

Vermont State Police Special Operations Unit



AFTER ACTION REPORT

South Burlington Protest Response

26A1001946

March 11, 2026

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

The following acronyms and abbreviations are used throughout this After Action Report.

Acronym	Definition
AAR	After Action Report
ASAC	Assistant Special Agent in Charge
BPD	Burlington Police Department
BWC	Body-Worn Camera (also Axon BWC)
CAT	Critical Action Team
CS	CS gas (tear gas / chemical agent)
ERO	Enforcement and Removal Operations (ICE)
EMS	Emergency Medical Services
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
HSI	Homeland Security Investigations
ICE	U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
ICS	Incident Command System
IACP	International Association of Chiefs of Police
OC	Oleoresin Capsicum (pepper spray / chemical agent)
PA	Public Address (system)
SBPD	South Burlington Police Department
SRT	Special Response Team

Acronym	Definition
TSU	Tactical Services Unit
UAS	Unmanned Aircraft Systems (drone)
UVM	University of Vermont
VSP	Vermont State Police

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On March 11, 2026, the Vermont State Police (VSP) responded to the scene of an active federal enforcement action conducted by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in South Burlington, Vermont. The federal enforcement operation involved the execution of a federal search warrant at a residence on Dorset Street and led to the formation of a large crowd surrounding the residence.

Prior to this incident, the Department of Public Safety (DPS) previously engaged in executive-level discussions with federal law enforcement officials regarding expectations for pre-planning, information sharing, and coordination for any potential federal enforcement actions within Vermont. These discussions emphasized the importance of timely notification and collaborative planning to ensure that state and local law enforcement agencies could effectively protect public safety during any planned enforcement actions. Federal officials did not notify state and local agencies ahead of the enforcement actions on March 11, limiting the ability of Vermont law enforcement to prepare for operational demands. This After Action Report (AAR) examines these events in detail.

As the day progressed, the crowd around the residence grew and federal agents indicated their intent to obtain and execute a judicial warrant at the residence. A Unified Command was established at South Burlington City Hall with representatives from local, state, and federal agencies. Vermont law enforcement officials raised repeated and significant public safety concerns to ICE about their stated intention to execute a warrant at a residence surrounded by a large crowd, particularly given the lack of a detailed operational plan by ICE, limited maneuverability, proximity to a school, and the potential impact on the broader community. Despite requests, ICE representatives provided minimal planning details and rejected recommendations from Vermont law enforcement and representatives from the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) and Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) to pursue alternative

or delayed enforcement strategies, stating that ICE personnel were en route and would proceed regardless of the local involvement.

During a subsequent call, an ICE leader confirmed their intent and capability to execute the warrant, stating that ICE was prepared to use gas and impact munitions if necessary. Vermont law enforcement concluded that this plan posed an unacceptable risk of injury to the crowd but also recognized they lacked authority to halt the federal action. Ultimately, Vermont law enforcement determined that remaining engaged was necessary to mitigate the risk of harm to the crowd.

As the federal investigation unfolded on March 11th, VSP resources, including the Critical Action Team (CAT), were deployed to protect public safety and ensure separation between federal agents and the crowd. Initial conditions reflected a peaceful crowd that changed in its posture and temperament later in the afternoon as federal officials prepared to execute their warrant. By late afternoon individuals from the crowd attempted to physically block law enforcement officers from approaching and entering the residence and later blocked egress routes following execution of the warrant.

Crowd behavior intensified to include coordinated obstruction, thrown objects, direct interference with officers and vehicles, and assaults on law enforcement personnel. Controlled crowd management tactics were employed in an effort to maintain order and facilitate movement. During periods of elevated threat, CAT members twice requested expanded use-of-force options, including OC/pepper spray, but these requests were denied by command staff.

During the extraction phase, conditions further deteriorated. Law enforcement vehicles were immobilized, roadways were intentionally blocked, and officers were subjected to sustained physical contact and targeted aggression. The inability to establish and maintain clear egress routes resulted in a prolonged and increasingly volatile situation. Multiple officers were placed at elevated risk, culminating in damage to law enforcement vehicles and injury to a VSP member caused by shattered glass during an attempted breach of a police vehicle. Despite these conditions, local and state law enforcement were ultimately able to disengage and withdraw from the area.

This AAR provides an assessment of this incident, including a detailed timeline, analysis of operational decision-making, evaluation of interagency coordination, and assessment of tactical effectiveness. It identifies key strengths, including rapid mobilization, operational discipline under pressure, and coordination efforts among state and local partners, while also addressing critical areas for improvement.

Primary areas for improvement center on five operational themes: the effectiveness of Unified Command as a functional decision-making structure across agencies; pre-event intelligence sharing and coordinated planning with federal partners; the establishment of defined control zones, ingress routes, and egress corridors prior to execution; communication integration across agencies; and officer safety measures.

This AAR is intended to serve as both an operational record and a planning resource. Its purpose is to inform future operations, strengthen interagency coordination, and improve VSP's capacity to manage complex, multi-agency incidents with officer safety and community policing as the foundation of that effort.

PART I: PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

Purpose

The purpose of this After Action Report (AAR) is to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of VSP response to the March 11, 2026 protest in South Burlington. This review is intended to identify strengths, challenges, and areas for improvement in order to enhance future operational effectiveness, officer and public safety, and interagency coordination during similar events.

Scope

This review examines the actions of VSP personnel, with a focus on the Special Operations Unit and CAT, as well as coordination with partner agencies including local law enforcement and federal entities involved in the execution of the operation.

The scope includes:

- Pre-event awareness and planning
- Deployment and operational execution
- Crowd management and control measures
- Use of force considerations and command decisions
- Communication and coordination across agencies
- Officer safety and incident outcomes

This review is intended primarily for internal use by VSP command staff and operational units. However, it is recognized that this document may be reviewed externally by stakeholders, including legislative bodies and the public, and may be subject to redaction where necessary to protect sensitive law enforcement information.

Methodology

This AAR is based on a comprehensive review of multiple sources of information, including:

- Body Worn Camera (BWC) footage from VSP personnel

- Use of Force documentation
- Command-level feedback and compiled timelines
- Statements and feedback from personnel directly involved in the operation
- Observations and input gathered during a multiagency post-incident debrief
- Evaluation of statements made by event attendees as well as complaints received by the Office of Internal Affairs.

Information from these sources was analyzed, cross-referenced, and developed into a consolidated timeline to identify key operational themes.

Legal / Policy / Jurisdictional Framework

The March 11, 2026, incident occurred within a complex operational environment involving overlapping jurisdictions and authorities. The primary law enforcement action, which was the execution of a federal search warrant, was initiated and conducted by ICE. State and local law enforcement agencies do not have the legal authority to interfere with or prevent federal law enforcement officers from carrying out federal laws. State and local law enforcement agencies, including VSP, ensured public safety at the large gathering and served as a buffer between federal agents and protesters.

VSP actions during this incident were governed by applicable state statutes and departmental policies, including those related to use of force ([VSP-DIR-701](#)), and crowd management ([VSP-DIR-419](#)). VSP was authorized to take enforcement action in response to violations of Vermont law, including disorderly conduct and impeding, while also maintaining constitutional protections related to lawful protest and free speech.

Consistent with Fair and Impartial Policing policy, VSP was not engaged in any investigation of civil immigration laws or biased profiling tactics before or during this incident ([VSP-DIR-301](#), 4.1, A., 3, c). VSP's role was limited to public safety and enforcement of Vermont law and never extended to civil immigration enforcement. Members were required to ensure that all actions were based on lawful authority, including reasonable suspicion or probable cause, and that individuals were not detained or treated differently based on perceived or actual immigration status. VSP's presence at the scene was therefore focused on:

- Allowing the safe exercise of constitutional rights
- Maintaining public order
- Serving as a buffer between federal agents and protesters
- Evaluating and responding to violations of state law when possible

The operational environment required continuous reassessment of lawful authority, particularly as crowd behavior evolved from verbal defiance, to passive resistance, to active interference with law enforcement operations, and ended with assaultive behavior by members of the crowd. Additionally, coordination with federal officials introduced complexities related to communication, operational control, and alignment of objectives.

Command decisions regarding use of force, arrest posture, and tactical response were made within this framework, with an emphasis on maintaining proportionality, minimizing escalation, and ensuring officer and public safety.

Incident Overview

On March 11, 2026, a federal law enforcement operation conducted by ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) at a residence on Dorset Street in South Burlington prompted a rapidly developing public gathering that evolved into a large-scale protest. ICE requested municipal assistance for operational support and security. South Burlington Police Department (SBPD) responded initially and assessed the incident was growing to a level that would need additional resources, which ultimately led to their request for VSP support.

By mid-afternoon, approximately 150–175 individuals had assembled in the immediate area. The crowd was initially peaceful but non-compliant, with individuals positioning themselves to obstruct access to the residence and interfere with law enforcement movement.

As the operation progressed, crowd size and intensity increased, with individuals coordinating efforts to block access routes, surround law enforcement, and interfere with movement. For more details on this topic see the detailed chronological timeline of events.

The VSP CAT was deployed to help manage the growing crowd presence and serve as a buffer between federal agents and protesters while federal agents executed a judicial warrant. CAT personnel operated in close proximity to protesters and the target residence to serve as a buffer between federal agents entering the residence and protesters blocking the entrance to the residence.

Following execution of the warrant and removal of individuals from the residence, conditions further deteriorated. The crowd blocked roadways, surrounded vehicles, and engaged in increasingly aggressive behavior, including throwing objects and making physical contact with officers.

Disengagement efforts were met with sustained obstruction by the crowd, resulting in prolonged exposure of personnel to hostile conditions. Law enforcement vehicles were immobilized, and one VSP member sustained an injury when a protester broke a vehicle window.

Despite these conditions and constraints, VSP personnel maintained discipline and disengaged from the area without further escalation.

PART II: DETAILED CHRONOLOGICAL TIMELINE

Note: This timeline represents an approximate reconstruction of events based on the best available information at the time of this report. Information was compiled from multiple sources, including agency reports from SBPD and BPD, VSP command-level documentation, body-worn camera review, and statements from involved personnel.

Time	Description
0738 hrs	SBPD responded to a reported multi-vehicle crash on Dorset Street. Officers located an unoccupied suspect vehicle in the northbound lane, a damaged civilian vehicle in the southbound lane, and two damaged federal vehicles in the Dorset Commons parking lot. Preliminary investigation determined federal agents had attempted to apprehend an individual associated with 337 Dorset Street; the suspect vehicle fled, struck multiple vehicles. Two occupants of the fleeing vehicle abandoned it and fled on foot into 337 Dorset Street.
0800 hrs	HSI supervision was informed of the ICE operation after it already occurred and did not have prior notice of the enforcement action.
0815 hrs	HSI deployed three agents to the area to monitor physical officer safety.
0840 hrs	SBPD became aware of a Migrant Justice “Rapid Response Request” for ICE vehicles outside 337 Dorset Street; public mobilization accelerated.
0845 hrs	SBPD Chief was informed ICE remained on scene and a crowd was forming. He contacted the on-scene ICE supervisor, who stated ICE intended to obtain and serve a criminal warrant once secured and had requested additional federal agents. SBPD deployed six officers with a limited public safety mission.
1119 hrs	VSP Special Operation Unit Commander, Captain Filipek, received the initial phone call from SBPD Chief Breault sharing information about the unfolding incident. No formal request for VSP resources was made. Strategic planning began within VSP. Estimated crowd size was about 40.
1130 hrs	VSP’s A Troop Commander, Captain Munson, arrived at the Williston Barracks, met with commanders, and was briefed on the developing incident and growing crowd at 337 Dorset Street.
1145 hrs	Estimated crowd size increased to approximately 50–60.

