report I acknowledge that effort and that support, and also acknowledge that the City continues to face thin margins. Nevertheless, as I see the task set by the Council, it is to recommend things that could or should be done in service of the singular objective of rebuilding the BPD—not necessarily things that can be done, or even how to make them happen.

With few exceptions, each proposal for how to address our staffing crisis boils down to money. The more urgent the need, the more money it will require. The business maxim “cheap, fast, or good—pick two” applies. Burlington needs to rebuild its police department, from its personnel to its facility, and it needs to do so quickly, and that will be expensive.


As of December 1, 2024, the BPD has 64 sworn officers, of whom 58 are “effective” and able to be deployed.⁹ An additional loss is anticipated: I expect we will end the calendar year with 63 officers. Historically, from 2015 to 2020, the BPD maintained a monthly average headcount of 97. In other words, headcount is down 30% from historic averages. (See Chart 01 on the following page)

The reduction of non-supervisory patrol officers is worse, however. In 2024 there are half as many non-supervisory patrol officers as there were in 2019. Patrol officers respond to the vast majority of calls for service, and while there are 50% fewer patrol officers than in 2019, there are 6% more incidents. (See Appendix 02)

Higher numbers of police mean less crime. (See Appendix 03) In this context, Burlington’s experience since 2020 is a case-study waiting to happen. Furthermore, even as headcount has fallen, demands on the police have substantially increased. Comparing the 53 months preceding July 2020 to the 53 months since, many high-stakes or high-impact incidents have increased substantially. There have been more robberies, simple assaults, and burglaries. Aggravated assaults are up 44%; aggregated larcenies and retail thefts are up 76%.

⁹ Examples of officers who are not “effective” are officers on long-term military leave, recruit officers at the Vermont Police Academy, officers on field training who cannot operate independently of their field trainer, officers on limited duty owing to pregnancy, etc.

Chart 01



Although numbers are small, murder and attempted murder have tripled. Stolen vehicles, gunfire incidents, and overdoses are up 364%, 369%, and 371%, respectively. (See Chart 02)

	2/1/2016 to 06/30/2020	7/1/2020 to 12/01/2024
Assault – aggravated	200	288
Assault – simple	737	775
Burglary	759	819
Gunfire	16	75
Larceny/retail theft	4,648	8,165
Murder / att murd	9	29
Overdose	306	1,440
Robbery	87	92
Stolen vehicle	214	994

Chart 02

Burlington’s most important goal should be getting sworn-officer headcount back to effective numbers that produced much more effective public safety for decades. Without this, the BPD’s other efforts will be for naught. This includes ongoing work to develop alternative means of response such as the Crisis Advocacy Intervention Programs, or CAIP, which includes the CSLs. As the practitioners themselves have attested, those programs cannot

exist without a healthy police service. If we could hire 20 police officers tomorrow, it would be the single-most important thing to do for public safety and make a massive difference in our public safety posture.

Many other municipalities have had to make hard decisions—or been required to make such decisions—around funding police. In Missouri, for example, where suburbs surrounding Kansas City have been alarmed at the city’s crime trends and what it means for the region’s economic seat, a statewide vote in August required Kansas City to increase its police department’s budget and “spend at least 25% of [the city’s] general revenue on police, amounting to tens of millions of dollars per year.”¹⁰ A similar state intervention occurred in Austin, Texas.¹¹ (For reference and comparison, in Burlington the police department budget is 17% of the total general fund budget.¹²)

The split between Kansas City and the capital in Jefferson City, Missouri, is entirely different from the relationship Burlington enjoys with Montpelier, and nothing so shocking is on our horizon. But it illustrates an extreme example of how a linchpin city can affect a region. As in Missouri, Burlington’s situation impacts the wider region. Our city is home to Vermont’s largest educational institutions, its largest hospital, its international airport, its most vibrant restaurant-and-nightlife scene, and a host of businesses, service-providers, and cultural mainstays. These need a safe, welcoming, orderly environment to thrive. They need effective public safety.

¹⁰ See <https://missouriindependent.com/2024/08/06/missouri-voters-approve-amendment-requiring-more-police-spending-in-kansas-city/>

¹¹ See <https://www.kxan.com/news/texas-politics/texas-legislature-responds-to-austin-police-budget-cuts-set-to-punish-cities-that-defund-police/>

¹² The total general fund, \$108,176,243; the police department’s budget is 17,851,103. See <https://www.burlingtonvt.gov/DocumentCenter/View/1727/4--Total-General-Fund-Budget> and <https://www.burlingtonvt.gov/DocumentCenter/View/1738/17---Police>

Accordingly, the most important task in front of the Queen City should be bringing aboard new police officers. Failure to make progress on this will accelerate many of the city's current challenges, particularly those associated with public order and personal safety, but also those associated with reputational deficit. In communications with business leaders while preparing this report, those leaders have asserted that diminished police presence and response, the sense of peril, and a pervasive lack of public order has led to diminished economic activity and store closures, particularly on the Marketplace. Community-based organizations have expressed similar concerns.¹³ Lastly, and most crucially for a police department that cares about victims, when there are too few officers it most deeply affects the most vulnerable, who use police services the most and in extremis. Important parts of our community have felt underserved and even abandoned over the past four-and-a-half years. We owe it to them to make better connections, to hear their concerns, and come when they call. We cannot do that fully with the numbers we currently have.

A. AN UPDATE ON CURRENT STAFFING LEVELS. As of December 1, 2024, the BPD has 64 police officers. Of those, 58 are "effective," in that they are available for immediate deployment as fully certified officers.

One concern that has recently come into starker relief, owing in part to my intention not to seek reappointment, is the BPD's levels of supervision. (See Appendix 04) Although the staffing crisis is most acute on patrol, it is also felt in our supervisory ranks. The leaders we have are excellent, but they are too few. For some time the department has had to operate with five sergeants rather than the eleven it is allotted. We have five lieutenants rather than six. And we currently have one deputy chief rather than two (and the one who remains is expected to retire in the spring, shortly after I do). Because of this, we have taken the unusual step of posting externally for the deputy chief position (Appendix 05).

B. AN UPDATE ON ONGOING RECRUITMENT EFFORTS. Chart 03, on the following page, shows total sworn-officer hires from 2010 to 2024 YTD. It also shows the number of officers from each of those annual hiring cohorts who are still currently employed by the BPD. Of all 140 officers hired since 2010, we have retained 36% as of December 1, 2024. (As noted earlier, 30 of those were hired since autumn 2021. Of those, we currently retain 19, or 63%.)

Chart 04, on page ten, breaks down the hiring data to compare recruit hiring to lateral hiring for the same period. It, too, shows the number of officers from each annual hiring cohort who are still employed. All recruit officers must attend the Vermont Police Academy (VPA), which has two classes per year, in February and August. Accordingly, the BPD hires for those classes in

¹³ In particular, I was influenced by input from an October 10 meeting with King Street Center Executive Director Shabnam Nolan. She shared what the Center is experiencing, including the fact that 50% of the Center's teens feel unsafe walking home. <https://www.kingstreetcenter.org/fall2024>

January and July. Lateral officers—i.e., officers with previous experience who do not have to undergo the full, 16-week training at the VPA—can be hired at any time of year. Lateral officers include officers from other agencies, often from police departments in other states, as well as BPD officers who leave but choose to return.

It's worth noting that retention for lateral officers is higher than for recruit officers. Lateral officers are more familiar with the vagaries of police work and better prepared for its vicissitudes.

In FY23 \$250,000 was allocated for recruitment efforts, and in January 2023 the City posted a request for proposals seeking a recruitment firm. The most qualified respondent to the RFP sought a sum that, frankly, gave me and then-Mayor Weinberger pause. Furthermore, between the strong work of our recruitment team and the strong new contract, the BPD saw sufficient hiring success in 2023 that it did not use the allocation, which carried over into FY24.

YEAR	TOTAL IN	Of total hired, # still employed as of 12/01/24
2010	8	2
2011	13	4
2012	4	1
2013	13	5
2014	12	3
2015	10	1
2016	13	4
2017	9	2
2018	12	4
2019	12	3
2020	5	3
2021	1	1
2022	7	5
2023	15	8
2024*	7	5
TOTAL	141	51 (36%)

* 2024 shown through Dec 01, 2024

Chart 03

In 2023, our recruitment team—Recruitment Officer Corporal Carolynne Erwin and Recruitment Coordinator Anhad Bajwa¹⁴—hired 15 sworn officers, the most in more than three decades. Accounting for nine retirements and resignations, the BPD began 2023 with 61 sworn officers and ended the year with 69. This includes 11 recruit officers and four lateral officers.

The hiring success in 2023 extended beyond sworn officers and into our professional ranks, as well. In all, the BPD hired 32 new employees in 2023. This was more people than in any other year for which we have records. It included the 15 sworn officers mentioned above, as well as five Emergency Communications Specialists (dispatchers), five CSOs, four CSLs, a Public

¹⁴ Sadly, Recruitment Coordinator Bajwa left us in October to relocate out of state. Additionally, Corporal Erwin has chosen to leave the post in January and will retire in July. Officer Sergio Caldieri, one of our best trainers and most highly educated officers, has been assigned to the recruitment role and is currently shadowing Corporal Erwin.

YEAR	RECRUIT HIRES		Of recruits hired, # still employed as of 12/01/24	LATERAL HIRES	Of laterals hired, # still employed as of 12/01/24
2010	8		2	0	
	Jan: 2	Jul: 6			
2011	9		3	4	1
	Jan: 8	Jul: 1			
2012	3		1	1	0
	Jan: 2	Jul: 1			
2013	9		3	4	2
	Jan: 7	Jul: 2			
2014	11		3	1	0
	Jan: 7	Jul: 4			
2015	6		0	4	1
	Jan: 2	Jul: 4			
2016	8		2	3	2
	Jan: 4	Jul: 4			
2017	10		3	1	0
	Jan: 4	Jul: 6			
2018	10		2	1	1
	Jan: 4	Jul: 6			
2019	9		3	3	0
	Jan: 6	Jul: 3			
2020	4		2	1	1
	Jan: 4	Jul: 0			
2021	1		1	0	
	Jan: 0	Oct: 1			
2022	5		3	2	2
	Jan: 2	Jul: 3			
2023	11		5	4	3
	Jan: 6	Jul: 5			
2024*	5		3	2	2
	Jan: 1	Jul: 4			
	109		36	31	15
			33%		48%

* 2024 shown through Dec 01, 2024

Chart 04

Information and Community Engagement Coordinator, a Technology Support Specialist, and a Recruitment Coordinator.