Time	Description
1215 hrs	Command Post opened at South Burlington City Hall.
1225 hrs	Information provided from SBPD Chief: Two additional ICE agents from New Hampshire arrived; the crowd escalated and physically attempted to block them. A federal agent deployed pepper spray, and contaminated a SBPD Lieutenant in the process. Crowd members moved into the street and surrounded SBPD officers. This event caused SBPD Chief to formally request VSP and Burlington PD (BPD) assistance and shut down part of Dorset Street for safety.
1235 hrs	SBPD sought state assistance for the Dorset Street incident via dispatch.
1236 hrs	The assistance request was acknowledged and relayed for follow-up.
1245 hrs	Command Post leaders from SBPD, BPD and VSP expressed concerns to ICE regarding public safety, the immediate impact on the community, and the need to delay or alter the operation. ICE declined to change its plan. SBPD Chief also spoke with an ICE Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) from Boston and received no willingness to modify the approach.
1302 hrs	VSP Agency Assist case was confirmed and dispatch opened case 26A1001946.
1310 hrs	VSP activated CAT and directed them to respond to the Williston Barracks. Captain Filipek arrives at the City Hall Command Post. Captain Munson remained at the barracks to consolidate resources and stage VSP personnel, Department of Motor Vehicles, and Fish & Wildlife. Vermont Intelligence Center confirmed continued widespread social media calls for additional civilian response.
1315 hrs	Five Field Force Troopers and Williston Station Commander departed Williston Barracks directly to the scene. Reported approximately 125 protesters present.
1320 hrs	ICE supervisor identified their suspect by name to the Command Post and stated ICE had an administrative warrant and intended to seek a criminal warrant for illegal reentry and assault on a federal agent related to the crash.
1325 hrs	Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) ASAC and Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) representatives arrived at the Command Post, expressed concern with ICE's plan, and offered alternative investigative means. ICE officials rejected those alternatives. SBPD Chief spoke with ICE leadership in Boston to express Vermont law enforcement concerns; no change was made to their plan. ICE supervisor also stated that ERO SRT was already en route. <i>(These command discussions are explained in further detail in the Part III Chronological Narrative below).</i>

Time	Description
1330 hrs	Captain Munson requested traffic message boards on I-89 reflect Dorset Street was closed due to an incident.
1342 hrs	Traffic sign package request was declined unless traffic spilled onto the interstate.
1412 hrs	Updated field estimate placed the crowd at approximately 170 protesters surrounding the house.
1506 hrs	Another field estimate reflected approximately 170 protesters surrounding the house.
1520 hrs	School dismissal planning concluded with a decision to reroute buses and prevent children from walking through the area.
1530 hrs	<p>A Troop Commander briefed Troopers, CAT, TSU, DMV, and Fish & Wildlife at the Williston Barracks. Crowd size was estimated at approximately 200. During a Command Post conference call with the ICE ERO SRT commander, ERO SRT advised it was staged at Hannaford and prepared to move once the warrant was signed. When asked for an operations plan, ERO SRT said it intended to move to the front door, breach, enter, and search; ERO SRT leader communicated to the Command Post leadership they would use gas, OC, and less-lethal tools if necessary to move the crowd. VSP and local leadership strongly opposed ERO SRT's stated approach and communicated their strong disagreement to them. ERO SRT did not change their plan in response to state and local opposition. Accordingly, VSP developed a plan to have CAT create a safe passage to the front door in an effort to prevent a broader and more aggressive federal force response. <i>(These command discussions are explained in further detail in the Part III Chronological Narrative below)</i></p>
1601 hrs	Report of protesters at the residence were fortifying the front door area with wood and debris from the porch railing; there was also information that one person may have chained themselves to the structure, though officers could not get close enough to confirm it. Officers also noted an influx of people carrying backpacks, gas masks, face coverings, helmets, goggles, and padded gloves, and their posture became more aggressive.
1607 hrs	Hannaford's rear parking lot was established as the forward staging area. Leadership from SBPD, BPD, VSP, CAT, and federal partners briefed the plan. VSP again reinforced to ICE ERO SRT leadership that it would not participate in the use of gas or less-lethal munitions to disperse the crowd. CAT noted protesters,

Time	Description
	media, and onlookers began surrounding the staging location and climbing snowbanks to watch law enforcement preparations.
1642 hrs	Final command briefing was pushed to units at Hannaford. VSP leadership reiterated that under no circumstances were gas agents to be deployed by VSP for crowd dispersal and that any life-safety need for chemical agents would require regrouping and a new plan.
1645 hrs	An ICE agent, acting independently and outside the coordinated briefing, presented a copy of the warrant to the crowd at 337 Dorset Street and advised they would be executing shortly. This was not coordinated through the Command Post, and caused a commotion with the crowd. Lt. Lozier confronted the ICE agent and told him to stop, as he was acting outside of the command strategy and only escalating tensions.
1650 hrs	The Command Post was notified that the federal warrant had been signed.
1703 hrs	The final unified operational plan was completed and briefed to leaders at Hannaford and disseminated to personnel. HSI prepared to assist in delivering the dispersal notice.
1708 hrs	Update from the field indicated federal cruiser with the PA system was moving into position to deliver the dispersal notice.
1712 hrs	A federal dispersal order was issued from an HSI vehicle. Portions of the crowd near the vehicle audibly acknowledged the order and chanted that it would not leave.
1724 hrs	Units moved from Hannaford staging to 337 Dorset Street. CAT loaded into the green CAT van and followed the caravan to the residence.
1725 hrs	CAT and ERO SRT arrived at 337 Dorset Street. The crowd was estimated at approximately 200.
1726 hrs	CAT dismounted and moved toward the house in two columns to create separation between the crowd and ICE. Troopers observed multiple protesters already outfitted for physical conflict with goggles, masks, helmets, ear coverings, plastic coverings, and rain gear. CAT removed several protesters from the front door area and cut garden hoses wrapped around the handrails that had been used as a barrier.

Time	Description
1727 hrs	Multiple protesters offered strong resistance to removal. One red-bearded, bald male behaved aggressively and attempted to re-engage after being pushed off the stairs.
1728 hrs	Objects were thrown from the crowd. A male in an orange hat and black-and-white balaclava threw an umbrella and then a bag containing a Powerade bottle and a possible rock that struck troopers. ICE agents ascended the stairs and the first federal agent used a ram to break the door open.
1729 hrs	Protesters on both the east side and south side of the house pressed into troopers, reaching toward faces and striking several officers. CAT members documented being punched and struck multiple times while trying to hold the line. A female repeatedly pushed into them, and the red-bearded male aggressively charged at them before other troopers intervened.
1731 hrs	Troopers pushed the line back on the south side of the house to maintain a buffer between federal agents and protesters. A male in the orange-hat/balaclava male struck CAT Trooper in the face, knocking down her face shield.
1732 hrs	ICE ERO SRT inside the residence requested a mirror, VSP denied their request. A CAT Trooper, positioned nearest the front door, had to relay information manually because there was no direct interoperable radio communication between ICE inside the residence and state/local officers outside. Protesters continued gathering in front of the house.
1734 hrs	Troopers removed wood planks and a 2x4 from a protester attempting to block the entrance.
1736 hrs	ICE ERO SRT again requested a mirror or ladder from VSP; VSP denied their request. Crowd tension increased each time troopers moved toward the doorway.
1738 hrs	ICE ERO SRT deployed gas inside the residence during the interior search.
1739 hrs	At the Command Post, ICE leadership advised there was still no contact with anyone inside and that suspects might be hiding in a crawl space; crowd temperament continued to shift more aggressively toward VSP.
1740 hrs	Troopers on the perimeter reported crowd escalation and Captain Munson began discussing contingencies for departure as aggression increasingly focused on state and local police.

Time	Description
1741 hrs	Protesters began using whistles and air horns in large numbers in Troopers' ears.
1742 hrs	Status update from the scene indicated all VSP personnel were okay but crowd behavior was escalating. CAT Trooper remained the on-the-ground liaison at the doorway because direct radio communications with ICE inside were still absent.
1749 hrs	ICE ERO SRT removed individuals from the residence. Crowd hostility escalated sharply. Objects were thrown and verbal threats intensified. CAT began a defensive withdrawal toward the street. Secondary ICE ERO officers moved vehicles closer to the residence and blocked in staged cruisers on Dorset Street, which limited extraction options; this movement was not communicated through the Command Post or state/local leaders on scene.
1750 hrs	Federal agents emerged from the house with detainees and CAT attempted to create a path to the vehicles; crowd members immediately engaged in physical interference.
1751 hrs	Federal authorities took custody of the detainees and attempted to move them to transport vehicles bound for Champlain ERO. The crowd attempted to interfere with removal by blocking their movement, and pushing law enforcement, and pulling on detainees.
1752 hrs	CAT and VSP units began attempts to egress from the scene. Troopers had to split into elements to create paths to vehicles while the crowd tried to block every attempt.
1753 hrs	Protesters ignored lawful orders to clear the roadway and formed a human chain approximately five to seven rows deep across the road, with roughly 25–35 people across. An ICE vehicle carrying detainees had its tires slashed. Protesters linked arms and physically interfered with troopers. CAT attempted a line-separation formation to open the roadway, but the crowd was too numerous and resistant to be broken with the available personnel.
1756 hrs	CAT continued attempts to create a separation corridor so vehicles could exit. As vehicles moved, the crowd adapted and stacked more people into the roadway with interlocked arms.
1758 hrs	CAT made their first request to CPT Munson for authorization to deploy OC because of active aggression and inability to create safe separation.

Time	Description
1800 hrs	CAT TL instructed CAT members to put on gas masks. CAT continued holding the line and enduring active resistance and assaultive behavior. The OC deployment request was relayed to CPT Filipek at the Command Post. Unified Command denied the request and directed that vehicles attempt to back out while CAT held the crowd at the front line.
1801 hrs	A female in the crowd experienced a medical event and collapsed behind the crowd. Rescue was called but could not reach her by vehicle and moved in on foot.
1808 hrs	A protester behind the CAT line was physically removed after refusing to leave the roadway.
1810 hrs	Vehicles began backing out, but the crowd advanced toward them. CAT was instructed to begin egress while maintaining line integrity.
1811 hrs	CAT attempted to egress, but the crowd closed distance and forced troopers to hold the line again. CAT made a second request to deploy OC, the request was relayed through the VSP chain of command to the Command Post.
1812 hrs	A protester in a pink helmet advanced into the line and troopers restrained and held him back.
1813 hrs	The CAT request to use OC was denied again by Unified Command. Both ends of the street were reported blocked by protesters. Arrest attempts resumed; one protester resisted strongly with assistance from the crowd and was ultimately taken into custody.
1817 hrs	Crowd coordination increased and protesters again attempted to pull troopers into the crowd. CAT members again called for alternative less-lethal tools for safety purposes and did not receive authorization.
1820 hrs	A female with a gold-plated name tag repeatedly questioned troopers regarding what charge people would face for refusing to leave the roadway and asked who was in charge. CAT directed her to command-level troopers.
1821 hrs	State Representative Logan approached troopers and inquired about the legal basis for arrests.
1822 hrs	The crowd closed in and surrounded law enforcement again. Lawful orders to clear the roadway were ignored. CAT Team Leader documented being chest-bumped; another subject with a camera resisted removal and was arrested for

Time	Description
	disorderly conduct. An arrestee was placed in Trooper Chandler's vehicle, which was then heavily surrounded by the crowd.
1824 hrs	Diminishing daylight conditions were identified as a developing risk factor, with approximately 30 minutes remaining until sunset. VSP leadership recognized that continued operations under reduced visibility would increase risk to personnel and complicate scene management.
1828 hrs	Protesters attempted to breach the line again. CAT began final egress as the crowd slowly disengaged and then re-formed.
1832 hrs	CAT Squad 1 returned to the van, removed gas masks, and was immediately surrounded, preventing departure.
1834 hrs	Protesters struck an ICE vehicle with a bag and swarmed the roadway around the remaining ICE vehicles. Most federal vehicles exited by this point.
1835 hrs	CAT was ordered to clear a lane for ICE vehicles. CAT Squad 1 dismounted again and advanced toward protesters under active resistance.
1836 hrs	CAT physically attempted to push the crowd back to clear a lane.
1838 hrs	An ICE vehicle operator advanced into the CAT formation that was holding the crowd back. This forced CAT members to clear from the vehicle path as they risked being injured from the ICE vehicle as it hastily departed, it also placed the crowd at risk of the same.
1840 hrs	Dialogue was attempted with a self-identified protest leader in an effort to de-escalate, but no resolution was reached. Troopers encouraged protestors to move people out of the roadway, while another aggressive male in an orange hat and balaclava urged continued opposition.
1847 hrs	CAT was ordered to return to the CAT van and leave the area. Protesters intentionally obstructed the troopers' path and made physical contact. A male with dreadlocks pushed two troopers near the van, the male charged and struck another Trooper in the back/right shoulder.
1850 hrs	CAT Squad 1 loaded into the CAT van and Squad 2 into the truck. Protesters threw dirt and leaves onto windshields as daylight faded.
1851 hrs	Snowballs were thrown at the CAT van.

Time	Description
1853 hrs	Hard objects struck the CAT van and cracked the windshield. The crowd became increasingly violent, with multiple attempts to open the rear door and swastikas drawn on the rear of the van.
1854 hrs	The CAT van was forced to stop when a protester intentionally moved in the vehicle path and placed a foot under the front wheel. 1854 hrs also marks sunset, the scene was dark, chaotic, and the reduced visibility elevates risk while degrading situational awareness.
1855 hrs	The CAT van managed to move a short distance away, but CAT personnel observed uniformed troopers still surrounded and at risk. Squad 1 exited to assist, then immediately had to get back in as protesters ran toward them. A CAT Trooper was struck when a male with dreadlocks sprinted at the van, shattered the rear window with his head and shoulder, and drove glass into the CAT Trooper's eye. The male was still presenting himself as a threat to the CAT Troopers in the back of the van and a CAT Det. Trooper then deployed OC spray through the broken window at the male, and the van departed.
1855 hrs	Command Post advised ICE to abandon the disabled vehicle with slashed tires and called a tow truck to retrieve it. ICE supervisor David Johnston refused this vehicle retrieval option. HSI ASAC then contacted ICE Boston and received authorization for agents to abandon the vehicle.
1900 hrs	EMS was requested for the CAT Trooper's injury.
1903 hrs	ICE ERO SRT returned to the scene to recover the disabled vehicle with slashed tires. Flashbangs, chemical munitions, less-lethal impact tools, and additional force was used by ICE ERO SRT without prior coordination or communication with state or local personnel still on scene. Lt. Lozier was sprayed in the face twice with OC by ICE ERO SRT, and another sergeant was exposed to OC during this phase. Remaining VSP assets on scene were primarily Williston Station Commander and one sergeant.
1905 hrs	Lt. Lozier prevented an ICE vehicle from running over a female who was on the ground underneath the front bumper during the vehicle-recovery operation.
1910 hrs	All remaining VSP assets were clear from the scene. Traffic began reopening shortly thereafter. The injured CAT Trooper arrived at the Williston Barracks and was evaluated by EMS before being transported to UVM Medical Center for removal of glass from his eye.

Time	Description
1922 hrs	SBPD advised command that the roadway was being reopened.
1934 hrs	The recovered ICE vehicle later broke down on I-89 south near Exit 11 and another tow request was made.
1937 hrs	Tow service advised an approximate 25-minute ETA for the disabled ICE vehicle on I-89.
1954 hrs	Final scene update indicated protesters had largely dispersed, no active crowd remained at the residence, and SBPD was monitoring for residual activity.
0000 hrs (3/12/26)	The injured CAT Trooper was released from the hospital after treatment for the eye injury and returned briefly to the Williston Barracks before departing.

PART III: CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE

0700–0900 hrs Initial Incident & Federal Action

At approximately 0738 hours, the SBPD responded to a reported multi-vehicle crash on Dorset Street. Upon arrival, officers identified a suspect vehicle that was abandoned, a damaged civilian vehicle, and two damaged ICE vehicles in the Dorset Commons parking lot.

Initial investigation indicated that ICE ERO agents attempted to stop the suspect vehicle, which fled and collided with ICE vehicles during the encounter. The suspect vehicle then continued onto Dorset Street, where it collided with uninvolved vehicles before the occupants fled on foot into a residence at 337 Dorset Street. ICE agents established a perimeter around the house.

Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) was notified after the incident and responded to the scene. At approximately 0830 hours, a call to action issued by Migrant Justice was posted on social media platforms saying they activated a “rapid response network” and encouraged more supporters to attend. This resulted in the rapid formation of a crowd in the surrounding area of 337 Dorset Street, South Burlington.

What began as a federal enforcement action developed into a public order event involving a growing and increasingly engaged group of individuals.

0845–1115 hrs SBPD Management & Crowd Development

At approximately 0845 hours, SBPD Chief made contact with an ICE supervisor to assess the situation and determine the operational approach. Due to the evolving nature of the incident, a clearly defined and coordinated plan was not established at that time.

SBPD deployed an initial contingent of six officers with a defined mission to:

- Protect lawful First Amendment activity
- Prevent assaults and disorderly conduct
- Maintain public safety
- Ensure safe travel of vehicle traffic on Dorset Street

ICE personnel indicated their intent to pursue a criminal warrant related to the incident and to both bring in and stage outside federal resources. Initial information shared with state and local law enforcement was that charges of assault on a federal officer were being pursued. During this period, the crowd steadily increased in size, influenced by social media activity and organized community response.

SBPD notified partner agencies, including the Burlington Police Department (BPD), and maintained situational awareness while monitoring for further escalation. A live body-worn camera feed was established to support command-level visibility.

During this time both crowd size and complexity increased, while formal unified command and coordinated operational planning had not yet been established.

1115–1215 hrs VSP Awareness, Pre-Planning, and Initial Deployment

At approximately 1119 hours, initial coordination occurred between SBPD Chief and VSP Special Operations Unit leadership. Information was shared regarding the evolving situation, anticipated escalation, and the potential need for additional resources.

Shortly thereafter, coordination efforts began at the VSP Williston Barracks involving Special Operations Unit leadership and command staff. Although a formal request for assistance had not yet been made, VSP initiated information sharing for situational awareness. No VSP units were mobilized or deployed.

By approximately 1145 hours, the crowd grew to an estimated 50–60 individuals.

VSP engagement during this phase remained proactive, allowing for early coordination and planning prior to full operational deployment.

1215–1325 hrs Unified Command Establishment

At approximately 1215 hours, a Unified Command Post was established at South Burlington City Hall. Participating agencies included SBPD, BPD, and other supporting partners; VSP was not present yet as a formal request was yet to be made.

As additional federal personnel arrived on scene, crowd behavior escalated. At approximately 1225 hours, SBPD reported that an ICE agent deployed OC (pepper spray). A SBPD lieutenant was also affected by the spray.

In response, SBPD requested additional law enforcement resources, and Dorset Street was closed to vehicle traffic due to safety concerns. A formal request for VSP assistance followed. Initial VSP field force personnel from Williston Barracks were deployed to the scene.

Concurrently, Field Force A Troop Commander, Captain Munson staged at Williston barracks to coordinate incoming resources and support operational planning, while Special Operations Unit commander, Captain Filipek, responded to South Burlington City Hall to join Unified Command.

ICE leadership was directed to respond to the Command Post. During this period, local and state leadership raised concerns regarding operational approach and public safety risk.

At approximately 1310 hours, the VSP CAT was formally activated and directed to respond to the VSP Williston Barracks. This activation was for the CAT only and did not include its Public Order Unit. Additionally, five Field Force Troopers and the Williston Station Commander were deployed to the scene.

By approximately 1325 hours, the crowd increased to an estimated 125 individuals. Indicators of increased organization and resistance were observed, including individuals clustering near the residence and linking arms.

Federal partners, including the FBI and HSI, were present at the Command Post and engaged in coordination discussions as described below.

1325–1600 hrs Command Deliberations & Commitment to Execution

The South Burlington Police Department Chief had previously established a Unified Command at South Burlington City Hall. By approximately 1325, Unified Command had representatives present from VSP, SBPD, BPD, FBI, HSI, and ICE. Vermont law enforcement (representatives from SBPD, BPD, and VSP) raised significant concerns to the ICE representative about ICE's intention to pursue and execute a warrant in light of the large crowd surrounding the residence.

Vermont law enforcement asked the ICE representative for ICE's warrant execution plan. The ICE representative stated that they were staging ICE ERO SRT resources at a nearby parking lot. Vermont law enforcement asked for their operational plan for warrant execution. The ICE representative stated only that ICE ERO SRT intended to execute the warrant without providing

plans to address the large crowd surrounding the residence. Vermont law enforcement again raised significant concerns to the ICE representative about the public safety risks associated with their limited plan, including:

- Blocked access to the residence by a large crowd
- Increasing crowd size and density
- Escalating hostility toward law enforcement
- Limited maneuverability in the operational area
- Lack of a detailed operational plan from federal authorities
- Proximity to a school and densely populated area
- Potential impact on the surrounding community
- Timeline of potential operations and the imminent school dismissal

Vermont law enforcement and FBI and HSI representatives recommended alternative investigative approaches and delayed enforcement options to the ICE representative. The ICE representative rejected these recommendations and said ERO SRT personnel were en route from out of state and intended to proceed with warrant execution upon their arrival with or without the presence of Vermont law enforcement.

Vermont law enforcement strongly objected again because of the significant public safety risk posed by this plan. At approximately 1530 hrs, the ICE supervisor called an unidentified ERO SRT leader or commander on speakerphone. Vermont law enforcement reiterated their concerns to the ERO SRT leader, including the blocked access to the residence by a large crowd. In response to these concerns, the unidentified ERO SRT leader or commander on speakerphone communicated to everyone present that:

- ERO SRT would be proceeding with warrant execution as soon as the warrant was signed;
- ERO SRT had an “inventory” of less lethal tools including “gas” and “impact munitions;”
- ERO SRT had dealt with similar situations in other cities, and;
- ERO SRT would get to the front door of the residence.

Vermont law enforcement immediately determined that this plan presented an unacceptable public safety risk to the crowd at the residence and the surrounding community and could result in serious bodily injury or even death to individuals in the crowd. Vermont law enforcement discussed among themselves their options and the likely outcomes. It should be noted that the Vermont law enforcement present knew that they did not have the legal authority to order federal agents to stop their federal enforcement actions. Vermont law enforcement discussed whether they should disengage completely at this time in light of the unacceptably high public safety risk posed by the ERO SRT plan. Vermont law enforcement determined that disengagement by Vermont law enforcement would only increase the public safety risk posed by the ERO SRT plan. Vermont law enforcement determined that they were compelled to remain involved so Vermont law enforcement could limit as much as possible the

risk of harm posed by the ERO SRT warrant execution plan to the crowd at the residence and the surrounding community.

1600–1710 hrs Operational Staging, Resource Consolidation, and Pre-Execution Conditions

Resources consolidated and staged in the Hannaford parking lot on Dorset Street. Command functions remained active, and the crowd continued to grow and organize around the target location.

The federal warrant for 337 Dorset Street was signed at approximately 1650 hours.

Throughout this phase, state and Unified Command communicated operational expectations to state and local law enforcement personnel. Messaging to Vermont officers was clear that their role was limited to public safety and officer safety. Based on the discussions described in the prior narrative section, Vermont law enforcement command determined that deployment of CAT was necessary to reduce the risk of harm to the crowd surrounding the house. CAT was directed to create a safe access corridor to the residence and establish separation between the crowd and federal agents conducting the warrant service.

Federal SRT personnel advised they would proceed from the Hannaford staging area after issuing a dispersal order and allowing time for compliance.

1711 hrs Federal Dispersal Order

At approximately 1711 hours, a dispersal order was issued by federal agents using a marked vehicle with emergency lights activated and a public address (PA) system.

The crowd did not meaningfully comply. Individuals remained in place, continued occupying the lawn around the residence, and did not create any space to establish a controlled operating area.

1711–1724 hrs Movement from Hannaford Staging Area to 337 Dorset Street

Following the dispersal order, a period of time was allowed for compliance. When conditions did not change, staged resources began moving from the Hannaford parking area toward 337 Dorset Street.

During this movement:

- Crowd members tracked law enforcement movement
- Additional individuals converged toward the target area
- Crowd density increased around the residence and along anticipated ingress and egress routes

No effective buffer existed between the crowd and the operational area at the time of movement. Specifically, no buffer existed between the crowd and the path of travel to the front door of the target house.

As personnel advanced from staging to the objective, officers, federal agents, and members of the public occupied the same confined space without established separation zones or controlled evacuation routes.

1725 hrs CAT and ICE ERO SRT Arrival at 337 Dorset Street

At approximately 1725 hours, VSP CAT personnel and ICE ERO SRT arrived at 337 Dorset Street.

Upon arrival, Troopers encountered:

- A dense crowd in close proximity to the residence
- Limited space to establish control zones or structured movement
- Immediate verbal hostility and physical encroachment
- No effective separation between the crowd and the operational area

CAT personnel moved in two columns toward the front of the residence to create a buffer between the crowd of protestors and ICE ERO SRT. Movement was impeded by crowd pressure and non-compliance. Protestors were asked to move, ordered to move, and those that remained non-compliant were pushed back to create this separation space between them and ICE ERO SRT.

The front entrance area was obstructed by physical barriers, including a garden hose and wood materials, as well as individuals linking arms to block access.

During initial positioning, CAT personnel experienced assaultive behavior, including:

- CAT Trooper being struck in the head
- Pushing and attempts to pull personnel from formation
- Kicking, spitting, and objects thrown toward officers

1725–1749 hrs Warrant Execution Under Active Crowd Interference

As ICE ERO SRT agents initiated warrant execution and breached the front door, crowd interference increased immediately and intensified in proximity to VSP personnel.