While the main focus of this report is sworn-officer staffing, the success story in our Emergency Communications Center, or ECC, is worth noting. The BPD is allotted 14 dispatchers, but had fallen to four in 2022. The BPD ECC dispatches both police and fire—more than 40,000 calls for service per year. Typically there are two “Police Desks” and one “Fire Desk,” meaning the ECC is staffed by three dispatchers at any given time. Thanks to the recruiting team’s work, we currently have eleven dispatchers.

In 2024 so far, the BPD has hired 22 new employees, including four dispatchers, four CSOs, two CSLs, two members of the CARES team, two Records Clerks, and a Command Assistant.

Unfortunately, only seven sworn officers were hired in 2024, and thus far 12 have separated. This loss of momentum has put us off the forecasts Mayor Weinberger and I offered as part of the FY24 budget, forecasts that showed a path to more than 80 officers by late FY26.

During the budget process for FY25, I articulated a similar set of goals to Mayor Mulvaney-Stanak, who adopted them. On October 28, 2024, she included hiring in a document presented to the Council, “Mayor Mulvaney-Stanak's Administration Goals and Values FY25/First Term.”¹⁵ That document explicitly articulated a goal of increasing sworn-officer headcount to 77 sworn officers by the end of FY25, which would have been ten more than the officer count of 67 that existed during the budget process. Unfortunately, since developing the budget in May, it has become clear that there is no reasonable path to achieving these staffing numbers in FY25. The BPD began 2024 with 69 officers and is projected to end with 63. An increase of 14 officers in the first half of 2025 (i.e., the second half of FY25) is unlikely. When accounting for anticipated FY25 Q3 and Q4 separations that have yet to occur, the number by which the BPD would need to increase is not actually 14, it is 16 or more. Nevertheless, I am grateful that the Mayor has made clear that, if we are able to hire that number—or more!—she will find the budget for it.

Regarding the loss of hiring momentum in 2024, I am uncertain of its cause. In a New Year’s Day memo to the BPD on January 1, 2023, I wrote

I believe we’ve turned a corner in staffing too. We end the year at 63 sworn officers, which is slightly higher than the estimates I provided in the Rebuilding Plan and FY23 budget. We’re losing some officers in the next few weeks, but we’ll be gaining more than we lose as former officers return and as we prepare for the February Academy. Here’s my prediction: In 2022, we lost 13 officers but gained seven. In 2023 we will lose nine but gain 15. We will end the year with 69 police officers.

In 2023, that prediction turned out to be spot on. Growth is a function of retention and recruitment, and in 2023 there were factors that improved both, including the BPD’s best-in-the-region contract and the defeat of Proposition 7.

In a New Year’s Day memo to the BPD on January 1, 2024, I wrote

The change we continue to need is rebuilding. We cannot live up to our neighbors’ public safety expectations—and our own—without proper staffing. We ended 2023 with 69 sworn officers, just as I predicted in Memo 2023-01 last year. To put that in context, we brought in 15 sworn officers. That’s the largest number in well over a decade. And we’ve kept 13 of those hires. It’s true that we also lost valuable teammates—nine total. ... In February 2024, our first VPA class won’t hit the numbers we saw in February ’23. But

¹⁵ See CivicClerk, <https://burlingtonvt.portal.civicclerk.com/event/7131/files/attachment/6695>

I'm confident we'll bring in 11 sworn officers in 2024. I anticipate we'll lose five. And I predict that we'll be at 75 sworn by the end of the year.

In 2024, that has not borne out. Regarding recruitment in 2024, sworn-officer applications were down significantly, as shown at right in Chart 05. As a result, we did not hire 11 as predicted, we hired seven. And rather than losing five, we lost 13. The unanticipated separations stemmed from a range of factors: an officer who moved to the Shelburne Police Department; a lateral officer who returned with his family to Texas; an officer in field training who expressed exasperation at the workload and paperwork requirements and returned to Florida; an officer on field training who expressed dismay about our agency's operational pace and moved to the University of Vermont Police Department; an officer who wanted to be an SRO and moved to another police department that has the role.

	APPLICATIONS RECEIVED BY BPD	OF THOSE RECEIVED, # HIRED
2021	53	3
2022	142	15
2023	119	8
2024*	53	3

Chart 05

We have tried and are trying to overcome the dearth of applications, including new levels of advertising. In March, Corporal Erwin and Coordinator Bajwa got a full-page, centerfold ad placed in the New York Post, the most-read tabloid in New York City, with the ninth largest circulation in America. At the end of the summer, we contracted with Horizon Visual Media, a video-production company from Maine, which came to Burlington and made high-quality video content for us. We are also in negotiations with a company called All-Star Talent for an online recruiting campaign where we would use that content. All-Star Talent was featured in several presentations at the recent International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) conference, receiving high marks from satisfied agencies. Looking to the \$250,000 that had been reserved in FY23 and again in FY24, we set aside \$100,000 to fund sign-on bonuses. (In September 2021, the City Council approved retention and recruitment bonuses using funds from the American Rescue Plan Act, and the ARPA-backed recruitment bonuses have been expended or otherwise accounted for.) We have also used approximately \$40k from this fund to pay for the Horizon videos. In FY25 the City Council allocated an additional \$100,000 for recruitment efforts and the BPD will be using a majority of that for a social-media advertising campaign and new recruitment website.

Redacted 1 V.S.A. 317(c)(15)

In addition to these efforts, there are two additional programs that could enhance recruitment. Neither is currently in progress or implemented. (See Appendix 06 and Appendix 07)

In addition to sworn officers, both recruits and laterals, we are also working to replace both of our Deputy Chief positions, and have engaged in targeted advertising for those roles, specifically via the IACP and the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF). We have already received applications and expect to begin a vetting process at the beginning of January.

C. A REVISED RECOMMENDATION ON THE NUMBER OF UNIFORMED SWORN POLICE OFFICERS. The BPD should once again be authorized for 105 sworn officers.

The BPD's current staffing is inadequate. Sixty-four officers is manifestly too few. The BPD is unable to be as responsive as in the past (see the Priority Response Plan), some city crimes and conditions have deteriorated compared to the past (see Chart 02, page 7), and officers are exhausted. As of December 3, 2024, which is 43% of the fiscal year, the BPD's Uniform Services Bureau has used 53% of its overtime (budgeted \$900,000 for the fiscal year) and Airport Services has used 54% of its overtime (budgeted for \$60,000). Combined police overtime, which includes patrol, detectives, the drug unit, etc., is 53% expended for the year. This is slightly more than in years past, and it's also being borne by fewer officers.

We are asking too few officers to do more than they are able. And yet they do, a fact that routinely amazes me. That said, there is no unassailable method of determining headcount. The IACP states, "Ready-made, universally applicable patrol staffing standards do not exist. Ratios, such as officers-per-thousand population, are totally inappropriate as a basis for staffing decisions."¹⁶ At one end, the CNA Report used 2019 incident volume data and a 12-hour shift

¹⁶ See <https://www.cpsm.us/police-staffing-standards-are-a-myth-experts-say/>

system, the so-called “Pitman schedule,” to recommend 88 officers (with the airport), 40 of them assigned to patrol. But CNA failed to account for the Valcour system’s inability to track anything other than an officer’s time on scene, and therefore drastically underestimated administrative time as well as training time. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]¹⁷ At the other end, an older staffing analysis conducted by Rutherford-Ruotolo Consulting Consortium, which was reapplied by then-Deputy Chief Matthew Sullivan in 2021, suggested 84 non-supervisory officers assigned to patrol. Factoring in supervisors, detectives, and the airport would yield an overall headcount of approximately 120—a number I would relish but one that I know the BPD can operate below. (See Appendix 08) **Redacted 1 V.S.A. 317(c)(15)**

Despite this, the question of what is the right or the wrong staffing has occupied nearly every discussion about police over the past four-and-a-half years. In short, articulating a headcount cap has become a political artifact and a constant reminder of the 2020 reduction. As the original draft of the September 9 resolution stated, “CNA’s October 2021 recommendation of an authorized headcount of between 85-88 uniformed Burlington Police Department officers, is no longer reflective of current conditions.” It further stated, “to better address the current state of public safety in Burlington, to provide the City necessary flexibility in drafting the report asked of this resolution, and to send an important message to the community that the City is fully committed to its Police Department, the City hereby removes the current ‘cap’ of 87 uniformed sworn officers at the Burlington Police Department.”

Over the past three months, while preparing this report, I have come to agree fully with the language of the resolution’s original draft. In conversations with community stakeholders at a variety of institutions, from the Boys & Girls Club to Spectrum to the King Street Center, people have revealed that they feel the lack of police presence and response, both for their institutions and their constituents.¹⁸ Business leaders have said the same. The Burlington Business Association reports that “In recent years, we have received an increasing number of concerns from downtown business owners regarding the safety of their employees and customers. Concerns include, violence, harassment, theft, and an increase in graffiti.”¹⁹ Accordingly, I

¹⁷ [REDACTED]

¹⁸ See <https://www.kingstreetcenter.org/fall2024>

¹⁹ See <https://www.bbavt.org/current-projects/public-safety-initiatives/>

believe it is best either to return to status quo ante or to dispense with the cap altogether and merely express how many officers the City can afford. Since the latter option would be devastating to morale and fail to provide necessary goals for rebuilding, I strongly recommend the former. **The BPD should once again be authorized for 105 sworn officers.** This is distinct from budgeting for that number.