CAT and supporting officers encountered:

- Physical obstruction of movement
- Active resistance at the point of entry
- Crowd members pressing into officers
- Interference with ingress to the structure

CAT personnel removed individuals from the immediate doorway area, cut physical barriers wrapped around the railing, and pushed the line back to create access for federal agents to enter the residence.

During this phase, CAT personnel continued to be subjected to:

- Thrown objects
- Repeated aggressive actions by specific individuals
- Whistles and air horns deployed at close range
- Increasing verbal hostility

From positions near the front door, communication limitations were identified. There was no direct interoperable radio communication between ICE personnel inside the residence and state or local officers outside. Information was relayed verbally between the doorway and exterior personnel. High levels of crowd noise further degraded the ability to hear portable radios.

During execution, ICE ERO SRT personnel requested equipment from VSP, including a ladder to access a crawl space. The request was declined.

SRT personnel indicated intent to deploy a chemical agent into the crawl space to address individuals believed to be inside. At one point, CAT personnel closed the front door in an attempt to limit potential exposure of chemical agents to individuals outside the residence.

1749–1753 hrs Detainees Removed and Crowd Hostility Intensifies

At approximately 1749 hours, federal agents began removing individuals from the residence.

Following removal of detainees, crowd hostility increased. Officers reported:

- Objects being thrown
- Increased verbal threats
- Continued physical interference

CAT personnel began a controlled withdrawal from the residence toward the street while maintaining position around federal agents and detainees.

Individuals attempted to pull detainees away from federal agents and the crowd expanded into the roadway and blocked movement

During this phase, ICE personnel repositioned vehicles on the opposite side of the median, parallel to existing law enforcement vehicles. This repositioning reduced available space and contributed to restricted egress routes.

By approximately 1753 hours:

- Individuals ignored lawful orders to clear the roadway
- Protesters formed a human chain several rows deep around law enforcement vehicles
- A federal vehicle carrying detainees was reported to have slashed tires
- Individuals linked arms and physically interfered with vehicle movement

CAT personnel made several arrests for disorderly conduct and attempted additional detentions. These efforts were limited by crowd size, resistance, and the inability to safely isolate individuals.

1753–1834 hrs Extraction Attempts, Repeated Interference

During the extraction phase, personnel operated in sustained close-contact conditions while attempting to establish movement corridors for officers and vehicles.

CAT members documented the following sequence:

1758 hrs — CAT requested authorization to deploy OC/chemical agents due to active aggression from the crowd. Personnel donned gas masks pending approval.

1802 hrs — The request was denied. Command directed that vehicles attempt to back out while CAT maintained the front line.

1808–1813 hrs — Individuals remained in the roadway, continued closing distance on vehicles, and increased aggression toward officers. A subsequent request for OC deployment was denied.

1817 hrs — Individuals continued attempts to pull troopers from formation. Arrest attempts remained limited due to crowd size and resistance.

1822 hrs — The crowd surrounded law enforcement personnel, ignored lawful orders to clear the roadway, and continued obstructive behavior.

1828 hrs — Individuals attempted to breach the line as CAT initiated final egress efforts.

1832 hrs — CAT Squad 1 returned to the transport van; the vehicle was immediately surrounded and unable to depart.

1834 hrs — Individuals struck an ICE vehicle and occupied the roadway around remaining federal vehicles.

Personnel reported sustained close-contact interference, including pushing, grabbing, crowding of vehicles, and repeated obstruction of movement routes. Officers encountered ongoing difficulty moving vehicles, personnel, and detainees out of the area.

1836–1854 hrs Final Egress Efforts and Continued Interference

Beginning at approximately 1836 hours, CAT and supporting personnel continued efforts to clear lanes for ICE and law enforcement vehicles to exit Dorset Street.

1836 hrs — CAT was directed to clear a lane for ICE vehicles and push the crowd back to create space for movement.

1838 hrs — An ICE vehicle advanced toward CAT personnel, requiring members to move out of the vehicle's path.

1840 hrs — De-escalation dialogue was attempted with an individual identified as a protest leader; no resolution was achieved.

1847 hrs — CAT was directed to return to the transport van to disengage. Individuals obstructed movement and made physical contact with personnel.

1850–1854 hrs — CAT Squad 1 loaded into the van. The vehicle was struck with debris, including dirt, leaves, snow, and other objects. One individual positioned a foot under the front wheel, preventing forward movement and requiring the vehicle to stop.

Interference with vehicle movement and officer disengagement remained continuous.

1855 hrs Trooper Injury

At approximately 1855 hours, the CAT transport van moved approximately 150 yards from the primary protest area before stopping after CAT personnel observed uniformed troopers still surrounded and requiring assistance.

CAT Squad 1 dismounted their vehicle to assist those personnel. As additional individuals rapidly converged, an order was given for Squad 1 to re-enter the van.

The last Trooper entering the vehicle attempted to close the rear door (which already sustained damage) a male approached at a sprint and struck the rear window with his head and shoulder, causing it to shatter.

The impact struck the Trooper in the head and face, and shattered glass entered his right eye, causing immediate pain and injury.

Another Trooper deployed OC spray through the broken rear window toward the individual. The van then departed the area.

1855 hrs to Conclusion VSP Final Disengagement

Following departure of the CAT van, law enforcement personnel continued disengagement operations from the area.

During this phase, ICE ERO SRT personnel conducted efforts to recover a federal vehicle that was immobilized due to slashed tires. Unified Command advised ICE leadership at the command post that a tow truck was called to recover this vehicle. ICE leadership did not want to leave it behind. Captain Filipek and Chief Breault advised ICE Leadership they needed to leave the vehicle behind because the scene is unsafe, the protestors are getting violent, it is dark, and the overall risk to recover this vehicle immediately is too high, and recovering the vehicle would compromise the safety of officers still on scene. ICE leadership declined this option and emphasized they did not want to abandon the vehicle. HSI ASAC contacted ICE leadership in Boston and received authorization for agents to abandon the vehicle.

ICE ERO SRT had already departed the scene at this time and then made an unannounced and uncoordinated effort to return to the scene to recover this disabled ICE vehicle. State and local law enforcement were unaware of this effort until ICE was back at the scene deploying flashbangs, large cannister chemical munitions (OC), and less lethal impact munitions. This was an escalation of force by ICE that caught Vermont law enforcement off guard. ICE ERO SRT members were utilizing physical force on members of the crowd during this vehicle recovery effort and knocked several protestors to the ground.

ICE ERO SRT tactics were not only utilized on the crowd at this time; two VSP members were subjected to OC spray and one VSP member was subjected to multiple flashbangs detonating at his feet, sprayed in the face twice with OC, and hit in the arm, neck, and chest with non-lethal pepperball impact projectiles.

As this happened ICE agents attempted to drive the disabled vehicle away. One female was on the ground in front of the vehicle and not in view of the driver of the vehicle. She was under the front bumper and as the vehicle moved forward the front tire was approaching her body. Lt. Lozier saw this individual on the ground in front of the vehicle and began yelling commands to stop the vehicle and hitting the operator's window to get the attention of the federal agent

driving the vehicle, making physical contact with the federal agent when the window was rolling down. Lt. Lozier then assisted in moving the female out from underneath the vehicle.

These actions occurred while the rest of Vermont law enforcement attempted to withdraw from the area. Once law enforcement personnel successfully disengaged from the crowd, VSP personnel and assets regrouped at the Williston Barracks. There was a head count performed to account for all personnel, medical evaluation was conducted, and an initial debrief occurred.

PART IV – OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS

A. Mission Command (ICS / Unified Command)

The March 11, 2026 incident involved a complex and rapidly evolving situation requiring coordination between local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies operating under overlapping but distinct authorities. A Unified Command structure was formally established at South Burlington City Hall; however, its effectiveness was limited by competing operational priorities and a lack of full alignment among participating agencies.

Early in the incident, SBPD and VSP leadership made deliberate efforts to establish a coordinated command structure. This included early communication with federal partners, establishment of a Unified Command Post, and continuous assessment of risk as crowd conditions evolved. State and local leadership consistently emphasized a measured approach focused on de-escalation, public safety, and maintaining order on a high-volume roadway with nearby schools, within an increasingly volatile setting.

Despite these efforts, cohesion within Unified Command was constrained by the operational posture of federal partners, specifically ICE. Federal leadership maintained decision-making authority over the timing and execution of the warrant and proceeded without adopting concerns raised by state and local partners. ICE rejected the recommendations to delay or modify the operation made by Vermont law enforcement. Vermont law enforcement made these recommendations due to the public safety risk, including the crowd size and lack of established control zones.

As conditions deteriorated, this lack of alignment became more pronounced. While a Unified Command structure existed, it did not operate with full unity of effort. ICE retained control over key operational decisions, including timing of execution and tactical approach, while state and local agencies were left to manage the conditions created by those decisions.

VSP's role shifted accordingly. Rather than operating as a fully integrated partner, VSP functioned in a risk mitigation capacity alongside federal operations that were not fully coordinated. Vermont law enforcement command made the deliberate decision to remain engaged, recognizing that disengagement by Vermont law enforcement would increase the risk of physical harm to the crowd surrounding the residence.

This dynamic produced several operational impacts:

Reduced Command Clarity: Personnel operated in an environment where command intent was not consistently aligned across agencies, leading to confusion during critical phases, particularly during extraction and disengagement.

Limited Influence on Operational Timing: Vermont law enforcement clearly articulated safety concerns to ICE regarding their warrant execution plan, but ICE rejected these concerns and continued on their plan to proceed.

Degraded Unity of Effort: Coordination existed, but actions were not fully synchronized, resulting in parallel rather than unified operations.

Increased Risk Exposure: Proceeding under suboptimal conditions placed personnel in a compressed and volatile environment without the control measures typically associated with planned crowd management operations.

These challenges became most evident during the final phases of the incident. ICE ERO SRT personnel conducted independent vehicle recovery actions that differed from the coordinated approach being implemented by state and local personnel. These actions introduced additional confusion, disrupted withdrawal efforts, and further reduced the effectiveness of Unified Command during a critical period.

While a Unified Command structure was established at the state and local level, it did not function as a fully integrated decision-making body across all participating agencies. Federal actions remained operationally separate, creating additional risk and requiring VSP to operate in a reactive risk mitigation role rather than as a fully integrated partner in coordinated command and control.

B. Intelligence & Event Awareness

The initial actions taken by ICE on the morning of March 11th are characterized by zero shared intelligence with Vermont state and local law enforcement. This forced a rapid information dissemination after their failed apprehension, and an accelerated transition from awareness to operational engagement. While VSP demonstrated initiative in identifying emerging risk factors, the overall intelligence picture was incomplete and did not support the level of pre-planning typically required for an operation of this scale. It placed Vermont law enforcement in a reactive posture from the very beginning.

Initial awareness of federal enforcement activity and the potential for public reaction developed during the early hours of March 11, 2026. Communication between VSP and SBPD leadership reflected an understanding that the nature of the operation had a high likelihood of attracting public attention and organized protest activity. This recognition prompted early

discussions focused on contingency planning, resource availability, and the need for a coordinated response.

However, intelligence sharing from federal partners was limited in both scope and timing. Critical details regarding the warrant, operational timeline, and anticipated actions were not fully communicated during the early stages. This restricted the ability of VSP and SBPD to conduct comprehensive risk assessments, develop contingency plans, or pre-stage resources consistent with best practices for managing large-scale public demonstrations.

As information began to circulate publicly, primarily through social media and community networks, crowd formation occurred rapidly and with little predictability. Groups and individuals mobilized, resulting in a growing and increasingly assertive presence within a condensed timeframe. No clear timeline was provided by federal authorities regarding warrant execution, further compressing the planning window and limiting the ability to adjust operational posture in advance.

The absence of a fully developed intelligence picture had several operational impacts:

Limited Pre-Planning Capability: Without detailed information on federal timelines and tactics, VSP, SBPD, and BPD were unable to fully implement structured crowd management strategies, including the establishment of control zones, designated ingress and egress routes, and clearly defined operational perimeters.

Reactive Resource Deployment: Personnel and specialized resources, including CAT assets, were deployed in response to evolving conditions rather than through deliberate pre-staging aligned with a defined operational plan.

Increased Reliance on Real-Time Decision Making: Command staff were required to make critical decisions with incomplete information, adjusting strategy as conditions changed.

Reduced Opportunity for De-escalation Planning: The compressed timeline limited the ability to conduct proactive messaging, liaison engagement, or other measures that could have influenced crowd behavior prior to escalation.

While there was awareness that Migrant Justice and affiliated community members were mobilizing, there was no detailed or actionable intelligence indicating the scale, or level of resistance that would ultimately occur.