Returning the agency to an authorized headcount of 105 that routinely yields a headcount in the high 90s would allow the BPD to reconnect with the community, including in the schools. (Along with a repudiation of the headcount clause in the Racial Justice resolution, there should be a repudiation of the clause that removed SROs from the Burlington School District.) It would allow the BPD once again to adopt the hallmarks of progressive, community-oriented policing. It would allow officers to return to an area-based deployment model, wherein officers are assigned to specific parts of the city and come to understand the people, problems, and potential of those neighborhoods. It would allow the deployment of a dedicated Marketplace foot patrol team—as many as six officers, regularly assigned to the Marketplace and its environs, connecting with businesses and visitors alike. It would allow a Street Crime Unit, which would better address unacceptable public disorder, including open-air drug use—a crime that, with higher headcount, would once again be regularly disrupted. (See representations of deployment models in Appendix 09 and 10 and 11)

If one were to describe all of this to any current or retired BPD officer whose hire date is 2019 or earlier, he or she will exclaim, “but, but, that’s what we always had!” For two decades, Burlington was a nationally recognized, award-winning practitioner of community policing.²⁰

All of this is also part of Neighborhood Policing, which I helped design and implement as part of the NYPD’s Reengineering 2014 project. One of my greatest regrets about my tenure as Chief of Police is that the staffing crisis has prevented me from building on the BPD’s community policing model by adopting Neighborhood Policing, and the integral role of Neighborhood Coordination Officer, or NCO.²¹ But when the NYPD created the model in 2015, it did so by expanding staffing for the first time in more than a decade, not in the face of a 30% reduction. Indeed, the program was a response to the fact that, in understaffed patrol precincts, patrol had “devolved into answering calls for service and little else. ... The Neighborhood Policing Plan seeks to restore the patrol officer to the role of problem solver and community guardian, who knows the neighborhood and works closely with residents. ... It assigns the same officers to the

²⁰ See 2012 IACP Community Policing Awards, <https://gilee.gsu.edu/programs/community-policing/#1568923944814-e239bf5a-0792>

²¹ See <https://www.nyc.gov/site/nypd/bureaus/patrol/neighborhood-coordination-officers.page>

same sectors on the same tours, helping the cops to know the neighborhood and the neighborhood to know the cops.”²²

My belief that staffing needs to be returned to status quo ante doesn’t mean I believe in the status quo, however. Since 2020, the BPD has undertaken a number of responsive, progressive efforts to maintain our public safety posture, respond to community concerns, and innovate at the same time. As part of the Public Safety Continuity Plan, the BPD successfully augmented the number of CSOs, an unarmed, non-sworn role that provides low-level, quality-of-life services but cannot make arrests. The BPD has been able to hire people for these roles more quickly than for sworn officer positions, whose background checks, VPA training, and field training can take almost a year or more. We’ve also had a great deal of success using the CSO role as a proving ground for employees who want to become police officers; four of our current officers first served as CSOs. But CSOs aren’t cops, and the limits on what they can lawfully do and safely address has made it clear that they are not replacements for cops.

We have also continued to innovate with the creation of CAIP. Run by Assistant Director, CAIP, Lacey-Ann Smith, CAIP is a collaborative model that strives to provide seamless continuity of care and integrates change directly into public safety’s largest component: the police. The backbone of CAIP is the CSL position, which, when introduced as part of the Public Safety Continuity Plan, was the only position like it in Vermont. (Other agencies have since adopted similar programs, often after consulting with BPD, such as Brattleboro’s BRAT²³ and Rutland’s community resource specialists.²⁴) The CSLs are in-house social workers who address issues associated with chronic mental health needs, homelessness, and substance-use disorder. CSLs aren’t replacements for cops, either; they’re a police enhancement.

CAIP offers “lower barrier” assistance and supplements the existing social-service system—and bridges gaps. When a call for help comes in, an officer responds to the incident and establishes safety, by intervening in an unstable or dangerous situation, or sometimes by making an arrest. But when that officer also knows that the underlying causes are not solved by enforcement, the officer can call a CSL to bridge the gap between that 9-1-1 call and other services that might help the person—and potentially prevent a call in the future. CAIP also includes the Burlington CARES program (Crisis Assessment Response and Engagement Services), which provides clinical crisis response.

²² The Police Commissioner’s Report, “A New Cop In Town,” p10, <https://www.nyc.gov/assets/nypd/downloads/pdf/publications/pc-report-2016.pdf>

²³ See https://www.commonnews.org/issue/787/787resource_assist_team

²⁴ See <https://vtdigger.org/2022/09/09/former-rutland-police-commander-returns-as-civilian-community-liaison/>

I believe CAIP is part of the future of policing. AD Smith, Community Support Supervisor Anna Wagling, and I presented the model at the 2023 IACP conference and I think it's a template for what police agencies everywhere should create. An authorized headcount of 105 sworn would allow a next-stage expansion of CAIP: co-deployment with sworn officers. These would be officers who apply for the role and receive additional training in domestic-violence prevention, crisis intervention, and outreach. They would co-deploy with both CSLs and members of the Burlington CARES team. Additionally, School Resource Officers would be assigned to CAIP to enhance the relationship our CSLs have forged with Burlington's youth. Placing officers in the CAIP team, as shown in Appendix 12, would represent an important new career path for officers, and, I believe, would be a valuable recruitment opportunity. (See Appendix 12 for my vision of a fully staffed, integrated CAIP)

In addition to CAIP, we have improved our collaboration with the Police Commission and adopted Department Directive 40 *External and Internal Complaints, Supervisor Reviews, Administrative Reviews, Internal Investigations & Discipline* to guarantee the Commission's involvement and input. Our use-of-force directive became the template for the statewide policy. We have enhanced and expanded our data transparency, so that it is the most comprehensive of any law-enforcement agency in the state. We have conducted innovative, iterative fair and impartial policing training that we created with the Center for Policing Equity.

Data transparency fosters police legitimacy, but also police improvement. By recognizing areas where concerns exist, we can confront them when they are driven by factors that officers or the department can control. This includes tracking racial disparities and monitoring them for bias. It also includes making descriptions of every use of force public, and releasing a great number of them on video as well.

D. A COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT OF ANY RECRUITMENT HURDLES AT THE BURLINGTON POLICE DEPARTMENT. The single biggest recruitment hurdle is the history described in the background section, above. It has engendered a sense that the City does not support police. This sentiment is described in the separating officers' exit questionnaires. (See Appendix 01) More recently, and applicable to our local recruitment pool, it is well articulated in a letter sent to the City Council by a BPOA executive board member Michael Moran. (See Appendix 13)

This history is now exacerbated by recent news reports about a survey describing greatly diminished morale and the parlous condition of our facility.²⁵ Regarding the building, it has been described by the recruitment team and officers as a tremendous obstacle to recruitment. Mayor Mulvaney-Stanak has made it a clear priority to address this.

²⁵ See <https://vtdigger.org/2024/11/22/we-are-in-a-crisis-internal-survey-shows-deep-discontent-among-burlington-police/> and <https://vtdigger.org/2024/11/29/burlingtons-dilapidated-police-building-is-dragging-down-department-morale-and-spurring-concerns-of-health-risks/>

Regarding the survey, I responded to it in August, during an internal event called an All In. I repeated the presentation for the public last week, at the Police Commission meeting on Tuesday, November 26. The presentation is available on Town Meeting TV.²⁶ As I said at both the August All In and the November Police Commission meeting, the survey had troubling feedback, but it was ultimately a positive experience to get that feedback—because it gave us a chance to address it.

I believe this report offers the Council and the city the same opportunity.

There are additional recruitment (and retention) hurdles that are outside the control of the department or the City Council. They have to do with how officers are supported by or interact with the next stages in the criminal justice process—specifically, how officers’ enforcement actions are followed by prosecutors, courts, and corrections. For most offenders, alternative practices like those offered by the Community Justice Center are preferable to using a backlogged, overburdened court system. (See Appendix 14) But, for the small percentage of recidivists who commit a plurality of our public order crimes, property crimes, and even significant numbers of violent crimes, the lack of accountability both frustrates officers and perpetuates our public-order and public-safety problems. For this small number of recidivists, the threat of apprehension is meaningless without consequence, particularly carceral consequence.²⁷ Carceral consequence has the added benefit of incapacitating wrongdoers for the duration of their incarceration. Whether or not it rehabilitates them or addresses so-called root causes is beside the immediate point: a jailed criminal cannot victimize neighbors.

1. The extent to which additional administrative support at the Burlington Police Department will allow officers additional time to actively engage in community policing. Over the past few years, we have had success rebuilding our professional ranks. Two key positions are missing. First, a Budget Manager, to ensure that critical function is being addressed in close coordination with the Chief Administrative Officer and the staff at the Clerk / Treasurer’s Office and needed to ease Executive Manager Shannon Trammell’s currently unacceptable workload. Second, a Network Administrator, to ensure that our critical, stand-alone technology infrastructure is appropriately managed and secured. Other than these, we are largely staffed for non-sworn positions. (See Appendix 15)

That said, the nature of this question seems directed more at the possibility of new positions, designed to reduce officers’ administrative workloads. It may be worth

²⁶ See <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SGj8oEAOcgc&t=3778s>, at minute 30:00.

²⁷ See <https://manhattan.institute/article/hardening-the-system-three-commonsense-measures-to-help-keep-crime-at-bay>

exploring the use of civilian analysts in the Detective Services Bureau, or DSB. Employees who could assist with video review and document preparation, such as affidavits, preservation requests, subpoenae duces tecum, nontestimonial identification orders, etc., could reduce workload and enhance efficiency.

2. How the current salary, paid time off, and benefits package for officers compares to market data for other police departments in our region. Regarding other regional competitors, the largest agency in the region—and the nation—offers a six-step pay scale that tops out at \$126,410. The NYPD starts at \$60,884 but rises to \$126,410 after five-and-a-half years. It offers 27 vacation days following five years of service; unlimited sick days with full pay; prescription, dental, and vision benefits; an annuity fund, deferred compensation plan, and 401(k); a lifetime pension at one-half salary after 22 years; an annual \$12,000 variable supplement fund upon normal service retirement (22 years); and excellent promotional opportunities through ten different ranks and a myriad of specialty roles.

Burlington is not New York City, and the BPD is not the NYPD, but the Queen City faces the most intense workload in the state of Vermont. By volume and variety, our officers see more than any of their peers. This was true even before the “Defund the Police” movement and its results, but it has been exacerbated by both the decrease in staffing and a change in the types of crimes experienced, particularly gun violence. Several new officers who separated gave the agency’s pace as their reason.

Chittenden County law-enforcement agencies are often vying for the same talent, and each of our agencies’ compensation packages affects the others.²⁸ Chart 06 shows our peer agencies’ current staffing, allotted staffing, and police officers’ starting and ending salaries. For example, Milton’s recent renegotiation is inevitably going to influence any other police bargaining that happens in 2025, including Burlington’s.

	STAFFING		SALARY	
	CURRENT	AUTH	START	TOP
BURLINGTON	65	87	76,717	99,324
COLCHESTER	26	31	51,131	84,625
ESSEX	31	25	59,633	106,412
MILTON	15	17	72,654	97,281
SHELBURNE	9	12	59,613	95,284
SOUTH BURLINGTON	30	40	61,588	89,585
UVM PD	18	24	60,195	76,690
WILLISTON	15	17	63,710	87,488
WINOOSKI	15	15	63,134	101,156

Chart 06

²⁸ Please note that these agencies’ salary figures are, if not apples to oranges, then at least Honeycrisps to Cortlands. Each agency offers different steps and some have different pay scales for corporals or detectives, to say nothing of comparisons of benefits and other fringe.

[REDACTED]

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It has been noted that other agencies are experiencing staffing issues, regionally and nationally. The table above appears to show that several Chittenden County agencies are down as much as BPD, at least as a percentage. But it must be noted that the table shows the BPD's current authorized count—which is insufficient. When compared to the BPD's historical numbers, to which I argue the agency should be returned, the diminishment is larger than any regional peer. In fact, compared to most departments across the country, the BPD saw a greater exodus.²⁹ In January 2023, a PERF survey of 182 agencies reported that, on average, sworn staffing decreased by 5% from January 2020 to January 2022, and then decreased another 1% from January 2022 to January 2023.³⁰ The BPD's situation was far worse than the PERF average: our sworn staffing decreased 25% during the first period, and then 9% during the second.

²⁹ One exception is Seattle, WA, which currently sits at 848 when its pre-COVID staffing target was approximately 1,600. See <https://mynorthwest.com/4015303/rantz-year-end-seattle-police-staffing-is-dire-but-union-warns-of-this-looming-crisis/>. But other agencies that were subject to “Defund the Police” pressures and have seen headcount crash, such as Austin, TX, and Portland, OR, are only down 19% and 16% respectively. See <https://www.kxan.com/news/local/austin/apd-staffing-shortage-continues-with-over-330-sworn-officer-vacancies/> and <https://www.portland.gov/police/documents/staffing-projections-study-0/download>. As another example, see Birmingham, AL, which is down 15% and has created a \$15.8 million plan to address it. <https://www.al.com/news/2024/10/woodfin-reveals-birmingham-police-staffing-shortfall-details-and-how-he-plans-to-address-it.html>

³⁰ See “New PERF survey shows police agencies have turned a corner with staffing challenges,” <https://www.policeforum.org/staffing2024>

3. The current level of hiring bonuses. We currently offer a \$15,000 bonus, based on a plan that I proposed and the City Council approved in September 2021. (In that plan I also proposed \$15,000 retention bonuses for officers who were employed at the time; the Council approved it but reduced the retention bonus to \$10,000.) The recruitment bonus was underpinned by American Rescue Plan Act funds, and is paid out in three installments: \$2,000 one week after an eligible recruit officer's or lateral officer's successful completion of field training; \$5,500 on the ten-month anniversary of the completion of field training; \$7,500 on the twenty-two month anniversary of the completion of field training. The BPD is strongly in favor of maintaining this incentive.


In FY22 and FY23, the BPD spent \$670,000 on retention bonuses for sworn officers, and \$180,000 was allocated for the recruitment bonuses. All of the retention bonuses have been distributed. Additionally, all of the FY22 recruitment allocation has been "spoken for," in that we have hired officers who are eligible for the funds. Not all the monies have been distributed, however, because some officers not yet received all three installments and some eligible officers separated prior to receiving all the money or portions of the money. Our two most recent hires, who graduated from the Academy on November 25, have been promised the bonuses but their payments will have to come from a source other than the ARPA funds.

4. The extent to which establishing positions for part-time officers who have obtained Level I or II certification may assist with staffing needs. I am not supportive of hiring Level I or Level II officers. I believe that the pacing of policing in Burlington exceeds their scope. Furthermore, the difference between Level I, Level II, and Level III officers is generally their respective ability to be accepted into and complete the VPA and its demanding physical and academic curriculum. Level III officers must be able to meet those standards, which are the minimum we expect for our officers. (After all, subsequent to the VPA, the BPD puts its officers through the longest field training program in Vermont—at least 580 hours.)


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
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
6. The extent to which Vermont’s residential training academy affects recruitment efforts. Mayor Mulvaney-Stanak notes that the Vermont Criminal Justice Council, which runs the VPA, is currently seeking a Project Manager for Alternative Paths to Law Enforcement Officer Certification. The VCJC seeks to facilitate establishing a non-residential alternative to the residential VPA. The VCJC anticipates the project manager will implement all aspects of this project over approximately four years.³¹



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³¹ See <http://vcjc.vermont.gov/about-us/rfp>



E. A PROPOSED TIMELINE FOR THE BURLINGTON POLICE DEPARTMENT TO FULLY STAFF UP TO THE REVISED STAFFING LEVELS RECOMMENDED IN RESPONSE TO THIS RESOLUTION. As I noted in the Executive Summary, an optimistic but achievable projection shows reaching 84 sworn officers is possible by the end of FY28. (See Chart 08 on the next page)

The projection in Chart 08 accounts for 13 known/anticipated separations or tenure retirements (i.e., two officers currently on terminal leave, myself, two officers currently eligible to retire, and eight officers who will become eligible for a 20-year service retirement prior to the end of FY28 on June 30, 2028). The projection assumes that there will be another nine unknown separations during the period, for a total of 22 separations.

The projection assumes that the agency will be able to hire a new Chief of Police and two new deputy chiefs. Finally, the projection assumes that the BPD will hire two recruits and one lateral officer in the remainder of FY25, ten recruits and four laterals in FY26, 11 recruits and two laterals in FY27, and ten recruits and two laterals in FY28. For context, the BPD hired nine recruits and three laterals in FY23, and six recruits and five laterals in FY24. Some good news is that there will be no tenure retirements in Calendar Year 2027, which could provide room to regain momentum. That said, with the way officers currently feel, 2027 seems a long way off.


In short, the hiring-to-loss ratios have been, are, or are projected to be:

Historic: FY22 3:17, FY23 13:12, FY24 11:8

Current: FY25 10:13

Projected: FY26 13:7, FY27 13:5, FY28 12:5

Chart 08



With regard to a roadmap to achieving a return to staffing in the mid 90s, it's an open question. Part of the pattern shown immediately above involves what Jim Collins in "Good to Great" might call "the flywheel"—that is, the magic of momentum. It's a sense of forward motion that becomes self-reinforcing. If, in FY29 and FY30, the BPD could maintain a hiring pace similar to that projected for FY26 to FY28—that is, netting six or seven officers per year—it could potentially achieve 95 by the end of FY30.

Chart 09, however, shows that over the past 15 years the BPD's best net growth has been five. The optimistic projection above requires the BPD to exceed its best-ever year repeatedly for five years in a row. A glummer but possibly more realistic projection would essentially double the time to recovery: headcount in the 80s by FY30, and in the 90s by FY35.

Some good news here is that, while FY25 through FY27 have seen / will see 11 officers become eligible for service retirements, FY28 through FY30 will only see five officers reach the same milestone. In fact, no officers reach tenure in FY30. This may provide additional breathing room to regain momentum. (See Chart 10)

	IN	OUT	DELTA
2010	8	8	0
2011	13	4	9
2012	4	5	-1
2013	13	8	5
2014	12	11	1
2015	10	8	2
2016	13	11	2
2017	9	9	0
2018	12	18	-6
2019	13	12	-1
2020	5	12	-7
2021	1	17	-16
2022	7	13	-6
2023	13	9	4
2024	7	13	-6

Chart 09

# OFFICERS TENURE ELIGIBLE			
FY24	3	CY24	4
FY25	6	CY25	5
FY26	4	CY26	3
FY27	1	CY27	0
FY28	3	CY28	3
FY29	2	CY29	2
FY30	0	CY30	2

Chart 10

Maintaining momentum is easier conceived than done, however, as the drop from 2023 to 2024 attests. The police profession is fraught, and the possibility of a terrible incident, here or far away, and the return of the fervor that affected the nation in 2014 or in 2020 regarding police and police reform is always there.

Could the BPD get to 95 sworn as shown in Appendix 11, by the end of FY28? How many officers would the city need to hire? We will begin 2025 with 63 sworn, meaning the BPD needs 32 officers, net, to get to 95. But we know of 13 separations between now and then, so the BPD actually needs 45 officers. Furthermore, we have to factor in additional losses at the VPA or during field training or among officers who otherwise chose to leave. Chart 03 on page nine suggests that, over the long-term, we should plan for an average loss rate of 64%, although that chart's data are affected by the exodus following the City Council's June 2020 vote. Picking a more reasonable loss rate of 40%, which approximates the pre-2020 rate, yields 18 officers of 45. That means

that, to grow from 63 to 95 the BPD would actually need to hire 63 more officers (32 + 13 + 18). Could it do so?

In the category of “wish fulfillment,” our relatively modest goals (compared to Seattle’s need for more than 700 officers, say) could almost certainly be obtained within a shorter time frame if Burlington aggressively advertised. Returning to the “cheap, good, or fast—pick two” maxim, would there be an appetite for a multi-million-dollar ad buy if it could promise to get us to 95 police officers in a few years? There’s no advertising firm that can make such a promise, of course, and the business maxim is balanced by the Madison Avenue maxim: “half the money you spend on advertising is wasted, you just don’t know which half.” Nevertheless, the projection articulated above could be accelerated with sufficient spending.

It should be noted, however, that it would be highly unlikely that the VPA or the BPD’s Field Training Officers could accommodate 63 hires in 30 months. This would mean recurring recruit classes of seven or eight (a number the BPD has never sent to the VPA, which has limited space and only allots a certain number of seats to each agency) and four to five laterals per year, or smaller recruit classes but as many as ten laterals per year. The option that relies more heavily on laterals would potentially be more feasible for the VPA and our FTO program.


F. RECOMMENDATIONS ON WHAT TEMPORARY SUPPORTS ARE AVAILABLE TO ASSIST


BURLINGTON. At the recent All In, and again at last month’s Police Commission meeting, I discussed the efforts we have already undertaken to ease workload, or make it more efficient. This includes linking our computer-aided dispatch system, Valcour, to our AXON body-worn cameras to reduce data entry via simplified tagging and a return to “see AXON” for certain “CFS non-event” incidents. It also includes using pre-charge referrals when appropriate, as per a new MOU with the Community Justice Center. And it includes simplified administrative tasks using a new system called Lefta, procured by Executive Manager Trammell. For his part, Deputy Chief of Administration Brian LaBarge, a seasoned investigator who oversees DSB, is ensuring that all burglaries, robberies, and aggravated assaults that are not solved by patrol on the shift will be assumed by DSB.

The BPD has benefited tremendously from the partnership of the Burlington Fire Department and their absorption of most overdoses. The BPD no longer goes to all ODs, although it still tracks them when they’re reported via 9-1-1. Instead, police go when there’s a safety element other than the medical overdose or a criminal element other than the drug possession.


Additional avenues that other agencies have explored include “Drone as First Responder” programs, in which drones are used to assess scenes prior to officers’ arrival, and sometimes confirm that a police response is not necessary. Implementing a program here would provide another avenue for both officer career path and, potentially, civilianization.

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G. A PROPOSED SCHEDULE FOR THE BURLINGTON POLICE DEPARTMENT TO PROVIDE THE CITY COUNCIL REGULAR UPDATES ON STAFFING LEVELS, RECRUITMENT BENCHMARKS, AND RETENTION RATES. Every month I provide our staffing levels—which reflect both hiring and retention—to the Police Commission, the City Council, and the public via the monthly Chief’s Report to the Police Commission.