Despite these limitations, VSP, SBPD, and BPD leadership demonstrated situational awareness and adaptability by recognizing the escalating risk environment early and initiating coordination efforts. However, the lack of timely and comprehensive intelligence from federal partners constrained the ability to fully prepare for and shape conditions prior to execution.

The use of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) during the incident highlighted an additional gap in situational awareness capability. Although UAS assets were present, they were underutilized and did not provide sustained aerial visibility to support command-level decision making.

A related gap was identified in body-worn camera technology. SBPD personnel deployed Axon BWC systems with live-streaming capability, which allowed command staff at the Unified Command Post to monitor ground-level conditions in real time. This feed provided direct situational awareness that informed strategic decisions during the incident. VSP does not currently have live-streaming capability integrated into its BWC systems. As a result, command staff could not access real-time ground-level video from VSP personnel, relying instead on secondhand information to assess rapidly changing conditions. The contrast between SBPD's live-feed capability and VSP's current technology underscores a meaningful gap in command-level visibility during dynamic operations.

Expanded UAS utilization and integrated live-streaming capability across both aerial and ground-based platforms would provide a significantly broader operational picture, allowing command staff to better assess crowd dynamics, officer positioning, and emerging risks in real time. All use of these technologies will remain consistent with 20 V.S.A. § 4622 and continue to ensure deployment is limited to lawful public safety purposes.

Limited intelligence sharing and compressed pre-event coordination resulted in a reactive operational posture. Rapid crowd mobilization outpaced the ability to establish structured control measures, increasing risk and reducing opportunities for proactive de-escalation. It ensured the mobilization and deployment of protestors outpaced the investigative steps taken by federal law enforcement officers. This in combination with a singular course of action determined by ICE made a confrontational and challenging warrant execution probable.

C. Crowd Behavior & Dynamics

The crowd dynamics observed during this incident evolved rapidly from an initially lawful assembly into an increasingly resistant and, at times, assaultive group that directly interfered with law enforcement operations. While protest activity was anticipated, the scale, speed of mobilization, and level of coordinated resistance exceeded expectations and materially impacted conditions on the ground.

In the early phases, individuals gathered near the operation site, expressing opposition through verbal engagement, presence, and passive resistance. Following visible law enforcement activity and the continued presence of federal agents, the crowd grew in size, density, and intensity. This growth was accelerated by real-time information sharing and social media, drawing an estimated 200+ participants to the scene within seven hours.

As numbers increased, the behavior of numerous protestors shifted from passive presence to active interference. Individuals positioned themselves to obstruct law enforcement movement, including blocking vehicle access routes, surrounding vehicles, and occupying key ingress and egress points. These actions limited mobility and created immediate safety concerns for personnel operating within confined and unpredictable conditions.

Throughout the incident, officers reported escalating hostility directed toward personnel and equipment. These included:

Physical Obstruction: Individuals intentionally blocked law enforcement vehicles, preventing both forward and reverse movement and limiting the ability to reposition or disengage safely.

Vehicle Encirclement: Law enforcement vehicles, including CAT transport units, were surrounded by large numbers of individuals who struck, kicked, and applied force to doors, windows, and vehicle bodies.

Assaultive Behavior: Officers were subjected to pushing, grabbing, and attempts to breach vehicle interiors. Objects were thrown at vehicles and personnel, contributing to an increasingly hazardous situation.

Targeted Aggression: Certain individuals demonstrated deliberate and aggressive actions, including running toward law enforcement vehicles and engaging in direct physical attacks.

Field personnel described a clear shift once the warrant operation commenced; from managing a protest to operating in an environment where they were being actively targeted. Officers reported feeling outnumbered, constrained in their movement, and vulnerable due to the size, density and behavior of the crowd. As ICE executed their warrant, VSP was outnumbered approximately 5:1 by the protestors; conditions that reinforced the command decision to prioritize restraint and de-escalation.

This shift became most evident during extraction and disengagement efforts. As law enforcement attempted to exit the area, individuals relocated to close off escape routes, re-surrounding vehicles, and increasing levels of aggression. The ability to rapidly re-form and reposition contributed to repeated delays and prevented a controlled withdrawal.

The injury to the CAT Trooper illustrates the level of risk present during this phase. During an attempted disengagement, a subject ran at full speed toward a law enforcement vehicle and forcibly broke through a rear window, striking the trooper and causing injury from both impact and shattered glass. The incident unfolded within seconds, highlighting the volatility of the situation and the limited reaction time available to personnel.

While not all individuals engaged in assaultive behavior, the actions of a smaller subset influenced the overall posture of the group. Their actions created conditions that exposed personnel to sustained interference, elevated risk, and an inability to effectively control the scene.

The decision to limit enforcement actions and to not pursue large-scale arrests in real time, while operationally constraining, aligned with the broader objective of minimizing escalation in a densely populated and rapidly evolving situation.

Crowd behavior progressed from lawful protest to active interference and targeted assault, degrading mobility and increasing risk to personnel. As the event continued, additional

individuals arrived equipped with protective gear, including masks, goggles, helmets, and other items consistent with preparation for physical confrontation. This reflected a shift from a primarily passive demonstration to a more resistant and confrontational environment. The actions of a subset of aggressive individuals influenced the broader crowd dynamic, contributing to loss of control of the scene, officer injury, and difficult extraction efforts.

D. Field Operations (CAT / Field Force Troopers)

Operations during this incident were conducted in a compressed, rapidly evolving setting with limited pre-planning, restricted maneuver space, reduced personnel allocation, and escalating crowd interference. The VSP CAT, along with supporting personnel, was required to adapt quickly to conditions that deviated from standard crowd management practices and planned operational frameworks.

CAT resources were deployed in response to developing conditions rather than through a fully pre-staged plan. Upon arrival, CAT personnel were immediately integrated into efforts to enhance public safety during a federal warrant execution and manage the growing crowd presence. Their role centered on creating and maintaining temporary corridors and separation zones to facilitate the movement of personnel and subjects between the target location and transport vehicles.

This required CAT members to operate in close proximity to the crowd, often within confined spaces where physical separation was minimal or nonexistent. Personnel relied on coordinated movement, presence, and controlled positioning to create short-duration pathways for ingress and egress. These actions were conducted under continuous pressure, including physical resistance, obstruction, and direct interference.

Despite these constraints, CAT members made persistent efforts to verbally engage individuals in the crowd throughout the operation. Troopers directed repeated orders to move, used calm and direct verbal communication to request compliance, and attempted to identify and appeal to individuals positioned at the front of the crowd. At multiple points, CAT personnel made deliberate efforts to de-escalate confrontations by addressing specific individuals, directing others to step back, and communicating the limited and specific nature of law enforcement objectives. These efforts were sustained even as crowd behavior intensified. While the overall impact was limited, particularly as crowd density increased and the behavior of individuals grew more aggressive, the commitment to verbal engagement before physical action reflects the approach that characterized VSP's performance throughout this incident. Actions remained measured and focused on maintaining safety, consistent with direction to prioritize de-escalation while still accomplishing mission-critical tasks.

The conditions on scene limited the effectiveness of these tactics:

Restricted Space: The physical layout and crowd density prevented the establishment of durable control zones or sustained separation between law enforcement and the crowd.

Continuous Crowd Reconstitution: Temporary corridors created by CAT were rapidly filled, requiring repeated effort to re-establish movement paths.

Lack of Pre-Established Perimeters: The absence of defined outer and inner perimeters reduced the ability to manage flow and maintain operational boundaries.

Operational Compression: Movement and extraction tasks were conducted within a confined and contested space, increasing both physical strain and decision-making pressure. The positioning of federal vehicles further restricted movement and contributed to blocked egress routes, limiting CAT's maneuverability and options for disengagement.

During the execution phase, CAT supported the movement of federal agents and subjects to and from the target location. These efforts required repeated entry into the crowd and exposed personnel to sustained interference. While movement was achieved, it was not conducted under controlled conditions, and each successive movement increased complexity and risk.

As the incident transitioned into extraction and disengagement, CAT operations shifted to facilitating withdrawal and maintaining personnel safety. This included attempts to move vehicles through obstructed routes and reposition personnel under increasingly hostile conditions. These efforts were met with intensified resistance, including vehicle encirclement and assaultive behavior, further reducing tactical effectiveness.

These challenges were compounded by the lack of synchronized tactical coordination across agencies. While CAT operated with clear internal direction and cohesion, Vermont law enforcement was not aligned with ICE's operational objectives and actions. This required personnel to react to evolving conditions without the benefit of coordinated timing or movement across all involved agencies.

E. Use of Force & Command Decisions

Use of force during this incident was guided by a deliberate command decision to prioritize restraint, proportionality, and overall public safety within a highly volatile and densely populated setting. While personnel were subjected to sustained interference and, at times, assaultive behavior, force was intentionally limited to what was necessary to protect personnel and allow essential movement.

This posture was established early and reinforced throughout the incident. Command guidance emphasized avoiding escalation that could result in widespread confrontation, increased risk of injury, or loss of control within a rapidly growing crowd. As a result, enforcement actions (including arrests and higher levels of force) were intentionally constrained, despite conditions that might otherwise have supported a more assertive response.

Prior to execution, VSP command staff communicated directly with ICE SRT leadership and established that VSP personnel would not participate in the use of chemical agents (CS gas and/or OC/pepper spray) for crowd dispersal or movement. It was clearly articulated that if conditions arose where chemical agents were deemed necessary, VSP would disengage and reassess under a revised operational plan. Federal leadership acknowledged this position and indicated that chemical agents would be used only if required for life-safety circumstances, with the understanding that such a decision would require reassessment of the overall approach.

Personnel operated under these constraints while encountering repeated obstruction, vehicle interference, and direct assaults. The decision to limit force—including two denied requests from CAT to deploy OC—required officers to absorb a higher level of risk and operate within narrow tactical margins. This included maintaining position in close proximity to hostile individuals, delaying enforcement actions, and prioritizing disengagement over control during later phases of the incident.

These command decisions resulted in increased exposure to risk and reduced the ability to immediately address assaultive behavior. Limited staffing further compounded these challenges, restricting the ability to establish control, conduct arrests, and maintain effective crowd management under sustained pressure.

Documented uses of force were limited to incidents involving chemical agent deployment and specific actions beyond the necessary pushing, pulling, and restraining of individuals. This reflects a command-level determination to focus reporting and accountability on higher-level force applications, recognizing that the lower-level physical interactions mentioned above were frequent and inherent to the conditions but did not individually warrant formal documentation. In addition, and in accordance with normal practice, all VSP body-worn camera footage was reviewed by VSP lieutenants to ensure adherence to policy standards.

An example of justified force occurred during the assault on the CAT Trooper. After a subject forcibly breached the rear window of a CAT vehicle and caused injury, OC spray was deployed by another trooper to stop the immediate threat and allow for disengagement. This use of force was consistent with policy, proportionate to the threat, and necessary to protect personnel. A Use of Force report was completed in accordance with VSP policy.

Several factors influenced the decision to maintain a restrained posture:

Crowd Density and Proximity: Close physical proximity between officers and a large number of individuals increased the likelihood that escalation would result in uncontrolled spread of force, collateral injury, or panic. Panic conditions would present a significant risk to bystanders, including the potential for trampling, injury, and loss of control within a densely packed and unpredictable environment.

Operational Objectives: The primary objective was to maintain a buffer between federal agents and the crowd while federal agents executed a judicial warrant, not to conduct mass enforcement or suppression operations.

Risk of Escalation: A more aggressive posture, including mass arrests or expanded use of less-lethal tools, was assessed as likely to escalate conditions beyond manageable levels given available resources and constraints.

Interagency Considerations: The presence of multiple agencies with differing roles and authorities required additional caution to avoid compounding confusion or conflicting enforcement actions.

Maintaining restraint limited the ability to immediately address unlawful behavior but aligned with a broader risk mitigation strategy. Command staff continuously assessed conditions and determined that this approach provided the most viable path to eventual disengagement without further escalation.

This approach carried operational consequences, resulting in extended exposure to hostile behavior and limited the ability to immediately address unlawful conduct. The balance between restraint and control reflected a deliberate and necessary trade-off in managing a volatile and rapidly evolving situation.

F. Arrest Strategy & Limitations

Arrest strategy during this incident was deliberately limited due to operational constraints, safety considerations, and the objective of avoiding further escalation in an already volatile setting. While numerous instances of unlawful behavior occurred (including obstruction, interference, and assaultive conduct) the conditions on scene did not support a safe or effective arrest posture.

Arrests were not identified as a primary operational objective. The mission remained focused on maintaining a buffer between federal agents and the crowd and protecting public safety. As the situation developed, it became clear that attempting arrests under these conditions would introduce additional risk without improving operational outcomes.

Several factors influenced this approach:

Crowd Makeup: The number of individuals present exceeded available law enforcement resources. The crowd was tightly packed, mobile, and capable of quickly surrounding officers. Attempts to isolate individuals for arrest would have required officers to commit to fixed positions, increasing vulnerability and reducing mobility.

Lack of Control Zones: The absence of defined inner and outer perimeters eliminated the ability to safely process or remove arrested individuals in a controlled manner.

Resource Allocation: CAT was not deployed at full strength, limiting available personnel from the outset. Existing resources were committed to maintaining minimal movement and supporting extraction efforts. Diverting personnel to arrest teams would have further reduced the ability to maintain safety and operational continuity.

Escalation Risk: Arrest attempts in this setting were likely to trigger immediate resistance from surrounding individuals, potentially escalating into broader confrontation and increasing the likelihood of injury.

Limited Extraction Capability: Even if arrests were successful, there was no reliable method to safely transport individuals from the scene due to blocked routes and vehicle encirclement.

Based on these factors, command staff made a deliberate decision to deprioritize arrests and focus on maintaining mobility, protecting personnel, and facilitating disengagement. This required officers to tolerate ongoing unlawful behavior in order to prevent a broader loss of control.

This approach meant that enforcement opportunities were not acted upon in real time. This was a strategic decision based on conditions on the ground.

The absence of immediate arrests does not preclude accountability. VSP has identified multiple individuals whose conduct during this incident warrants criminal review. Actions captured on body-worn camera footage and other evidence are being assessed for prosecution. VSP will pursue charges in cases where evidence supports violations of Vermont laws.

Attempting to apply a traditional arrest-based enforcement model in an environment lacking basic control measures would have likely resulted in rapid deterioration of conditions and increased risk to both officers and the public.

G. Egress Breakdown Analysis

The extraction phase represented the most critical breakdown point of the incident. While earlier phases were conducted under increasing pressure, it was during disengagement that operational limitations, environmental factors, and interagency misalignment converged, resulting in degraded control, repeated delays, and increased risk to personnel and the public.

At the onset of extraction efforts, conditions on scene had already deteriorated. The crowd grew in size, occupied Dorset Street, and demonstrated a sustained willingness to physically interfere with law enforcement operations. As a result, the ability to conduct a controlled and coordinated withdrawal was severely limited.

Several factors contributed to the inability to achieve effective egress:

Lack of Pre-Planned Extraction Routes

No clearly defined or secured ingress and egress routes were established prior to execution. Personnel were required to rely on the same congested and contested pathways used during entry. Efforts were made to identify a route toward the interstate; however, these routes were compromised as the crowd expanded and repositioned.

Without protected corridors, extraction became reactive rather than controlled.

Loss of Mobility

Vehicles, including CAT transport units, were repeatedly blocked, surrounded, and immobilized. Individuals positioned themselves to prevent both forward and reverse movement, often encircling vehicles and applying force to doors, windows, and slashed tires.

Additionally, federal vehicles repositioned during the later stages of the operation without coordination, further restricting available space and contributing to blocked egress routes. This loss of mobility created multiple static positions where officers were exposed to sustained interference and unable to reposition safely.

Contested Operating Space

The absence of control zones and the density of the crowd created a confined and highly contested space. As disengagement efforts progressed, officers operated within increasingly narrow margins, with limited ability to create distance from surrounding individuals.

Under these conditions, even minor disruptions escalated into larger operational challenges.

Continuous Crowd Reconstitution

Attempts to create temporary movement corridors were consistently undermined by the crowd's ability to rapidly reoccupy space. Even when movement was achieved, those gains were short-lived as individuals filled in behind and around advancing personnel.

This resulted in repeated cycles of limited progress followed by renewed obstruction, extending time on scene and increasing exposure to risk.

Interagency Tactical Misalignment

Extraction efforts were further degraded by a lack of synchronized tactics across agencies.

While VSP, SBPD, and BPD prioritized controlled disengagement and officer safety, federal SRT actions were not consistently aligned with that approach.

During the final phases, federal personnel conducted independent vehicle recovery efforts and deployed less-lethal tools, including flashbang devices, pepperball munitions, and OC—in close proximity to both the crowd and VSP personnel. These actions introduced additional movement and disruption into an already congested space, diverted focus from coordinated withdrawal, and contributed to confusion among personnel on the ground.

Delayed Decision Thresholds

Once conditions deteriorated, opportunities to disengage earlier in a controlled manner were limited. As extraction began under these conditions, options narrowed. Additional personnel were not immediately available to reinforce the operation, and further deployment would have

required time without a clear ability to improve conditions. Proceeding without viable exit strategies significantly reduced flexibility during this phase.

Resulting Operational Impacts

These factors produced a prolonged and fragmented disengagement characterized by:

- Repeated delays in vehicle movement
- Extended exposure to hostile and assaultive behavior
- Increased physical risk to personnel operating in close proximity to the crowd
- Loss of coordinated movement across agencies
- Reduced situational awareness in rapidly changing conditions

The injury to the CAT Trooper occurred within this context and is directly tied to the breakdown in extraction capability. The inability to disengage rapidly and safely forced personnel to operate in close quarters with aggressive individuals, increasing the likelihood of injury.

Assessment

The challenges encountered during extraction were not the result of individual performance. They were driven by systemic factors, including insufficient pre-planning, lack of protected movement corridors, and misaligned interagency actions during a critical phase of the operation.

VSP personnel adapted to these conditions and ultimately achieved disengagement without further serious injury. However, the process was prolonged, resource-intensive, and exposed personnel to avoidable risk.

Extraction operations were degraded by the absence of pre-planned egress routes, loss of mobility due to crowd obstruction, and interagency misalignment. Federal actions introduced additional disruption during a critical phase, contributing to a fragmented and high-risk disengagement process that increased exposure to officer injury.

H. Interagency Coordination (ICE / Federal Partners)

This incident involved multiple law enforcement agencies operating under different authorities, priorities, and operational frameworks. Coordination among VSP, SBPD, BPD, and other state and local partners remained consistent and aligned. Coordination with ICE, however, presented challenges that directly impacted operational effectiveness.

VSP leadership made deliberate efforts to establish a coordinated Unified Command structure and maintain open communication with federal partners. Command staff engaged in ongoing dialogue with ICE representatives as described in more detail in the Chronological Narrative at 1330–1600 hrs.

Despite these efforts, ICE proceeded with their plan to obtain and execute the warrant and rejected Vermont law enforcement's recommendations to adjust or delay their plan. This created a disconnect between operational priorities. While VSP focused on managing risk, stabilizing conditions, and preventing escalation, ICE remained focused on executing the warrant within its established timeline. The result was parallel objectives rather than a fully integrated operational approach.

This lack of alignment produced several impacts:

Limited Collaborative Decision-Making: Key decisions, including execution timing and tactical approach, were made without full integration of state and local input.

Inability to Align Operational Tempo: Efforts to slow or manage the pace of the operation were not adopted, resulting in execution under increasingly unstable conditions.

Reduced Effectiveness of Unified Command: While a command structure was in place, it did not function as a fully collaborative decision-making body during critical phases.

Operational Friction in the Field: Differences in tactical priorities and communication contributed to confusion and reduced effectiveness of coordinated movement.

Increased Risk Exposure: Proceeding without full alignment elevated risk to both law enforcement personnel and the public, particularly during execution and extraction phases.

These challenges became most pronounced during the later stages of the incident. As law enforcement attempted to disengage, ICE SRT personnel conducted independent vehicle recovery actions that differed from the coordinated withdrawal approach being implemented by state and local agencies. These actions introduced additional movement and complexity into an already congested environment and disrupted coordinated disengagement efforts.

During this activity, VSP personnel operating nearby were directly impacted by less-lethal tools deployed by federal personnel. Two VSP members were struck by pepperball munitions and sprayed in the face with OC. They were also exposed to flashbang detonations within approximately 3–5 feet without hearing protection. These actions created immediate officer safety concerns, including temporary vision impairment and disorientation while operating within a dense and hostile crowd.

At the same time, a federal vehicle with disabled tires attempted to move through the crowd while less-lethal tools were actively being deployed by ICE. During this movement, two individuals were knocked to the ground directly in front of the vehicle. Observations indicated the operator was not aware of their position, and forward movement continued as one individual remained in contact with the front tire. A VSP commander intervened by signaling and striking the driver's side window to stop the vehicle, preventing potential serious injury.

These events occurred without coordinated communication or integration with state and local personnel and increased risk to both officers and members of the public.

Despite these challenges, VSP leadership made the deliberate decision to remain engaged. The basis for this decision is described in greater detail in the Chronological Narrative at 1330–1600 hrs.

VSP personnel continued to adapt to evolving conditions, maintaining coordination where possible and working to mitigate risk within the constraints of the broader operational environment. However, the lack of alignment with federal actions remained a persistent factor throughout the incident.

Multi-agency operations involving federal, state, and local partners inherently present coordination challenges. Effective operations require shared commitment to Unified Command principles, including collaborative decision-making, aligned objectives, and clear communication.

Interagency coordination with ICE was limited by differences in operational priorities and decision-making. These conditions introduced additional risk and reduced the effectiveness of coordinated operations.

These findings are consistent with national observations (Annex A), which identify early coordination, clear expectations, and integrated planning as critical to reducing operational risk in multi-agency environments

I. Communications

Effective communication during this incident was challenged by operational complexity, multi-agency involvement, and rapidly changing conditions. Core communication systems remained functional; however, the overall flow of information—both vertically (command to field) and horizontally (across agencies)—was inconsistent at times and contributed to reduced coordination during critical phases of the operation.

Multiple agencies operated simultaneously, each with their own communication structure and chain of command. While efforts were made to place all state and local law enforcement on the same radio channel, consistent adherence was not achieved across all personnel. Due to the reactive nature of the incident, a fully integrated communication plan was not established prior to execution. Command guidance and intent were delivered through conference calls from the command post to VSP, SBPD, and BPD leadership at staging locations.

Pre-deployment guidance provided to personnel was clear and deliberate. Troopers were advised that enforcement of state criminal offenses, including custodial arrests, was not being prioritized due to operational constraints, including the volatile environment and insufficient staffing to simultaneously conduct arrests and maintain effective crowd control.

Emphasis was placed on patience, professionalism, and maintaining discipline despite the expectation of close physical contact and interference. Personnel were directed to anticipate being touched, grabbed, or struck and to remain composed under those conditions. Clear direction was also provided that, once the federal warrant objective was complete and personnel were safely withdrawn, VSP units were to disengage. An EMS extraction point was established in advance at the South Burlington Fire Department, with coordinated medical support on site.

Several factors degraded communication effectiveness:

Channel Congestion: High radio traffic during peak periods made it difficult to transmit and receive critical information in a timely and effective manner.

Environmental Noise: Sustained crowd noise—including whistles at close range, air horns, yelling, and chanting—degraded officers' ability to hear and transmit radio communications. Even at maximum volume, portable radios were frequently ineffective, resulting in missed transmissions, delayed coordination, and reduced situational awareness.

Hearing Protection and Communication Limitations: Prolonged exposure to high-decibel noise impacted both verbal communication and radio clarity. The absence of hearing protection systems with integrated communication capability limited the ability of personnel (particularly CAT) to maintain clear communication within their teams while monitoring command channels.

General Hearing Protection Needs: Personnel operating in these conditions were exposed to sustained high-decibel noise without adequate mitigation. This contributed to fatigue, reduced clarity of communication, and potential long-term hearing impact.

Limited Interoperability: Not all agencies operated on shared or interoperable radio channels. While most state and local personnel were on Channel 2, there was no direct radio communication with ICE, requiring information to be relayed through intermediaries rather than communicated in real time.

Fragmented Information Flow: Updates regarding changing tactics, movement, and conditions were not always disseminated uniformly across all personnel. Each agency often communicated internally through its own chain of command, resulting in delays and inconsistencies.

Limited Real-Time Command Visibility: SBPD's deployment of Axon BWC systems with live-streaming capability provided Unified Command with direct visual access to ground conditions during critical phases of the incident. This capability allowed command staff to make more informed decisions in real time without relying solely on radio. VSP personnel were not equipped with equivalent live-streaming technology, limiting the command post's ability to independently assess field conditions as they evolved.

At the command level, communication between VSP, SBPD, and BPD occurred regularly. However, the absence of a single ground force commander at 337 Dorset Street limited the

ability to translate those discussions into coordinated action. Information was exchanged, but it did not consistently result in synchronized movement or unified execution.