IV. RETENTION

One thing not explicitly mentioned in the point-by-point is retention. Retention is the foundation. If current officers cannot be retained, the police department will fail. With effective staffing at 58, every loss has an outsized impact. In the face of this, officer wellness is incredibly important. I have tried to maximize officers through development; minimize exhaustion by minimizing calls; and avoid ordered overtime, but the fact that four officers to a shift has become the new normal is taking a toll.

Of the 58 separations the BPD has experienced since the Racial Justice resolution, 26 employees have left the BPD for other law-enforcement agencies. Eighteen have been tenure retirements, in which the employee attained 20 years of service or more before leaving. Of those 18, six were among the 26 officers who separated and went to other police agencies, suggesting they still had gas in the tank and might have stayed but for some combination of factors. (For a tenure-based breakdown of all separations, see Appendix 01) Fifteen more officers will reach retirement eligibility by 2030. What can be done to keep some of them past 20 years? What can be done to keep ALL our officers? A strong contract is key, but there are other options, as well.

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B. TRAINING. From an administrative perspective, allowing officers to attend training is beneficial for officer wellness and training standards, but it can be challenging for operational staffing. Every officer attending training is an officer who's not on the road answering calls for

³⁴ <https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/final-report-presidents-task-force-21st-century-policing>

³⁵ <https://www.police1.com/iacp/iacp-2024-quick-take-how-the-rapid-city-police-department-turned-the-tide-on-recruitment-and-retention>

service. That said, it's worth the challenge, both for what the officers gain and for what the city gains as training helps officers grow and develop. Last year the BPD sent employees to programs like: wellness training, ALERRT active shooter, IA Investigations, Conflict Resolution, Gang Investigations, Reid Technique, mindfulness for the Crisis Negotiation Unit, Cybercrime & Digital Evidence, LLIM instructor, and others. Executive Manager Trammell worked with Mayor Mulvaney-Stanak to increase the FY25 training budget by 46%, to \$160,000. We have a number of goals, and have already accomplished some, including sending multiple employees on a first-ever "field trip" to the annual IACP conference in Boston.

C. SUPERVISORS. Another retention tool hinges on supporting our supervisors. Earlier, I described the multiple vacancies in our supervisor ranks. (See Appendix 04) This has caused two problems. The workload under which sergeants currently toil, with five sergeants instead of 11, means that they are exhausted—but it also discourages non-supervisory officers from attempting to promote. This, in turn, perpetuates the current sergeants' workload. One proposal to address this, to incentivize officers into promotion, and to improve retention is to address the salary compression that exists among the ranks. Supervisors in the BPD are compensated according to the Police Unified Pay Scale, or PUPS, which was created by Chief Michael Schirling and adopted by the City Council in 2014. The PUPS pegs supervisors' salaries to the salary negotiated by the BPOA. It's simple and effective, but after a decade it needs

FY25		FY26	
PO Step 15	\$99,324.96	PO Step 15	\$99,324.96
Sgt 1 6.0%	\$105,284.46	Sgt 1 8.0%	\$107,270.96
Sgt 2 1.5%	\$106,863.72	Sgt 2 1.5%	\$108,880.02
Sgt 3 1.5%	\$108,466.68	Sgt 3 1.5%	\$110,513.22
Sgt 4 1.5%	\$110,093.68	Sgt 4 1.5%	\$112,170.92
Sgt 5 1.5%	\$111,745.09	Sgt 5 1.5%	\$113,853.48
		Sgt 6 1.5%	\$115,561.29
		Sgt 7 1.5%	\$117,294.71
Lt 1 6.0%	\$118,449.79		
Lt 2 1.5%	\$120,226.54	Lt 1 8.0%	\$126,678.28
Lt 3 1.5%	\$122,029.94	Lt 2 1.5%	\$128,578.46
Lt 4 1.5%	\$123,860.38	Lt 3 1.5%	\$130,507.13
		Lt 4 1.5%	\$132,464.74
DC 1 8.0%	\$133,769.22		
DC 2 1.5%	\$135,775.75	DC 1 10%	\$145,711.21
DC 3 1.5%	\$137,812.39	DC 2 1.5%	\$147,896.88
DC 4 1.5%	\$139,879.58	DC 3 1.5%	\$150,115.33
		DC 4 1.5%	\$152,367.07

Chart 11

adjustment. Chart 11 compares the current FY25 PUPS to a *proposed version* of an FY26 PUPS. The larger percentage increases, from 6% to 8%, could incentivize promotion and retention. The greater number of Sergeant steps, from five to seven, could address another challenge we currently have: five of six lieutenant spots are currently filled and none of the five is expected to retire prior to 2031. If we successfully hire two outside deputy chiefs, we can anticipate very little movement in the sergeant-to-lieutenant progression for the next several years.


With regard to attracting new deputy chiefs, this adjustment could also make that salary more competitive as well. (For more information on supervisor and officer tenure, see Appendix 17)

D. RECONCILIATION. Of our 64 sworn officers, 72% were on staff during the Defund the Police movement. One of the most important retention tools would be for the City of Burlington to make a formal apology for and repudiation of lines 51 to 53 of the 2020 Racial Justice resolution.³⁶ This could be accompanied by a Council / BPOA pledge to work together to rebuild the police department to 105 sworn officers. Compared to new contracts, bonuses, incentives, and adjustments to the PUPS, this is the least expensive and possibly most effective retention tool, because it costs nothing and will have immediate impact.

³⁶ “BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the Burlington Police Department decrease through attrition, allowing officers to elect of their own accord to retire or leave for other reasons, the maximum total number of uniformed police officers by 30% from 105 to 74 uniformed officers” from the *Resolution Relating to Racial Justice Through Economic and Criminal Justice*, June 29, 2020, lines 51 to 53.

V. REBUILDING

The BPD's most important project is rebuilding. This means continuing to hire new dispatchers, CSOs, and CAIP members, and other professional staff, but, most pressingly, it means retaining the dedicated sworn police officers we have and adding experienced lateral officers and new police recruits to that foundation. Rebuilding also means addressing our facility. For BPD headquarters, it's past time for an overhaul or a wrecking ball. On this topic, Mayor Mulvaney-Stanak has been compellingly clear that both One North Avenue and Fire Station One need effective replacements, and about her vision for a new building.



Redacted 1 V.S.A. 317(c)(15)

B. LOOKING FORWARD. Six years ago, I applied for a deputy chief position in the BPD. I did so because my family and I wanted to move to Vermont, and return to the city in which I was born. But I also did so because the BPD was a stellar, forward-thinking, innovative agency. I took a 60% paycut to take the job and didn't regret it. My 15 months as a deputy chief had the best work/life balance of my career. I loved being part of such a responsive, connective, and effective agency. Then came the calls to "Defund the Police." Four years of crisis have necessarily affected how responsive and connective the BPD can be, and how much it can do. But the people who are its heart are still among the best police officers and police employees in the nation. I truly believe that there is a path by which the agency can return fully to what it was. That optimism is not about seeing the glass as half full rather than half empty. It's about seeing the glass for what it is and believing we can fill it up. The agency's legacy—and the work its people do, every day—show that the BPD can and will continue to meet its mission of keeping people safe, by preventing crime and disorder, with and for the community. With the support of that community, we can do more than continue, we can rebuild, so that every call for service becomes a chance to make Burlington safe and fair, everywhere for everyone.

VII. APPENDIX

Appendix 01: Exit Questionnaire Overview

From July 01, 2020, through October 15, 2024, there have been 57 separations of sworn police officers from the BPD. During this same period, the BPD has hired 30 sworn police officers.

Among the 57 separations there were 56 people (one employee separated twice). Of the 56, there were 50 men and 6 women. Of the 56 people, 48 have been white, three have been Asian, three have been Black, and two have been Hispanic.

The graph at right shows the tenure distribution for the separations.


Four separations happened while the employees were at the Vermont Police Academy (VPA), and five happened while employees were on field training.

Two separations were the result of terminations for cause, and another occurred while the employee was suspended.

Twenty-seven officers found employment with other federal, state, or municipal law-enforcement agencies. But in four of those 27 instances, employees who separated and moved to other law-enforcement agencies ultimately returned to the BPD—and all four of those are currently employed at the BPD.

In two instances, employees who separated were transitioned into a Community Service Officer (CSO) role to undergo additional training while remaining employed by the BPD. Both those officers-turned-CSOs were later rehired as sworn police officers.

Years of Service at Separation



THIRTY-FIVE EXIT QUESTIONNAIRES

When employees separate from the BPD, the BPD provides an exit questionnaire. (Note: Ten separations occurred under circumstances in which the questionnaire was not used, such as

failure at the VPA, termination for cause, medical separation, etc.) Not all employees fill out the questionnaire, or every field in it. The following contains responses from 35 questionnaires, or 75% of questionnaire-eligible separations. In addition to numerical ratings questions, the questionnaires have seven fields in which employees may offer written comment.

REASON FOR LEAVING (mark as many as apply)

REASON	Total # responses in this category
1. Secured a different job	18
2. Dissatisfied with pay	0
3. Moving from area	7
4. Family circumstances	5
5. Health reasons	2
6. Dissatisfied with type of work	6
7. Dissatisfied with supervisor	0 (one respondent crossed out "supervisor" and replaced it with "city leadership")
8. Dissatisfied with co-workers	0
9. Other	25


RATING SECTION

Please use the following ratings for the following section:


Not Satisfied – 1 2 3 4 // **Acceptable – 5 6** // **Satisfied 7 8 9 10**


RATINGS	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Training received	0	1	0	1	1	3	5	4	10	10
Company benefits	0	0	0	1	2	2	4	13	5	8
Career opportunities	1	1	2	2	2	4	7	3	4	8
Supervision received	0	0	0	0	0	1	7	13	9	5
Working conditions	1	3	7	2	4	2	5	5	2	3
Pay for work required	0	0	3	2	4	6	7	4	4	5
Type of work performed	0	0	1	2	3	1	10	6	5	6
Work schedule	0	0	1	1	1	2	2	6	6	15
The job met my expectations	0	0	3	1	5	2	1	10	7	5
City's commitment to employees	16	4	0	6	1	2	3	2	0	1
Supervisor's mgt methods	0	0	0	1	0	3	7	11	6	6
Recognition for work	2	2	2	1	2	4	3	7	8	4
Respect for work	7	1	1	0	5	5	3	3	6	3

[Each cell shows the number of employees who selected the respective rating for the respective category. The results for each question are represented graphically on the following pages. Some employees left some ratings categories blank; totals may not sum equally]












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Appendix 02: Headcount vs Incident Volume



Because headcount has fallen while incidents have risen, some officers are handling three times as many incidents. This graph compares month-by-month incident volume to month-by-month sworn officer headcount. It shows **incidents-per-officer for all sworn (red)** versus for **non-supervisory sworn on patrol (blue)**. The majority (>75%) of incidents are answered by non-supervisory patrol officers. Other incidents are answered at the airport, by detectives, by supervisors, or by CSOs and CSLs. (For example, CSOs were the primary officer on 16% of incidents in 2022, 12% in 2023, and 13% so far in 2024.) Therefore the true burden on sworn patrol officers lies somewhere between the red—a 100% trendline increase—and the blue—a staggering 200% trendline increase.

Appendix 03: Peer-reviewed academic studies demonstrating more police mean less crime.

Devi & Fryer, 2020, "Policing the Police: The Impact of 'Pattern-or-Practice' Investigations on Crime." Federal pattern-and-practice investigations that were preceded by "viral" incidents of deadly force have led to a large and statistically significant increase in homicides and total crime. The authors estimate that these investigations caused almost 900 excess homicides and almost 34,000 excess felonies. The leading hypothesis for why these investigations increase homicides and total crime is an abrupt change in the quantity of policing activity—i.e., police withdrawal.

Mello, 2019, "More COPS, Less Crime." By studying the natural experiment provided by the Great Recession and the effect of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act's impact on funding for the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) hiring grants, this shows that, relative to low-scoring cities, those above the cutoff experience increases in police of about 3.2% and declines in victimization cost-weighted crime of about 3.5% following the distribution of hiring grants. The effects are driven by large and statistically significant effects of police on robbery, larceny, and auto theft, with suggestive evidence that police reduce murders as well.


Cheng & Long, 2018, "Improving police services: Evidence from the French Quarter Task Force." The New Orleans French Quarter Task Force (FQTF), which increased police visibility in the French Quarter, reduced robberies, aggravated assaults, and thefts by 37.4%, 16.9%, and 13%, respectively. Second, our findings imply that the proper use of monitoring and incentive strategies has the potential to further improve police services.

Vidal & Kirchmaier, 2017, "The Effects of Police Response Time on Crime Clearance Rates." Shows a causal relationship between faster response times and better clearance rates; demonstrates response times are affected by staffing.

MacDonald & Grunwald, 2012, "The Effect of Privately Provided Police Services on Crime: Evidence from a Geographic Regression Discontinuity Design." Research demonstrates police reduce crime; in Philadelphia, extra police provided by the university generated approximately 45-60% fewer crimes in adjacent city blocks. Police cars spent as much as one extra hour per shift in each of the treatment areas. The study found that treatment areas experienced a 6-13% reduction in crime, with the largest effects observed for disorder violations.

Klick & Tabarrok, 2005, "Using Terror Alert Levels to Estimate the Effect of Police on Crime." Using daily crime data during the period the terror alert system has been in place, the authors show that the level of crime decreases significantly, both statistically and economically, in Washington, D.C., during high-alert periods.

Appendix 04: Supervisor Vacancies



Appendix 05: Deputy Chief Prospectus




The Burlington Police Department in Burlington, Vermont, is seeking qualified applicants for the role of Deputy Chief of Police. The two Deputy Chief positions are second in the chain of command for the Burlington Police Department (BPD), reporting directly to the Chief of Police. There are two deputy chief positions. The Deputy Chief, Operations, manages the daily operations and activities of the Uniform Services Bureau, which is comprised of patrol, the airport, and the Community Service Officers (CSOs). The Deputy Chief, Administration, manages the Administrative Services Bureau and the Detective Services Bureau. These three bureaus, overseen by the two Deputy Chiefs, are the agency's largest organizational components.

Additionally, the BPD contains a business management component, overseen by the Executive Manager, and a social services component called CAIP, or Crisis Advocacy Intervention Programs, overseen by the Assistant Director, CAIP. The Deputy Chiefs, the Executive Manager, and the Assistant Director comprise the agency's executive staff, which works closely and collaboratively together, and reports to the Chief of Police.





Sitting on shores of Lake Champlain, Burlington is Vermont's largest city, with 44,000 residents and daytime populations that can be more than double. It's a vibrant community that frequently finds itself on "best of" lists for its lifestyle and great public spaces like the Church Street Marketplace. Home to important businesses and institutions like the University of Vermont, Patrick Leahy International Airport, Dealer.com, Burton Snowboards, Seventh Generation, the region's largest hospital, and more, the Queen City also has some of the state's best nightlife, restaurants, performance spaces, and artistic venues. Our award-winning Burlington Greenway bike path is a jewel among the city's many parks. Vermont is renowned for outdoor excellence, be it biking, hiking, sailing, or skiing, and the Green Mountains are less than 45 minutes away. With great schools, good jobs, and a welcoming community, Burlington and Chittenden County are the perfect place to set down roots and move to the next stage of your career.





The BPD has more than 150 years of accomplishment, and a wonderful future ahead. We have an authorized headcount of 87 sworn officers and 58 professional staff, including innovative roles like the unarmed CSOs, and in-house social workers in CAIP called Community Support Liaisons, or CSLs. We serve a diverse community and strive to reflect that diversity in our ranks.

We pride ourselves in being at the leading edge of policing, from operational advances like ICAT, to cutting-edge equipment like body-worn cameras and drones, to tactical innovations like our Emergency Response Unit, and new programs like our CAIP team and CARES program. By volume and variety of calls for service, our patrol officers are the most experienced in the state, and our detectives have an incredible closure rate for gunfire and homicide, including high-profile shootings and half-century-old cold cases.

The City of Burlington is seeking a seasoned law-enforcement professional with a strong leadership presence, a mind for progressive policing, and exemplary interpersonal skills. Our residents want an effective crime fighter and a community-oriented protector who understands that police keep people safe by working with and for their neighbors.







The incoming Deputy Chief must have the ability to engage with and be present in the community and the BPD. At the same time, Burlington is at the forefront of recognizing, embracing, and resourcing the idea that public safety is not a task for police alone—as evidenced by our robust professional staff and the myriad of services they provide. Our deputy chiefs must have excellent staff management and budgeting abilities. Creating innovative policy and gathering and analyzing data are also important skillsets.

Candidates must have a minimum of ten (10) years of police experience and a minimum of three (3) years in a supervisory police role. Candidates must possess, or be able to obtain within one (1) year, a Vermont Police Academy Law Enforcement Certification as a Level III officer. Out-of-state candidates must be current law-enforcement officers or have been separated from a certified law-enforcement role for no more than three (3) years. A bachelor's degree or higher is preferred; other experience, including military experience, may be considered. Attendance at a program like the FBI National Academy or PERF SMIP is strongly preferred. Candidates must possess, or be able to obtain within sixty (60) days, a valid Vermont Driver's License.


The Deputy Chief of Police is compensated according to the Police Uniform Pay Scale, or PUPS, which is defined by the police officer contract. The Burlington Police Officers Association, or BPOA, will renegotiate in July, 2025. The current PUPS for Deputy Chief ranges from \$133,769 to \$139,880, depending on experience. Additionally, the BPD currently offers a \$15,000 recruitment incentive, paid in three timed installments. The City of Burlington's benefits include retirement with five-year vesting, full medical benefits, and wellness incentives.

Contact us at <https://www.bpdcareers.com>





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Appendix 08: Burlington Police Staffing Calculation, provided by Deputy Chief Sullivan

In 1990, Rutherford Ruotolo Consulting Consortium, Inc. performed an evaluation for the City of Burlington regarding the Burlington Police Department and the appropriate level of staffing. The study used a mathematical formula to calculate proper staffing.

The formula used is as follows:

- 1) Calls for Service, plus
- 2) Add percent for calls requiring multiple officer response (e.g. what percentage of calls require more than one officer?) multiply this number by
- 3) Average time spent on a call (in hours) (add time for completing paperwork per call)
- 4) Hours per year in calls for service is multiplied by 3 to buffer for preventative patrol (visibility, service needs, etc.) This is the total hours required per year.
- 5) Total hours are then divided by 3,650 (This is the total number of hours required to staff one post on one 10-hour shift for one year = $10 \times 365 = 3,650$)

Quotient equals the minimum number of patrol posts needed for a particular shift.

In 1990 the percentage of calls answered by shift was:

Dayshift	34.81%
Evening Shift	40.12%
Midnight shift	25.07%

For the sake of simplicity, I used the same percentage of call volume per shift in 2020, as it is most likely very similar.

One important aspect of this exercise is to recognize that call volume is very fluid and is currently under reported for several reasons. Some of these reasons include the airport officers do not start incidents for many of the tasks they complete. One example of this is gate alarms. Another example is that dispatch will sometimes stack a particular card with multiple incidents downtown. An example of this is fireworks complaints.

2020 will be an anomalous year with very low call volume due to the COVID health pandemic. Thus, 2020 call volume numbers will not be a good measure of call volume. Call volume has been trending downward over the last few years and there are several factors that play into this. Some of the factors are that the Burlington police Department has been very proactive in addressing certain issues in the city. One example of this is quality of life issues in the Hill section where call volume has been reduced by almost 50% from 2012 until now. This was achieved through a partnership with UVM where UVM funded additional officers for targeted enforcement in the Hill Section. What we found was there was an inverse relationship between

officer-initiated calls and citizen-initiated calls. As more officers patrolled the neighborhood officer-initiated calls increased and as these calls increased, citizen-initiated calls decreased because officers were addressing issues proactively. Also noteworthy is the fact that UVM provided enough funding to double regular patrol numbers for the whole city, yet these additional officers focused almost exclusively on the Hill Section with measurable positive results.

The 1990 study found call volume at that time was approximately 40,000 calls for service per year. Contemporary call volume is as follows:

2013	34,278
2014	36,275
2015	37,324
2016	37,131
2017	32,671
2018	29,684
2019	28,476

The average call volume over the last seven years, 2013 to 2019, is 33,691 calls for service.

Another reason for the drastic drop in call volume is that officers self-initiated traffic enforcement has drastically declined. This was in part a result of then-Chief del Pozo directing officers to engage in more education than enforcement. The result of this direction is demonstrated by the number of traffic stops BPD engaged in with a high of 6,141 stops in 2015 falling to 2,019 stops in 2019. Lack of proactive traffic enforcement has resulted in a decrease in call volume of more than 4,000 calls per year.

For the sake of calculation I will use the average call volume of 33,691 calls for service. This is a conservative estimate due to under reported numbers.

Calls per shift:

Days	11,728
Eves	13,517
Mids	8,446

The percentage of calls that require more than one officer response is approximately 50%.

Days	11,728 plus 5,864 (50%) = 17,592
Eves	13,517 plus 6,758.5 (50%) = 20,276
Mids	8,446 plus 4,223 (50%) = 12,669

Each call takes an approximate average of one hour per call. This equals 1 for 1. (In 1990 they used .75 hours per call, but the job and paperwork requirements have increased.) Then apply the buffer multiplier of three. This is the same multiplier used in the 1990 study.