At the field level, personnel were required to make decisions based on incomplete or rapidly evolving information. This was most evident during extraction efforts, where conditions changed quickly and real-time coordination was critical. In some cases, officers operated without full awareness of broader movement plans or actions being taken by other units or agencies.

Independent actions taken by ICE ERO SRT personnel further complicated communication. Decisions made outside coordinated command channels reduced the ability of other agencies to anticipate movements, adjust positioning, and maintain situational awareness.

Despite these challenges, VSP personnel adapted to maintain communication under pressure. Informal coordination, direct verbal communication, and situational awareness helped offset some limitations of formal systems. These methods, however, were not a substitute for a fully integrated communication structure.

National-level discussions identify consistent and transparent communication as a critical component of effective intergovernmental operations (see Annex A). In this incident, gaps in communication and fragmented coordination contributed to reduced situational awareness and operational inefficiencies.

J. Officer Safety

Officer safety was materially impacted throughout this incident due to environmental constraints, crowd behavior, and operational limitations. While no life-threatening injuries occurred, personnel were repeatedly exposed to elevated risk conditions beyond what would be expected in a controlled and coordinated operation.

From the early stages of the incident, officers were required to operate in close proximity to a growing and increasingly assertive crowd. As the situation evolved, this proximity became a persistent risk factor, limiting reaction time, restricting movement, and increasing vulnerability to both intentional and unintentional harm.

Personnel experienced sustained physical interference, including pushing, grabbing, and obstruction of movement. This escalated to direct assaults on officers and law enforcement vehicles. Officers were struck in the head and face on multiple occasions. One officer was pulled to the ground, surrounded, and at times isolated within the crowd without the ability to create distance or reposition safely. Post-incident accounts reflect a sustained sense of vulnerability, as personnel were often unable to take enforcement action despite conditions that would typically justify it.

Vehicle-based operations presented additional safety challenges. Law enforcement vehicles were repeatedly immobilized, surrounded, and physically damaged. Windows, doors, and vehicle exteriors were struck and damaged. In one instance, a subject forcibly breached a vehicle window, resulting in injury to a trooper. These conditions eliminated the protective advantage normally provided by vehicles and instead created confined spaces with limited avenues for escape.

CAT personnel utilized department-issued balaclava-style face coverings to mitigate biological exposure. During the incident, officers were subjected to spitting and physical contact, and protective equipment such as eyewear was removed by members of the crowd.

Traditional protective measures, such as N95 masks or face shields, are not operationally viable in these conditions due to:

- Risk of removal by subjects
- Breathing restriction during physical exertion
- Limited coverage and fogging

Biological exposure risks include COVID-19, influenza, norovirus, herpes, and hepatitis. Face coverings are used strictly as a health and safety measure, not for anonymity.

During the disengagement phase, a VSP command staff member became immobilized in her cruiser after being positioned behind federal vehicles during a recovery effort. While attempting to maintain accountability of personnel, the vehicle was rapidly surrounded. Individuals gathered on all sides, striking and rocking the cruiser and attempting to damage components including mirrors and windshield wipers.

Objects, including mud and water bottles, were thrown onto the vehicle, significantly reducing visibility. Multiple individuals repeatedly struck the driver's side window with enough force to cause visible flexing, creating a reasonable expectation of failure and potential injury. The vehicle remained immobilized until additional personnel intervened and cleared a path, allowing for departure.

In addition to physical threats, personnel reported a sustained sense of vulnerability due to being outnumbered, surrounded, and operating under constrained rules of engagement. Command-directed restraint, while appropriate, required officers to absorb a higher level of exposure and operate without the full range of enforcement options typically available in response to assaultive behavior.

Factors contributing to elevated officer safety risk included:

Lack of Physical Separation: The absence of barriers or control zones resulted in continuous close contact between officers and individuals in the crowd.

Restricted Mobility: Blocked routes and vehicle immobilization limited the ability to reposition or disengage.

Crowd Density and Behavior: The size, proximity, and escalating actions of the crowd increased both the frequency and severity of threats.

Operational Constraints: Limitations on use of force and arrest authority reduced immediate response options.

Interagency Misalignment: Uncoordinated actions during critical phases introduced additional unpredictability and risk.

The absence of more serious injury reflects the discipline and judgment of personnel. At the same time, the level of exposure highlights the importance of addressing the systemic factors that contributed to these conditions.

Officer safety was compromised due to sustained close-contact operations, restricted mobility, and escalating crowd behavior within a constrained setting. Personnel were required to operate under elevated risk while exercising restraint, resulting in increased exposure despite disciplined performance. National public safety discussions reinforce that officer safety and community safety are inseparable, and operations conducted without coordination increase the likelihood of conflict and harm. This dynamic was present during multiple phases of this incident.

PART V – LESSONS LEARNED

A. Key Strengths

Despite operational challenges and interagency friction, several strengths were demonstrated by VSP personnel and partner agencies. These directly contributed to preventing escalation, maintaining professionalism under pressure, and avoiding more serious injury or loss of control.

1. Discipline and Restraint Under Pressure

Vermont State Police troopers were assigned to maintain a buffer between an increasingly hostile crowd and federal agents engaged in the execution of a judicial warrant. This assignment required troopers to operate in a dynamic and volatile environment characterized by a large, densely assembled crowd, elevated noise levels, rapidly shifting conditions, and instances of assaultive and non-compliant behavior directed toward law enforcement personnel.

Troopers were exposed to sustained verbal provocation, close physical proximity to crowd members, and intermittent acts of aggression. These conditions required continuous situational assessment and rapid decision-making with limited opportunity for disengagement.

Throughout the incident, troopers maintained adherence to established command directives and Department policy. Observed actions reflected controlled and deliberate responses to evolving conditions, with no significant deviations from authorized tactics. Troopers utilized restraint in the application of force, limited their actions to those reasonably necessary to maintain the assigned buffer, and avoided unnecessary escalation despite ongoing external pressure.

The overall conduct of personnel was consistent with expectations for disciplined crowd management. Troopers' ability to maintain composure, follow directives, and apply measured responses under sustained stress contributed to the stabilization of the scene and reduced the likelihood of escalation into a broader confrontation.

2. Adaptability in a Dynamic Setting

Conditions changed rapidly, with limited pre-planning and continuous disruption. Personnel—particularly CAT members—adapted in real time to shifting conditions, including crowd movement, blocked routes, and evolving tactical demands.

The ability to adjust tactics and maintain team-level coordination under these conditions directly contributed to successful disengagement.

3. Commitment to Public and Officer Safety

As noted in the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) guidance (Annex A), officer safety and community safety are inseparable, and operations conducted without coordination increase the risk of conflict and harm.

Command decisions throughout this incident prioritized safety over enforcement. While this limited immediate control of the situation, it reduced the likelihood of widespread injury and maintained focus on protecting both law enforcement personnel and the public.

This approach was reflected in decisions to limit use of force, avoid mass arrests, and prioritize disengagement as conditions deteriorated.

4. Strong Internal Coordination (State and Local)

Coordination between VSP, SBPD, BPD, and other state and local partners remained consistent throughout the incident. Communication, intent, and operational posture reflected a shared understanding of priorities and risk.

This alignment provided stability within a broader multi-agency environment and supported more effective adaptation to changing conditions.

5. Leadership Presence and Decision-Making Under Stress

Command staff remained actively engaged, continuously assessing conditions and making deliberate decisions under pressure. These included maintaining restraint, remaining engaged to mitigate risk, and ultimately prioritizing disengagement.

The ability to make and sustain these decisions in a complex and evolving situation was a critical strength of the operation.

B. Primary Areas for Improvement

The incident exposed several systemic and structural deficiencies that impacted operational effectiveness, coordination, and officer safety.

1. Breakdown of Unified Command in Practice

Although Unified Command was established, it did not function as a fully integrated decision-making structure. Federal partners operated independently and did not adopt of state and local recommendations, resulting in parallel operations rather than a coordinated strategy. This reduced effectiveness and introduced avoidable risk.

2. Insufficient Pre-Event Intelligence and Coordination

Limited intelligence sharing and delayed coordination from federal partners hindered pre-event planning. Rapid crowd mobilization outpaced the ability to establish control measures, contributing directly to challenges during execution and extraction.

3. Lack of Pre-Planned Control Zones and Egress Routes

The absence of clearly defined perimeters, control zones, and protected egress routes was a critical gap. This directly impacted the ability to manage movement and contributed to repeated failures in establishing safe and efficient extraction paths.

4. Misalignment of Operational Objectives with Federal Partners

State and local agencies prioritized safety, de-escalation, and controlled operations, while federal partners maintained a fixed operational timeline. This misalignment drove key decisions that increased instability and risk to personnel.

5. Ineffective Communication Integration Across Agencies

Communication systems functioned, but there was no fully integrated interagency communication plan. This resulted in fragmented information flow, reduced situational awareness, and inconsistent understanding of operational intent.

6. Limited Operational Flexibility Once Conditions Degraded

Once the operation proceeded under suboptimal conditions, there were limited mechanisms to pause, reset, or disengage in a controlled manner. This reduced the ability to adapt strategically and prolonged exposure to risk.

7. Exposure of Personnel to Elevated Risk Without Adequate Mitigation Measures

Personnel operated in close-contact conditions with limited ability to create space or maneuver. While restraint in use of force was appropriate, it was not paired with sufficient protective measures or tactical options to reduce exposure.

8. Officer Identification and Public Perception Challenges

There was significant confusion among members of the public regarding the identification of law enforcement personnel. VSP CAT members wearing olive drab Class D uniforms with subdued markings were not readily distinguishable from federal personnel or other agencies.

This contributed to:

- Misattribution of actions, including use of force, to VSP
- Perception that officers were concealing their identity

The use of face coverings, including gas masks and balaclavas, was also perceived by some as an effort to obscure identity. In practice, these measures were used for legitimate officer safety reasons, including protection against bodily fluids and airborne irritants.

However, the absence of highly visible identifiers and name markings created a perception gap that impacted public understanding and trust.

9. Insufficient CAT Staffing During Initial Deployment

CAT activation was limited to a partial team deployment based on conditions at the time of the request from SBPD. This activation did not include the Public Order Unit which is part of the CAT. This CAT Public Order Unit was established within the previous six weeks prior to this incident and was still in the initial training pipeline. This reduced staffing affected the ability to establish perimeters, maintain control, and execute coordinated crowd management tactics.

This directly contributed to limitations in managing crowd movement, sustaining control measures, and reducing operational fatigue during prolonged engagement.

PART VI – RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are based on identified operational gaps and are intended to strengthen future planning, coordination, and execution of large-scale, multi-agency incidents involving civil unrest and federal partnerships.

1. Establish Clear Unified Command Protocols with Federal Partners

Develop and formalize expectations for Unified Command participation when working with federal agencies. This should include:

- Clearly defined decision-making authority and expectations for shared operational planning
- Pre-established protocols for conflict resolution when agencies disagree on operational approach
- A requirement that all participating agencies operate within the agreed-upon command structure once established

When Unified Command cannot be effectively maintained, leadership should evaluate all available options to ensure safety and operational integrity, to include consideration of adjusting or withdrawing involvement if conditions warrant. The absence of federal cooperation and coordination for safety planning does not eliminate VSP's obligation to protect public safety.

2. Require Pre-Operational Briefings for All Multi-Agency Events

Implement a standard requirement that any planned enforcement action with anticipated public presence includes a documented operational briefing involving all participating agencies. This should address:

- Roles and responsibilities

- Operational objectives and constraints
- Use of force posture
- Arrest strategies
- Contingency planning, including abort criteria

3. Develop Standardized Crowd Control and Civil Disturbance Response Plans

Enhance crowd management protocols to include:

- Pre-identified control zones, buffer zones, and protected perimeters
- Designated ingress and egress routes
- Scalable response options based on crowd size and behavior
- Early deployment triggers for specialized units (CAT, TSU, UAS)

In practice, this means that when an enforcement action with anticipated public response is imminent, VSP should seek early deployment to establish physical control zones before the bulk of the crowd assembles. Arriving after a crowd is already established eliminates the ability to shape the operational environment and forces reactive rather than proactive crowd management. Pre-deployment should be triggered by crowd indicators, not by the moment of warrant execution.

4. Strengthen Interagency Communication Integration

Develop a unified communications plan that includes:

- Designated interoperable radio channels
- Assignment of communication liaisons
- Real-time information sharing protocols

5. Establish Defined Extraction and Disengagement Protocols

Create standardized procedures for extraction under deteriorating conditions, including:

- Pre-planned routes
- Criteria for abandoning vehicles or equipment
- Coordinated disengagement triggers

6. Implement Risk-Based Decision Thresholds

Develop decision thresholds requiring command reassessment when conditions deviate from plan, including:

- Crowd size exceeding expectations
- Loss of control of movement corridors
- Sustained assaults on personnel
- Breakdown in Unified Command

7. Enhance Officer Safety Measures in Crowd Environments

Review and update equipment, training, and tactics to better protect personnel, including:

- Protective equipment enhancements
- Less-lethal tool accessibility
- Training focused on movement and team protection
- Potential use of targeted arrest teams to remove assaultive or dangerous persons from the operational area.

8. Formalize Federal Partner Coordination Expectations

Establish expectations regarding:

- Advance notification and intelligence sharing
- Alignment of timelines with state/local readiness
- Agreement on tactics prioritizing safety

9. Expand Training for Large-Scale Civil Unrest

Increase training focused on:

- Multi-agency coordination
- Crowd dynamics
- Escalation/de-escalation strategies
- Scenario-based exercises

10. Enhance Officer Identification Standards

Implement high-visibility identification measures including:

- "STATE TROOPER" placards
- Name and/or radio unit identifiers
- Helmet markings

These measures will reduce misidentification and improve transparency.

11. Formalize Policy on Protective Face Coverings

Develop policy and communication clarifying:

- Face coverings are used for officer safety (biological exposure, irritants)
- Gas masks degrade performance (vision, communication, endurance)
- These practices are widely accepted in crowd management
- Identity is preserved through visible identifiers

12. Formal AAR Implementation Process

Track implementation of recommendations through:

- Assigned responsibility
- Timelines
- Periodic review

13. Expand UAS Deployment and Real-Time Command Visibility

Increase the use of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) to enhance situational awareness during large-scale operations. Future deployments should include a minimum of two UAS assets when CAT resources are activated to ensure continuous coverage and redundancy.

UAS platforms should provide live-feed capability to the Command Post and field supervisors, allowing for real-time assessment of crowd dynamics, officer positioning, and emerging risks. This improves command decision-making and operational coordination.

All UAS use will continue to comply with 20 V.S.A. § 4622 and be limited to lawful public safety purposes without collecting or retaining data on individuals engaged in protected First Amendment activity.

14. Evaluate BWC Live-Streaming Capability

VSP should evaluate the integration of live-streaming functionality within its body-worn camera systems. VSP BWC's lacked real-time ground-level visibility that directly informed command decisions. A technology assessment should identify available options compatible with VSP's existing BWC infrastructure, evaluate cost and operational feasibility. Live-streaming capability should be considered for individual BWC systems, with the objective of providing Command Post personnel with integrated real-time visual access during large-scale or high-risk operations.

15. Implement Centralized Personnel Transportation for Large-Scale Operations

Utilize contracted transportation resources to support personnel movement during large-scale incidents. This approach will:

- Reduce the number of cruisers in operational areas
- Limit opportunities for vehicles to be blocked or targeted
- Improve coordinated ingress and egress of personnel
- Reduce congestion and enhance overall mobility
- Reducing the vehicle footprint directly improves maneuverability and lowers exposure to risk during both deployment and disengagement phases.

16. Full Activation of CAT for Civil Disturbance Operations

Activate the full CAT roster during civil disturbance incidents to ensure adequate staffing and operational capability. A full-strength deployment will:

- Enable establishment and maintenance of effective perimeters
- Support coordinated crowd management formations
- Improve arrest capability when conditions allow
- Reduce fatigue during extended operations

This approach aligns with national best practices and ensures sufficient resources are available to establish early control and prevent escalation.

PART VII – CONCLUSION

The events of March 11, 2026, in South Burlington presented a complex and rapidly evolving operational environment involving a federal enforcement action, large-scale public protest, and a multi-agency response under compressed timelines and elevated risk.

Troopers operated in a volatile environment marked by sustained interference, direct assaults, and restricted mobility, while maintaining adherence to policy and prioritizing the safety of both law enforcement personnel and the public.

This incident also identified critical gaps in interagency coordination. While a Unified Command structure was established, it did not function as a fully integrated decision-making body across all participating agencies. Key operational decisions were made independently of state and local coordination, contributing to increased risk, operational friction, and reduced effectiveness during critical phases of the event.

The challenges identified in this report are not attributable to individual performance. Rather, they reflect systemic issues related to coordination, planning, communication, and operational alignment in a multi-jurisdictional environment.

Moving forward, VSP will prioritize early coordination, clearly defined operational expectations, and decisive resource deployment in similar incidents. Establishing control early, maintaining unified operational alignment, and ensuring clear communication across all agencies are essential to reducing risk and improving outcomes.

Command intent is to respond to future incidents with sufficient resources to rapidly establish and maintain control of the operational environment, prevent assaults on law enforcement, and bring events to a safe and controlled resolution.

This incident reinforces a fundamental principle: effective multi-agency operations require more than co-location—they require full integration of planning, communication, and execution. Ensuring that standard moving forward is critical to officer safety, public safety, and operational success.

ANNEX A – Public Safety Leadership Convening (2026) Shared Principles of Intergovernmental Coordination

Shared Principles of Agreement – Public Safety Leadership Convening

Introduction

On March 4, 2026, leaders from federal, state, and local law enforcement; national law enforcement labor organizations; prosecutors’ offices; and state and local governments convened for a facilitated, solutions-focused discussion about the future of intergovernmental public safety cooperation.

Participants recognized that immigration enforcement is a legitimate federal responsibility and an important component of the nation’s public-safety framework. At the same time, they noted that the manner in which enforcement activities are conducted, particularly with respect to deconfliction, operational tactics, communication with partners, and awareness of community

impacts, can affect officer safety, public trust, and the effectiveness of joint operations.

The purpose of the convening was not to question federal authority or oppose enforcement activities. Rather, participants sought to identify practical and principled ways to improve cooperation in a rapidly evolving environment; ensure constitutional, predictable, and safe operations across all levels of government; and reduce avoidable operational conflict. Although participants represented a wide range of jurisdictions, missions, and perspectives, the discussion revealed substantial common ground. Participants expressed a shared commitment to strengthening relationships, clarifying expectations, and working together to enhance community safety.

A central theme emerging from the discussion was the importance of renewing and reinforcing working relationships and expectations among federal, state, and local partners. Participants observed that communication and coordination have faced challenges in recent years and that several recent high-profile immigration operations have highlighted opportunities to improve how agencies coordinate and support one another.

The principles outlined below reflect areas of broad agreement identified during the convening and are intended to serve as a constructive foundation for continued dialogue, collaboration, and shared problem-solving.



Foundational Principle: Refocus Relationships and Expectations

Participants agreed that it is vital that all enforcement tactics align with constitutional policing and community trust. They further agreed that strengthening and maintaining intergovernmental cooperation requires a renewed focus on relationships and shared expectations across policing, public safety, and criminal justice sectors. This should also include engaging in conversations with elected officials, community partners, and the public. This is not a one-time adjustment but an ongoing commitment to restore reliable operational communication; clarify and respect roles, authorities, and limitations; and ensure that enforcement tactics align with constitutional policing and community trust.

This refocusing acknowledges that while some partnerships remain strong, others require immediate attention to rebuild the predictability, mutual understanding, and confidence necessary for effective joint operations.

PRINCIPLE 1: COMMUNICATION, COORDINATION, AND COLLABORATION

Consistent, transparent communication is the single most important factor in restoring effective intergovernmental cooperation. In order to achieve this desired flow of communication, all parties must understand and agree that communication must flow in both directions equally. Participants described the current environment as one in which the absence of early notification, clear expectations, and consistent federal engagement has led to operational confusion, strained relationships, and unnecessary risk. Local agencies frequently learn about federal operations in their community only after they begin or when they are asked to provide protection or logistical support with limited briefing.

In many jurisdictions, particularly small and rural ones, local agencies lack personnel dedicated to federal liaison roles and the staffing capacity to absorb sudden federal operations,

leaving them unprepared to answer media inquiries or community questions. Early notification and predictable operational planning are therefore essential to avoid overwhelming already-thin staffing models.

Additionally, sudden or unexplained enforcement actions can erode community trust, discouraging victims and witnesses from reporting crimes or accessing services, which could contribute to violent offenders remaining at large. The group agreed that there is an urgent need to reframe communication practices, including routine planning, deconfliction, and shared operational understanding.

Federal, state, and local partners are interdependent; each brings tools, expertise, authorities, and perspectives that are unique to their specific roles. When these components operate in silos, confusion and duplication follow. While recognizing that not all situations allow for advance notice or coordination in exigent circumstances, when transparent and frequent communication occurs on the ground, prior to and throughout critical incidents, collaboration strengthens, outcomes improve, and officers and communities are safer.

PRINCIPLE 2: OFFICER AND COMMUNITY SAFETY

Officer safety and community safety are inseparable. When operations occur without coordination or deconfliction, there is a risk of inadvertent and potentially dangerous conflict between law enforcement officials from differing agencies, especially in complex, multi-agency environments. Federal and local agencies bring different training backgrounds, particularly in areas such as de-escalation, crowd management, and community engagement. Without aligned expectations and shared protocols, inconsistent tactics can escalate tensions and create an unsafe environment for both officers and residents. Policies that broadly prohibit interagency

communication or collaboration across levels of government further undermine these efforts, sacrificing both community and officer safety by preventing the very coordination required to avoid harm. Participants also stressed that officers must always be able to respond when fellow officers are in danger and that no governing body should impose restrictions that prevent agencies from providing immediate assistance in those critical moments. Officers also face heightened stress when public backlash to controversial actions by federal or local agencies falls on those men and women working on the street. Community trust is a protective factor. When people feel safe engaging with the police, officers gain allies, reporting improves, and crime becomes easier to prevent and solve. Sustaining this trust requires joint planning, accountable and constitutional tactics, and a shared commitment to safeguarding human dignity.

PRINCIPLE 3: TARGETING THOSE WHO COMMIT VIOLENT AND OTHER SERIOUS OFFENSES

All organizations were strongly aligned around the need to focus enforcement efforts on violent criminals, repeat offenders, and identifiable threats to public safety. While immigration enforcement is a legitimate federal responsibility, broad statistic-driven operations are counterproductive and divert resources, undermine trust, and can result in the apprehension of individuals who pose no threat to public safety. Agencies should concentrate on detaining individuals who unlawfully re-entered the country after being previously removed, individuals who have committed serious crimes, and people presenting clear threats to national security and public safety. Participants agreed that coordinating enforcement through jails can reduce the need for street-level operations that increase risk to officers, community members, and bystanders. Integrated intelligence, case coordination, and appropriate charging processes help ensure serious

offenders face consistent consequences. Participants also underscored that district attorneys and prosecutors play a critical role in this process and that law enforcement cannot be the only entity working to address violent crime; consistent charging decisions and follow-through by prosecutors are essential to ensuring that violent and other serious offenders face meaningful consequences. Centering enforcement on violent criminals, rather than collateral populations, offers a path to safer communities, more efficient resource use, and improved legitimacy across all levels of government.

PRINCIPLE 4: TONING DOWN THE RHETORIC

Harmful and overly political rhetoric has become a destabilizing force that fuels mistrust, heightens polarization, and complicates collaboration. Responsible, measured communication is a core public safety function. When rhetoric mischaracterizes officers or inflames fears within immigrant communities, cooperation declines and misinformation spreads; officers also face increased hostility and emotional strain. Conversely, rhetoric that dismisses concerns about unethical tactics

or community impact erodes legitimacy and reinforces perceptions that policing lacks transparency and accountability. Associations, community leaders, and all government partners should model factual, apolitical communication that centers constitutional principles, community well-being, and a shared responsibility for creating public safety. Coordinated, accurate messaging helps correct misinformation, reduce community anxiety, and create space for pragmatic solutions.

Shared Principles of Agreement

Participants expressed strong alignment around the following practices:

- Recognizing the public safety benefit, value, and legitimacy of properly coordinated federal immigration enforcement operations.
- Refocusing operational relationships and expectations, where needed.
- Preventing the risk of inadvertent and potentially dangerous conflict between law enforcement officials from differing agencies and enhancing community safety through clear incident leadership and interoperable communications.
- Prioritizing the apprehension of violent and other serious offenders and national security threats while minimizing collateral impacts.
- Treating community trust and human rights as operational requirements.
- Committing to cross-training, supervision, and transparent processes for investigating allegations of misconduct and/or law enforcement-involved critical incidents.
- Communicating consistently to reduce polarization and confusion.
- Promoting responsible, fact-based communication grounded in accurate, verified information to support officer and public safety, strengthen credibility, counter misinformation, and build trust between law enforcement and the communities they serve.