Days 17,592 x 3 = 52,776 hours required

Eves 20,276 x 3 = 60,828 hours required

Mids 12,669 x 3 = 38,007 hours required

Then divide the hours required by 3,650 to establish the number of posts required. Keep in mind that posts does not necessarily equal a ratio of 1 post to 1 officer. A post may require more than one officer. Posts required:

Days 52,776 divide by 3,650 = 14.459 posts = 15

Eves 60,828 divide by 3,650 = 16.665 posts = 17

Mids 38,007 divide by 3,650 = 10.413 posts = 10

Posts do not directly equate to one officer (please see page 29 and 30 of the 1990 study for explanation). An availability factor is used to determine 2.09 officers are required per post. This was calculated from 3,650 officer hours per year per post divided by 1,740 hours available equals 2.09.

Factors	Average days off	Average Officer Hours
Days Off	156 x 10	1,560
Holidays	11 x 10	110
Floating Holidays	2 x 10	20
Vacation	10 x 10	100
Sick Time	10 x 10	100
Personal Leave	2 x 10	20
Totals	191 x 10	1,910

The average hours off is then subtracted from the officer hours per year (per post).

3,650 minus 1,910 equals 1,740 hours available per officer on average.

The 3,650 hours per year is then divided by the hours available to determine the availability factor.

3,650 divided by 1,740 equals 2.09

Thus it will take 2.09 officers to cover each post.

These are officer posts, not including supervisory requirements.


	0730-1730	1645-0245	2230-0830	Raw Score	Total
Post #1	2.09	2.09	2.09	6.27	6
Post #2	2.09	2.09	2.09	6.27	6
Post #3	2.09	2.09	2.09	6.27	6
Post #4	2.09	2.09	2.09	6.27	6
Post #5	2.09	2.09	2.09	6.27	6
Post #6	2.09	2.09	2.09	6.27	6
Post #7	2.09	2.09	2.09	6.27	6
Post #8	2.09	2.09	2.09	6.27	6
Post #9	2.09	2.09	2.09	6.27	6
Post #10	2.09	2.09	2.09	6.27	6
Post #11	2.09	2.09		4.18	4
Post #12	2.09	2.09		4.18	4
Post #13	2.09	2.09		4.18	4
Post #14	2.09	2.09		4.18	4
Post #15	2.09	2.09		4.18	4
Post #16		2.09			2
Post #17		2.09			2
				Total	84

This calculation determines 84 non-supervisory officers should be assigned to the Uniform Services Bureau to handle calls.

If 84 non-supervisory officers were assigned to USB, the shifts would have 15 assigned to each day shift, 17 to each evening shift, and ten assigned to each midnight shift. Compare this to the current 2021 fall tour: 30 total non-supervisory officers are assigned to USB. Seven are assigned to one dayshift and six are assigned to the other day shift, six are assigned to each evening shift, and two are assigned to one midnight shift and three to the other midnight shift.


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Appendix 09: Historic deployment – 95 Effective



This is a visual of historical staffing, circa 2019. It has strong patrol coverage (including a swing shift); specialized roles like the DVPO, SROs, and a Community Affairs Officer; a Street Crime Team; and a full complement of detectives in DSB and CUSI. Area-based community policing and innovative protocols like ICAT require this level of staffing.


Appendix 10: Current deployment – 58 Effective



58 Officers total / 26 Officers Available for Patrol


This is current staffing. BPD has no swing shift, no SROs, too few supervisors per shift, no supervisor at the airport, no Street Crime Team, no Administrative Lieutenant, and no Deputy Chief of Operations.

Appendix 11: Vision for Deployment – 95 Effective



This is my vision of full staffing. It has full, area-based patrol coverage; a dedicated Marketplace foot patrol team; a sergeant and three officers assigned to CAIP as DVPOs / crisis officers / outreach escorts, plus three SROs who report to the CAIP sergeant; a Street Crime Team; and a full complement of detectives in DSB, the Drug Unit, and CUSI.

Appendix 12: What CAIP Could Be



This is my vision of a fully-staffed **Crisis Advocacy Intervention Programs** team.

CAIP's professional staff is overseen the Assistant Director CAIP, an executive team member of the BPD. The Community Support Supervisor (CSS), Burlington Crisis Assessment Response Engagement Services (CARES) Supervisor, and the Domestic Violence Victim's Advocate report to AD CAIP. Six Community Support Liaisons (CSLs) report to the CSS and two CARES clinicians report to the CARES Supervisor. The CSLs handle non-emergent social work while the CARES team addresses crises and clinical issues.

CAIP's sworn staff is overseen by the CAIP Sergeant. Six officers report to the sergeant, including three School Resource Officers (one assigned to BHS and BTC; one assigned to Hunt, CP Smith, Flynn, and IAA; and one assigned to Edmunds MS and ES, Sustainability, and Champlain), and three officers cross-trained as DVPOs and outreach workers.

The various components can codeploy or operate independently as required. Both AD CAIP and the CAIP Sgt report to the Chief of Police.

Appendix 13: Moran Letter



Burlington Police Officer's Association

To Whom It May Concern,

I am writing to express my concern regarding the ongoing hiring and recruitment issues at the Burlington Police Department. Over the past several years, it is no secret that the number of candidates for law enforcement positions has seen a sharp decrease in Vermont and across the country. There are several opinions as to why the number of applicants has dropped, including the consistent high level of stress, the daily liability assumed, the demonization of officers, and poor public perception. At a time when officers are needed more than ever, I had a unique opportunity to gather insight into why Burlington is having difficulty attracting applicants.

This past week, I had the privilege of assisting the 118th Basic class in the role as a Training Assistant at the Vermont Police Academy. In that role, I assist in teaching and assisting the recruits for one week, for each Vermont Police Academy class. I spend the entire day with the class and help guide them through the week. During that time, I sat down with the recruits for a Q&A session to address any concerns they might have after graduation and provide insight about the profession. At the end of the session, I asked for a show of hands from those who live inside or near Chittenden County. Of the 44 recruits, approximately 17 raised their hands. I then asked those recruits if any had applied to Burlington. All recruits lowered their hands. After a short discussion with said recruits, it became overtly clear that they all shared the same concerns about working in the Queen City, a major lack of support from both politicians and the community. Many recruits mentioned that surrounding communities have a proven track record of support from both town managers and community members, where Burlington does not. Some recruits referenced the officers in Burlington who were demonized during the protests of 2020 and felt that Burlington has not been the same since. While a few were on the fence about choosing Burlington over other departments, they ultimately decided against applying due to the lack of support from the city and the potential for ostracizing officers and facing public ridicule.

Furthermore, Burlington had four recruits in the 118th Basic class. All four recruits were not originally from Vermont and some have recent ties to the area. Of the four hired, two have since left, with one specifically noting that the pay was not as advertised. I believe this fact alone highlights the struggles that the Burlington Police Department will face in the coming years, as we were unable to secure even one recruit with deep-rooted ties to Vermont, let alone Burlington. This shows there is a direct correlation between the applicants that Burlington police department receives compared to surrounding agencies.



Burlington Police Officer's Association

These people are ignorant to the local political climate and do not understand the circumstances of the department that they are applying. People who live in the area understand and recognize the lack of support from the city leadership and community, whereas out-of-state applicants do not grasp this as well as someone who has lived in the area for a portion of their adult lives.

I believe that the perception of the city, the city council, and the mayor's office is a major deterrent for people who live in the area and want to pursue law enforcement careers to serve their local communities. Some wounds heal over time, but without outspoken support from these offices, I do not foresee Burlington being able to once again be the pinnacle of policing in the state of Vermont. Without being able to attract people with deep connections to the area, and reach into a deeper candidate pool, Burlington Police Department will face many years of staffing issues.

The first and clear step to fix the issues that the Burlington Police Department faces is to fix the optics that officers are not supported among politicians. We need outspoken members of the mayor's office and city council to speak up and speak out about the need for qualified officers with emotional connections to the area. With the new administration in the Queen City, I believe there is an opportunity to rebuild this department with outspoken support for the officers who are on the streets on a daily basis. Burlington once was the gold standard of policing in the state of Vermont, and it can be again with continued outspoken support and deliberate meaningful actions/votes, by the politicians of this city.

Respectfully,

Officer Michael Moran
Badge #398
1 North Ave Burlington Vermont
802-658-2700 Ext. 9
mmoran@bpdvt.org

Appendix 14: Community Justice Center MOU



MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN

BURLINGTON POLICE DEPARTMENT

AND

BURLINGTON COMMUNITY JUSTICE CENTER

REGARDING DIRECT PRE-CHARGE REFERRALS TO ALTERNATIVE JUSTICE



This Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), between the Burlington Police Department, hereafter referred to as "BPD," and the Burlington Community Justice Center, hereafter referred to as "CJC," provides as follows:

Section 1. Purpose and Scope of Agreement

The purpose of this agreement is to clearly identify the roles and responsibilities of each party as they relate to post-arrest or post-citation pre-charge diversion (pre-charge direct referrals made by the BPD to the CJC's **Restorative Justice Program (RJP)**). The agreement outlines criteria for referral, case flow, completion procedures, and special considerations.

Section 2. Background

When a sworn police officer with the BPD arrests or cites an offender for certain crimes as described in the Vermont Statutes or tickets an offender for certain violations of the City of Burlington's municipal code, a direct referral to the CJC may provide a speedy alternative to the juvenile and criminal justice systems. Offenders are held accountable for their actions in a timely and meaningful way. Along with reducing the number of cases and the costs and time lag associated with the standard criminal justice process, RJP's increase community safety by attending to the needs of the victim and the needs of the offender.

Section 3. Criteria for Referral

A. Offender Age: An offender who is ten (10) years old and older may be eligible for direct referral to the CJC RJP.

B. Offender Criminal History: To be referred by the BPD directly to the CJC:

1. An offender shall have no more than one prior arrest, citation, or ticket for any similar offense(s), or

2. An offender shall have had no incidents for a period of five or more years as indicated by the offender's Valcour history.

Furthermore, an offender who has been listed as an "Arrestee," "Suspect," or "Person of Interest (POI)" in a high number of police involvements / Valcour entries for other, unrelated offenses may be deemed ineligible for referral on a case-by-case basis at the discretion of the arresting officer in consultation with a supervisor. Those determined to be on arrest warrant status are also ineligible.

C. Offender Voluntariness: The arresting officer explains to the person that a referral to Pre-charge Diversion is voluntary, but the person must take responsibility and work with the CJC to make amends to anyone impacted. The officer will further explain that if the person were to complete the program successfully the matter would be closed. The officer asks the person whether the person is willing to participate in the program. The person must answer affirmatively and must indicate that they/he/she is prepared to accept appropriate responsibility for the offense.

D. Victim Notification. If the crime or municipal-code violation has a victim, personnel with the CJC will inform the victim that the case has been referred to the CJC RJP. If after a full discussion of the options available through the CJC the victim is unsupportive of this referral, the case will be returned to the BPD for prosecution. Victims may also request that the BPD directly refer the case to Pre-charge Diversion.

E. Prosecutor Notification. The CJC will, in writing, inform the Office of the Chittenden County State's Attorney of each case that has been referred, including the name of the offender(s), the date of the offense(s), and the offense type(s).

F. Offense Types. When an officer arrests or issues a citation to an offender for any of the following charges, and there is no felony charge or allegation of concurrent misdemeanor Domestic Assault involving intimate partner violence, and the offender meets the criteria in A through C above, the following charges WILL be sent to the CJC, absent specific reasons for exception that are approved by a supervisor:

- Retail theft under \$300 (13 VSA § 2575)
- Unlawful Mischief under \$500 (13 VSA § 3701)
- False personation / pretenses (13 VSA § 2001)
- Petit larceny under \$500 (13 VSA § 2502)
- Bad checks / insufficient funds (13 VSA § 2022)
- Simple assault (13 VSA § 1023)
- Disorderly conduct (13 VSA § 1026)

- Disturbing peace by telephone or other electronic communications (13 VSA § 1027)
- False reports to law enforcement authorities (13 VSA § 1754)
- Unlawful Trespass (13 VSA § 3705)
- Burglary of an unoccupied premises (13 VSA § 1201)
- Possession of stolen property (13 VSA § 2561)
- Theft of services (13 VSA § 2582)
- Possession of deadly weapon in school (13 VSA § 4004)
- Possession Drugs (18 VSA § 4234)
- Negligent operation (23 VSA § 1091 a)
- Excessive speed (23 VSA § 1097)
- Leaving the Scene of an Accident (LSA) (23 VSA § 1128 a)
- Alcohol consumption (Municipal Code 21-37, 21-38, 22-22)
- Other offenses subject to agreement by the BPD and CJC

The BPD may also refer civil violations and neighborhood and school conflicts as deemed appropriate.

Section 4. Criteria for Non-Acceptance

The CJC may return a case to the BPD in the following instances:

A. Refusal to acknowledge accountability. The CJC may return the case if the offender does not acknowledge that he/she/they committed the offense. The BCJC does not offer a court process that determines guilt or innocence. If the offender denies the charge(s), the offender will be advised that the RJP cannot be of assistance and that the Court is the proper venue to hear from any person who claims to have been wrongly accused. The case will then be sent back to the referring officer with an explanation of why the CJC cannot accept the case.

B. Domestic and sexual violence. Any case involving intimate partner and/or sexual violence will be returned.

C. Greater harm. Members of the CJC staff and/or RJP believe the process could be harmful to the victim, offender, program volunteers, or the larger community. The Burlington CJC will consider whether other restorative approaches may be more appropriate.

D. Failure to appear. The offender refuses to participate in the process and/or is unreachable (after repeated phone/text/email/direct outreach attempts).

E. Lack of victim approval. As stated in 3. D., above, if a victim is unsupportive of the case being referred to the CJC RJP, the case will be returned to the BPD for prosecution.

Section 5. Case Flow

A. Offense. When a BPD officer handles an offense eligible for the CJC RJP, the officer will give the offender contact information for the CJC RJP Adult Restorative Services Manager. This must be documented in the officer's narrative, e.g., "RJP explained to suspect and contact information provided."

B. Officer's report. The officer will complete a narrative (that can become an affidavit if necessary) and the name jacket(s) for all offenders involved. The paperwork must be completed within five calendar days of the incident. A supervisor will review the incident for referral.

C. Referral. Once the report is approved by a supervisor, clerks in the Records unit or the Uniform Bureau Support and Administrative Coordinator (UBSAC) will email the incident narrative and name jacket(s) to the CJC with the RJP cover sheet containing contact and demographic information for both the person responsible and for the victim. Offenders are encouraged to contact the CJC within seven (7) days from the referral date to participate.

D. Completion. Upon completion of the RJP process, or earlier if specifically requested by the officer, the CJC will forward a case-status report to the referring officer and UBSAC.

Section 6. Confidentiality of Police Referrals

All information provided by the BPD to the CJC is considered the responsibility of the CJC . The CJC does not share copies of information in any format. In youth cases CJC staff, Support Center staff, and Student Assistant Program Coordinators are able to collaborate on and freely communicate without a release about non-criminal incidents that happen on Burlington School District campuses.

Upon referral to the CJC, the matter shall become confidential. All information related to any offense gathered in the course of the process shall be held strictly confidential and shall not be released without the person's prior consent, except under the following conditions:

1. Where there is a threat or statement of a plan that a person may reasonably believe is likely to result in death or bodily injury to themselves or others or damage to the property of another person.
2. When disclosure is necessary to report bodily harm any party causes another during restorative justice programming.

3. When disclosure to other community-based restorative justice providers is necessary to facilitate coordination for an individual who has more than one active referral before different community justice providers.
4. Where there is a reasonable suspicion of abuse or neglect of a child or vulnerable adult and a report is made pursuant to the provisions of 33 VSA § 4914 or 33 VSA § 6903 or to comply with any law.

Section 7. Completion Procedures

A. Failure to complete. If the offender does not contact the CJC, does not respond when contacted by the CJC, or does not complete the RJP process, the case will be referred back to the BPD for prosecution. When returning a case, the CJC will email a formal “referral-back letter” as an attachment to the referring officer and the UBSAC and the Office of the Chittenden County State’s Attorney. The UBSAC will forward the letter to the Records unit. The Records unit will attach the letter to the case file. The officers will refer the case to the Chittenden County State’s Attorney’s Office for prosecution.

B. Successful completion. Upon successful program completion, the CJC emails a formal completion letter within seven (7) days as an attachment to the referring officer, the UBSAC, and the Records unit. The BPD will consider the matter closed. The Records unit attaches the letter to the case file and follows the checklist outlined in Appendix A, which includes:

1. Altering the reference to the offender in the Valcour Records Management System (RMS) by changing the offender’s role to “Other.”
2. Notifying the VCIC to remove fingerprints and the arrest record. Notification should be submitted within seven (7) days of receiving notice of successful completion from the CJC. The CJC should be copied on the notification.

Section 8. Special considerations

In consideration of the community volunteers who give their time to make this program possible, and the need to screen these volunteers adequately, the BPD agrees to assist with checking the criminal histories of all CJC volunteers. This will be done through the Vermont Crime Information Center’s (VCIC) online portal. It is understood that such checks will only include a list of any convictions in the state of Vermont.

For potential volunteers who have lived outside of the state of Vermont, the BPD will assist the CJC with obtaining a fingerprint-supported background check by fingerprinting the potential volunteer free of charge and submitting the FAC form to VCIC. The CJC will be responsible for paying the federal fee charged by VCIC. It is understood that the typical turnaround time for

such requests is 1-2 weeks. The CJC will be responsible for scheduling volunteers' fingerprinting, and for submitting necessary paperwork to the BPD Records unit. The contact person for this will be the Deputy Chief of Operations and/or the Community Service Manager.

Section 9. Amendment/Termination of Memorandum

This MOU shall remain in effect from the date signed unless or until any party to the agreement requests amendment or termination in writing. It is recommended that this agreement be revisited annually.

In witness whereof, this Agreement has been executed and is effective as to each of the parties as herein provided.

Burlington Police Department

Jon Murad, Chief of Police

Date: Aug 09, 2024

Burlington Community Justice Center

Rachel Jolly, Director


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
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
Appendix 15: All BPD Positions, Sworn and Professional

	SWORN POSITION		# AUTH	# ON STAFF
1	Chief		1	1
2	Deputy Chief		2	2
3	Lieutenant		6	6
4	Sergeant		11	5
5	Police Officer		67	50
			87	64

	PROFESSIONAL POSITION	GRADE	# AUTH	# ON STAFF
1	Application and Technology Support Specialist	15	1	1
2	Assistant Director of CAIP	24	1	1
3	Beach & Parks Patrol		x	x
4	Burlington CARES Clinical Supervisor	20	1	1
5	Burlington CARES Clinician	19	2	1
6	Business Manager	20	1	0
7	Command Assistant	15	1	1
8	Community Service Manager (CSM)	18	1	1
9	Community Service Officer (CSO)	15	11	6
10	Community Support Liaison (CSL)	18	6	6
11	Community Support Supervisor (CSS)	20	1	1
12	Criminal Identification Technician	18	2	2
13	Digital Media Redaction Specialist	14	1	1
14	Domestic Violence Victims Advocate	17	1	1
15	Emergency Communications Manager (ECM)	19	1	1
16	Emergency Communications Specialist (ECS)	17	14	11
17	Executive Manager	21	1	1
18	Inventory Control Specialist	16	1	1
19	Police / Fire Accountant	18	1	1
20	Police Receptionist	13	1	0
21	Police Recruitment and Hiring Coordinator	16	1	1
22	Public Info & Community Engagement Coordinator	18	1	1
23	Records Clerk	[13]	4	4
24	Senior Network Administrator	19	1	0
25	Training and Special Projects Coordinator	18	1	1
26	Uniform Bureau Support & Administrative Coordinator	16	1	1
			58	46
			145	110







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
Appendix 17: Sworn Officer Tenure

These charts show the current tenure of the 14 supervisors currently employed by the BPD (although two of these are on terminal leave). We have an unusually high number of supervisors who are relatively early stages of their careers. This is exacerbated by the Tier 3 rules that prevent pension collection prior to age 50. A 35-year-old lieutenant hired at 22 will be eligible for a half-pay pension at 42, but cannot claim it for another eight years. He can work another five, and “max out” the pension, but even then he would be 47 and would still not be able to collect for three years. While this change has been described as an actuarial necessity, owing to people living longer lives, and may have also been intended as “golden handcuffs,” it actually disincentivizes longevity if other options exist for our hypothetical lieutenant.


Officer tenure is more evenly distributed, but there is a gap in the historic presence of more seasoned “senior corporals,” the experienced officers who did not pursue supervisory roles but nevertheless create cultures of competence.

The good news about the tenure distribution of the department as a whole is that the BPD will see fewer tenure-based retirements over the next few years. Assuming officers do not leave prior to their service retirements (i.e., a minimum of 20 years’ service), this may provide an opportunity to keep officers and build on the foundation they provide.


SUPERVISOR TENURE



OFFICER TENURE



ALL SWORN TENURE



> 1 year ■ 1-5 years ■ 6-10 years ■ 11-15 years ■ 16-20 years ■ 20+ years ■